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Abstract
This thesis examines how the norm of nonintervention has interacted with the norm of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to construct a new normative architecture of international
order. Nonintervention has long served as a deeply embedded norm in the international
normative architecture. However, conflicting interpretations of how to respond in cases
of egregious intra-state human rights abuses have fuelled contestation surrounding the
potential for international protection measures including the projection of force. Drawing
from international relations theory, I embrace a social constructivist approach with
insights from the English School to explore the nature of normative structures and their
role in undergirding international society. While foreign policy decisions reflect a
spectrum of normative and non-normative considerations, norms serve as resources that
guide and shape the behaviour of actors. Outlining the emergence of R2P and its
invocation through empirical cases of mass atrocities in Sri Lanka (2009), Libya (2011),
and Syria (2011-2015), this thesis traces the contestation of nonintervention through
cases of intra-state humanitarian crises. I conclude that nonintervention has recurrently
challenged R2P as a means of securing international order and the rights of independent
political communities, with its persistent salience serving as a barrier to intervention and
more expansive interpretations of R2P.
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One core research question drives this thesis: how has the norm of nonintervention
interacted with the norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to construct a new
normative architecture of international order? Over the past several decades, the
international projection of force has been recurrently justified in terms of human rights
protection. Marking an apparent shift in the undergirding structure of the international
system, such actions have sparked debates surrounding their legal, ethical, and political
foundations. While argued as heralding an erosion of a traditional conception of
sovereignty and paradigm shift in international law towards human rather than state
security, mass atrocity crimes and egregious human rights abuses have waged with
inconsistent protection measures from the international community. Tracing the
contestation of nonintervention outlines its normative influence in informing the
decisions of state actors and highlights its persistent salience in cases of intra-state
humanitarian crises. This thesis critically analyses the recent cases of Sri Lanka’s final
stages of civil war against the Tamil Tigers, NATO’s intervention in Libya, and Syria’s
2civil war in which recognized imminent or ongoing mass atrocity crimes have been met
with invocation of R2P and a variation of international responses. Where R2P should be
operationalized, the norm of nonintervention has continued to persist and shape the
trajectory of R2P – impacting both its substance and implementation.
Theorizing Normativity in International Relations
From a pragmatic self-interested lens to state motivation based on economic self-help or
material structural advantages, states would only risk lives and resources in response to
threats to their own security or perceived material gains. Morality and ideational concerns
linked to universal human rights and the egregious suffering of populations in other areas
of the globe would be of little consequential concern. But then, why do historic periods
emerge of patterned variations in international behavior? The study of norms provides
insight into how state behavior changes, based on normative considerations that create,
sustain, and shape conceptions of interests. While material power plays an important role
surrounding the projection of force, actors exist within a socially constructed reality in
which both material and ideational factors inform interests, calculations and decisions.
Concerning the normative context of international relations, we must address the
theoretical assumptions surrounding international law and the undergirding normative
structures that inform actors within international society. Realists argue that an anarchic
structural reality defines the international system. Actors with given identities and
interests compete for resources through the principle of self-help tied to economic utility
maximization with international normative structures having nominal influence. While
international laws and norms of conduct may exist, they serve as instrumental means to
3justify behavior of the most powerful states1. Rather than viewing norms as powerless
variables, my analysis emphasizes the enabling and constraining influence of norms from
a social constructivist approach with insights from the English School.
Social constructivists emphasize norm’s central role as not only regulative in providing
privileges or constraints, but also as constitutive in that they can be internalized and
reciprocally reconstitute the interests and identities of states. Adopting Jeffrey Legro’s
definition within international relations, norms exist as collective understandings of the
proper behavior of actors2. As the invisible structures of international relations, norms are
independent to actors, but are created and shaped under the weight of global practices,
serving as reference points that give meaning to action and shape interests through
providing understandings of rights and constraints3. Through norms, agents derive
meanings and gain a contextual understanding of interests and the identities from which
they make reasoned decisions. Furthermore, because norms embody a quality of
‘oughtness’, they “prompt justification for action and leave an extensive trail of
communication among actors that we can study”4. What makes these normative
structures relevant relates to the nature of normativity and their strategic impact on the
foreign policy decisions and interactions among states. As norms emerge or change, they
re/construct interests, shaping the perceptions and behaviors of international actors –
which may elucidate change in international relations and the projection of military force.
1 See: Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1999), pp. 51-52.
2 Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Which norms matter? Revisiting the “failure” of internationalism’, International
Organization 51(1) (1997), 33.
3 Antje Wiener, ‘Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world politics’,
European journal of international relations 10(2) (2004), 189.
4 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’,
International organization 52(4) (1998), 892.
4The English School as an approach highlights that a normative order exists through a
level of shared beliefs, values, and culture manifested in an international society in which
actors do follow some rules and customs opposed to purely self-interested behavior with
norms and institutions having a regulative impact on the foreign policies of states5. As
Hedley Bull outlines, “These rules may have the status of international law, moral rules,
of custom or established practice, or they may be merely operational rules or ‘rules of the
game’, worked out without formal agreement or even without verbal community”6. While
a lack of common government does distinguish the international order from the domestic,
the international system cannot be considered truly anarchic, with normative structures
conditioning state interests7. However, as tied to beliefs and values, the normative
architecture of international order shifts historically in character and content through
perception of how to ensure international order. As Timothy Dunne asserts, “The
sovereign state is the constitutive community of international society, one whose
obedience to the norms of the society of states both reaffirms the identity of the sovereign
state and reconstitutes the structure of the international society”8. How norms then
function is through the contextualization of actions, interests, and identities within
international relations – informing actors through providing intersubjective meanings and
normative boundaries of legitimate conduct. “Their causal power, such that it is, lies in
the effect norms have on actors reasoning and subsequent actions. Norms influence actors
by shaping their perceptions and the argumentative logic that defines a particular issue or
debate”9. States intervene within an international legal and normative context, with
foreign policy choices reflecting a spectrum of both normative and non-normative
5 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colombia
University Press, 1977), p. 65.
6 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 64.
7 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (eds.) (Middlesex: Penguin Books,
1978), p. 105.
8 Timothy Dunne, ‘The Social Construction of International Society’, European Journal of International
Relations 1(3) (1995), 379.
9 Adriana Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law: A Critical Approach (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 22.
5considerations. Norms then serve as a resource for international actors, shaping “the goals
that states are likely to pursue and the means that are deemed legitimate and effective for
obtaining them, including the political costs and benefits associated with different
choices”10. International norms provide a baseline or standard of conduct and
intersubjective meaning from which actions derive perceptions and consequences that are
both material and ideational and cannot be separated from social and historical context11.
Much of the theoretical discussion surrounding normative order within international
relations has addressed how norms develop and emerge. Specifically, this body of work
has emphasized the promotion and projection of ideas by NGOs, individuals, or
institutional actors towards acceptance of behavior as normative practice. While the
successful emergence and implementation of norms has been discussed and illustrated
through a number of theoretical models, informing ‘positive’ behavioral changes,
relatively little research has addressed the interaction of norms in relation to each other as
well as the promotion and application of norms that proscribe behavior as standards of
conduct. These ‘negative’ norms that prohibit particular behavior may also inform policy
decisions in which inaction reflects more than material or pragmatic considerations
devoid of normative meaning but may be seen as actions in themselves. From this
perspective, prohibitive or proscriptive norms are also of great relevance within
international relations – a research focus that this thesis seeks to develop through the
contestation of nonintervention.
International Order and Nonintervention
10 Nicola P. Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, Intervention and Norm Contestation: China’s Stance on Darfur in
the UN Security Council’, Security Dialogue 41(3) (2010), 325.
11 Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘Conflicting Rules: Global Constitutionalism and the Kosovo Intervention’, Journal
of Intervention and Statebuilding 3(2) (1999), 188; Anthony C. Arend, Legal rules and international
society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6As a contentious practice throughout history, intervention has been widely addressed
within international relations and international law. Defined as coercive interference in
the domestic affairs of foreign powers, intervention has been interpreted broadly to
encompass economic and diplomatic coercion that is authoritative in its impact12.
However, I take a narrow approach to what has been emphasized as forcible military
intervention, as the cross-border projection of force. Authoritatively coercive by nature,
intervention vitiates sovereignty and has been disputed throughout history, shaping
particular norms of conduct, or recognized standards of how international actors should
or should not act at the international level13. These norms and international legal rules
have concentrated around the UN Charter since its emergence in 1945. As the central
vestige of international authority surrounding the use of force, Article 2(4) clearly
outlines that all states must ‘refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state’. Furthermore, Article 2(7) removes the
right of the UN, let alone other actors or states, from intervening in ‘matters essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. Within this international legal order, the
only permissible projection of coercive force are through government consent, under
Article 51 outlining state’s ‘inherent right of individual or collective self defense’, or
through measures mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII in response
to appraised threats to international peace and security.
Grounded in conceptions of sovereign equality and self-determination, nonintervention
was tied to human rights through the UN Charter and process of decolonization –
‘established as a sacrosanct and unconditional principle of international law’14. It is
12 Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, ‘Introduction’ in Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams (eds.),
Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 2006), p. 1.
13 Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘Humanitarian intervention’, in Patrick Hayden (ed.), The Ashgate Research
Companion to Ethics and International Relations (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p. 133.
14 Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2014), p. 56.
7important to recognize that this international legal order was established to proscribe
forms of international armed conflict15. Cases of domestic insurrection, civil war, or other
disturbances were defined as firmly within the domestic sphere, with the pertinent state
authority free to use force whenever it was seen fit. The projection of force to protect
populations even subjected to egregious human rights abuses and mass killings was
proscribed by international society. Throughout the Cold War, this international norm
was applied to an extent that made sovereignty a seeming ‘license to kill’ with
institutionalized indifference leaving the UN and member states bystanders to egregious
human rights abuses16. Those cases of unilateral intervention including India in Pakistan
in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978-79 and Tanzania in Uganda in 1978-79, which
could have been justified in terms of human rights protections largely reinforced
international aversion to intervention, with rare cases of UN recognition of human
suffering as justification of limited non-military sanction in Rhodesia and South Africa
predominantly reflecting security and territorial concerns17. Through normative and
positive legal development, nonintervention came to underwrite and in many ways define
the modern international order18.
The Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect
Following the Cold War, the normative context of humanitarian intervention shifted
under the weight of liberal human rights norms. What Justin Morris highlights as a
‘rebalancing of sovereign rights against international recognized standards of human
15 Christine D. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.
31.
16 Gareth Evans, ‘Ending mass atrocity crimes: a hopeless dream?’, speech given to the University of
Cambridge, 10 May 2013, http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech513.html.
17 Justin Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum’, International Affairs
89(5) (2013), 1268.
18 R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.
20; Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
8protection’19. A unipolar moment of Western power and democracy promotion heralded a
wave of commissioned reports and UN activism surrounding universal human rights
protection. This paralleled increasingly expansive peacekeeping and peacemaking
initiatives through the UN and regional organizations20. Early 1990s humanitarian
interventions in Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia proved particularly controversial,
while failures to protect in Srebrenica and Rwanda led to new statements of ‘never again’
echoing back to the Holocaust21. The 1999 NATO intervention in response to ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo re-exposed the contentious debate surrounding international rules on
the use of force. Launching an air war and bombing from 15,000 feet without UNSC
approval, NATO’s intervention looked more like traditional warfare than humanitarian
aid work22.
With initial sponsorship from the Canadian government, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was created in 2000 - meant to assist then-UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan and other international actors find common objectives and
a better means to approach sovereign responsibility and humanitarian intervention in a
changing international environment. Releasing their report ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in
December 2001, promotion on the part of individuals, states, and international institutions
yielded wide-ranging advocacy. As Thomas Weiss outlines, “With the possible exception
of the 1948 Convention on Genocide, no idea has moved faster in the international
normative area than the ‘responsibility to protect’”23. Drawing directly from – and
emerging to shift – the international normative context surrounding human rights
19 Morris, ‘Libya and Syria’, 1268.
20 Virginia P. Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents Choices After War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008).
21 Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide (New York: Rowan and
Littlefield Publishers, 2007).
22 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘“The Lady Doth Protest Too Much” Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
International Law’, The Modern Law Review 65(2) (2002), 166.
23 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007) p. 1.
9protection the ICISS sought to provide greater clarity surrounding rules and criteria for
when and under what authority humanitarian intervention could be more legitimately
carried out. Among its precepts, the R2P report outlined that sovereign states hold a
fundamental responsibility to protect their populations. However,
Where the population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or states failure and the state in question is unwilling or
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect24.
Innovative in its ability to shape international discourse surrounding human rights
protection, the norm has been invoked widely by individual states, NGOs, and
international institutions. Shifting the debate from external right to internal responsibility
placed emphasis on individual member states – the requirement of sovereigns to provide
security to internal populations – an argument long addressed within political theory25.
However, as Jennifer Welsh asserts, “the position that the international community might
have not only a right but also a responsibility to protect individuals inside the jurisdiction
of a particular state is more novel and controversial”26. As a positive obligation, this
responsibility affirms a particular duty or culpability on the part of international actors
and institutions in cases of failure to address cases of mass atrocity crimes within member
states. It also works to shape the basis of sovereign authority as contingent – a legitimacy
appraisal subject to institutions that are external to the state. The contribution of R2P as
Liu Tiewa asserts, is that it “upgrades the concept of preventing mass violations of
24 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect.
(Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), p. xi.
25 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”: Catalysing Debate and Building
Capacity’ in Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard (eds.), Implementation and World Politics: How
International Norms Change Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 124.
26 Ibid.
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human rights to an ‘international responsibility’, indicating that the international
community of states has a responsibility if not an obligation to intervene in states with
serious human rights abuses”27. Grounding the authority of states in the capacity to
protect its population – R2P does not assert new legal rules or institutional developments,
but rather can be seen to confer public power and allocate jurisdiction28. If a population is
subjected to egregious cruelty on large-scales due to regime unwillingness or inability to
protect, the responsibility shifts to the international community.
Within fifteen years of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty’s report on the Responsibility to Protect, there has been a progression of
effort to promote and implement the concept. The concept has been embedded in Kofi
Annan’s 2004 report ‘In Larger Freedom’, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document,
and UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon’s report ‘Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect’ (2009) which led to further consideration in annual UNGA debates illustrating
widespread support29. Institutionally, the UN Secretary General appointed a new Special
Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect in 2008 – tasked alongside the Special Advisor
on the Prevention of Genocide under a joint office to develop a strategy to better
implement the norm30. This has led to the creation of a convening mechanism to bring the
UN Under Secretaries General together during crisis situations and a UN-wide contact
group on R2P31. Outside the UN, the Responsibility to Protect has come to dominate
modern political discourse surrounding mass atrocities and humanitarian intervention. As
27 Liu Tiewa, ‘Is China like the other permanent members? Governmental and academic debates on R2P’ in
Monica Serrano and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), The International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the
R2P Cause? (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 148-170.
28 Anne Orford, ‘From Promise to Practice? The Legal Significance of the Responsibility to Protect
Concept’, Global Responsibility to Protect 3(4) (2011), 400-424.
29 UN Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General’,
UNGAOR, 63rd Sess., UN Doc. A/63/677, 12 January 2009.
30 Welsh, ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”’, p. 124.
31 Edward C. Luck, ‘From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ in Jared Genser
and Irwin Cotler (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Time
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 85-108.
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Aiden Hehir and Anthony Lang outline, fielding a ‘mini-industry’ of NGOs and think
tanks, “R2P is today unarguably the pre-eminent academic framework for discussing
humanitarian intervention”32. In 2008, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
was created in New York with partnership institutions across the globe along with the
establishment of an academic journal, Global Responsibility to Protect echoing an
expanding body of R2P scholarship33. The norm has been unanimously endorsed by the
UN General Assembly as well as UN Security Council – by mid-2015, included in
roughly 30 UNSC resolutions including those on Sudan, Central African Republic,
Somalia, Mail, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Syria, and Yemen34.
However, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Syria among other lower level structural atrocities have
yielded inconsistent responses with assertions of the international community recurrently
failing in its responsibility to protect domestic populations. The seemingly unheralded
UNSC mandated humanitarian interventions in Libya and then Cote d’Ivoire in 2011
were framed by many as successes for the R2P doctrine with UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon echoing by fall of 2011 that ‘now it should be clear that the Responsibility to
Protect has arrived’, and Thomas Weiss emphasizing that R2P was ‘alive and well after
Libya’35. However, as further crises emerged and evolved, there has been emphasis on
the seeming inconsistency of R2P’s implementation even within the Arab Spring with
Bahrain’s popular democratic uprising repressed with foreign military assistance and
32 Aiden Hehir and Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the
International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect’, Criminal Law Forum 26(1) (2015), 157.
33 Donald Steinberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Coming of Age?’, Global Responsibility to Protect 1(4)
(2009), 433; Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), p. 13.
34 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P’, last
modified 28 May 2015, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335.
35 UN Secretary-General, ‘Remarks at Breakfast Roundtable with Foreign Ministers on “The Responsibility
to Protect: Responding to Imminent Threats of Mass Atrocities”’, UN News Centre 23 September 2011,
accessed 4 August 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1325;
Thomas G. Weiss, ‘RtoP alive and well after Libya’, Ethics & International Affairs 25(03) (2011), 287-
292.
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Syria’s increasing civilian body counts in the hundreds of thousands36. A number of
scholars have outlined the erosion of R2P as a norm37, while Mohammed Nuruzzaman
echoed, “If R2P had come of age in Libya, it has certainly seen a tragic death with the
Security Council’s inability to initiate actions on Syria”38. From many of these
researchers, it is the pragmatic or economic motivations of states rather than normative
conceptions that drive state behavior39. As Robert W. Murray asserts, “R2P is inherently
a doctrine of intervention, despite what some of its cleverest advocates say about
prevention or normative development”40. The utility of R2P is tied to timely and decisive
responses to end ongoing human rights atrocities, with R2P framed as an institution in
crisis41.
In relation to R2P, Edward Luck outlines that the UNSC is constrained by two critical
elements, first, ‘there are problems without solutions, or at least without any feasible or
cost-effective answers in a reasonable time frame’ and second, that the Council ‘is not
above the vagaries of international politics’42. Taking a more critical stance, Aiden Hehir
contends a twin problem relating to ‘the lack of will and the absence of sufficient military
resources’ is indicative of systemic failure at the international level43. Without changing
the ‘locus of authority or the decision-making process’, R2P’s track record for acting as a
36 Aidan Hehir, ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to
Protect’, International Security 38(1) (2013), 137-159.
37 See: Jon Western and Joshua Goldstein, ‘R2P after Syria: To save the doctrine, forget regime change’,
Foreign Affairs 26 March 2013, accessed 5 August 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/
2013-03-26/r2p-after-syria; Elliott Abrams, ‘R2P R.I.P.’ The Council on Foreign Relations 8 March 2012,
accessed 14 June 2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2012/03/08/r2p-r-i-p/.
38 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria’,
Insight Turkey 15(2) (2013), 58.
39 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception,
Syria as the Norm’, UNSW Law Journal, 36(2) (2013), 617.
40 Robert W. Murray, ‘Conclusion: The Responsibility to Protect After Libya’ in Aidan Hehir and Robert
Murray (eds.), Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 228.
41 Kirsten Ainley, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: counteracting the
crisis’, International Affairs 91(1) (2015), 37-54.
42 Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 7-8.
43 Aidan Hehir, Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 221.
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‘moral lever’ has been questionable and likely to be heavily impacted by the rise of
Russia, China, and other BRICS (i.e. Brazil, India, and South Africa) implicitly asserting
a pluralist conception of strong state considerations for material self-interests rather than
normative considerations44. Stephen Hopgood argues, Western middle classes have at
times exerted a limited influence on the political decisions of European and North
American powers underwriting R2P. However, “Whether to use R2P or the ICC will be
decided on the ground not of justice but expediency”45. Asserting that the material
considerations are the primary driver of state behavior, R2P to many skeptics serves as a
limited means to shape behavior, failing to bring substantive change to suffering
populations. Andrew Garwood-Gowers echoes this assertion: “there is little evidence, so
far at least, that the emergence of R2P has substantially altered state decision-making on
whether, and if so, how to intervene”46. Meaning that while R2P might have some distant
or nominal normative value, without meaningful institutional change to separate
humanitarian aims from the political will of the P5, or development of an independent
military force, R2P’s enforcement ‘remains a matter of political will which is by
definition transitory and context specific’47. However, as Luke Glanville counters,
through recent humanitarian crises, “states were surely moved to intervene, or not to
block intervention, in large part because of the power of ideas and norms of human
protection related to R2P, and it is odd that so many scholars have been unwilling to
acknowledge this”48. While R2P has been transformational in shaping international
debate, it exists alongside a complex number of normative and non-normative
considerations impacting contextual cases.
44 Robert W. Murray and Aidan Hehir, ‘Intervention in the emerging multipolar system: why R2P will miss
the unipolar moment’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6(4) (2012), 387-406.
45 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 167.
46 Garwood-Gowers, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring’, 617.
47 Hehir and Lang, ‘The Impact of the Security Council’, 162.
48 Luke Glanville ‘Syria Teaches Us Little About Questions of Military Intervention’, in Robert W. Murray
and Alasdair McKay (eds.), In the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria, and Humanitarianism in Crisis (Bristol, UK:
E-International Relations, 2014), p. 49.
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This thesis provides an alternative hypothesis as to why international actors have failed to
meet an international responsibility. The reason, I argue, is in part the result of the
continued salience of nonintervention. As a recognized standard of international
behavior, the norm of nonintervention proscribes the projection of armed force devoid of
regime consent. With a humanitarian basis, nonintervention as a rule was meant to limit
the potential for international armed conflict and provide a foundation for political self-
determination in which political communities may determine their own internal systems
free from external interference. How this norm has continued to inform the decision of
state actors in cases of ongoing mass atrocity crimes provides further insight into R2P’s
argued advancement. Aligned with a critical constructivist approach, my argument traces
the behavior and justifications of states through three recent cases of imminent or
ongoing mass atrocity crimes. The emergence of R2P served in part as a response to the
normative salience of nonintervention as norm entrepreneurs sought greater acceptance of
international protection measures. As Gareth Evans asserts, “the whole point of
embracing the new language of ‘the responsibility to protect’ is that it is capable of
generating an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscious-shocking cases in a
way that ‘right to intervene’ language could not”49. However, while R2P has shaped the
norm of nonintervention, it has been reciprocally shaped in character and content which
can be traced from the R2P report’s emergence in 2001, through to the 2005 World
Summit Outcome Document as well as the principled assertions of states during concrete
cases of humanitarian crisis in which the meaning of R2P has been applied by actors.
What this dynamic illustrates is that while R2P has been transformational in its impact on
international discourse and human rights protections, it has been reciprocally shaped by
49 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution, 2009), p. 65.
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nonintervention, which as a norm continues to persistent with a level of continued
contextual salience – impacting the implementation of R2P.
Answering this research question provides an exploration of the acceptability of
particular forms of behavior at the international level which strategically empower of
constrain actors – serving as a guide for military strategists and foreign policy decision-
makers. When new norms emerge or existing norms change, they shape the ‘zones of
permissibility’ surrounding different types of behavior50. Illegitimate actions are seen to
derive negative material and ideational consequences, serving as manifestations of
prevailing interpretations of international beliefs and values. Reciprocally, what is
considered normatively acceptable may strategically empower states. How the normative
architecture has been shaped by the introduction of R2P sheds light on the shifts in the
acceptance of particular forms of behavior and character within international order –
clarifying the legitimacy of particular forms of military force projection at the
international level. If R2P has gained level of salience relative to nonintervention or
shaped the interpreted boundaries of nonintervention and constraints placed on states
within the international normative order, it may serve in limiting the costs or enable the
projection of force for humanitarian purposes under particular conditions. The
implications of this thesis for foreign policy decision-makers and military strategists then
is through providing a framework for context to address cases of mass atrocity crimes at
the international level. Through specific cases of mass atrocity crimes in which R2P has
been invoked, the contestation of nonintervention within the wider normative architecture
provides insight into how and why it has persisted, while also outlining the boundaries of
R2P as a conflicting norm. This work may also help guide future constructivist research
through outlining the evolution of R2P or other norm relative to a wider normative
50 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘How do Norms Matter?’ in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Laws in
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (7th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp. 43-51.
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context – broadening the scope and addressing more than a singular norm, but as
different norms are contested within concrete cases or policy areas. Ultimately, insights
into the evolution of sovereignty and constraints placed on state behavior at the
international level taken over recurrent cases. How normative structures interact within a
broader normative architecture then illuminates how they evolve and are shaped in
relation to each other as well as the wider international context.
This research question also has implications for the utility of force at the international
level. As social actions, the use of force does not exist as an end in itself, but aimed at
some political purpose. For military action to have maximum utility is then predicated on
legitimacy or the ability of force to achieve appropriate aims, linking the efficacy of force
to the normative dimension of international relations51. Meaning that if nonintervention
has continued to persistent, how it has been contested through state behavior and
justifications may shed light on why the norm has retained a high level of legitimacy.
This research question then illustrates how the ethical values or beliefs that underwrite
the norm of nonintervention have continued to serve as a salient block – how military
force should be projected and with particular caution in regard to not only the
international legitimacy of such behavior which has implications for the associated costs,
but also the utility of such action in actually achieving political goals. Intervention exists
as such a fundamental breach of the principles of political sovereignty and territorial
integrity, that to consider humanitarian intervention under R2P a growing ‘norm’ within
the normative architecture could be construed as a potentially dangerous provocation of
global instability through its consequences both within targeted state constructs and on
broader international order. This may provide insights to military planners and state
foreign policy decision-makers surrounding what behaviors should be avoided or treated
51 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 16.
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with particular caution for their detrimental costs as well as impact – outlining why
nonintervention has been promoted as a means of securing international order and
conceptions of justice.
As a norm, R2P has been successfully projected into global politics, implemented by the
UN through a number of cases, and invoked by powers globally surrounding large-scale
or imminent human rights atrocities. However, how do we know when R2P has gained
greater acceptance as an established or influential norm? As Antje Wiener highlights, “it
could be argued that norm ‘erosion’ rather than the ‘power’ of norms will eventually
carry the day”52. The contestation of nonintervention serves as an important lens in
addressing potential norm erosion, or contextual resurgence, as well as persistent salience
providing an inertial force against an emerging norm. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink outline, “new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a
highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and
perceptions of interests”53. Norms do not exist as binary concepts, but vary in their
influence on a spectrum, which changes historically and contextually. As Ian Hurd
echoes, “The contestation over, and ambiguity of, norms is an important aspect of world
politics that is often overlooked in IR, even amongst constructivists… [norms do] not
cease to exist as soon as one actor ‘changes its mind’ about the meaning”54. Addressing
the contestation of the conflictive norm of nonintervention in specific cases then serves as
an important lens to outline the continued salience of nonintervention, but also the
normative boundaries of R2P. While often under-addressed, a historical approach to
humanitarian intervention illustrates its long-spread practice in protecting foreign
populations from conceptions of egregious abuse or tyranny. While how to respond when
52 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 176.
53 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 897.
54 Ian Hurd, ‘The strategic use of liberal internationalism: Libya and the UN sanctions, 1992–2003’,
International Organization 59(3) (2005), 501.
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foreign populations have been subjected to egregious abuses and mass killing has been a
consistent subject throughout history, the normative context has changed55.
A Chapter Overview
Chapter 1 situates the theoretical and methodological framework for my argument
surrounding the importance of norms and their contestation in world politics. Illustrating
the impact of norms within international relations and interchange with international law,
this chapter highlights the theoretical assumptions surrounding the English School and
social constructivism as well as their suitability for addressing the contestation of
nonintervention. Outlining Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore’s life cycle of norms
serves as a starting point to address the emergence and evolution of norms56. States,
individuals, and other global actors introduce principled ideas into domestic or world
politics that may or may not gain legitimacy as prevailing standards of appropriate
behavior. A linear approach to norms emphasizes their structural power or structuring
impact on the policy decisions of states57. In contrast, this thesis embraces a critical
approach to the development of norms, and their impact through their ‘meaning-in-use’
and ongoing contestation drawing from Antje Wiener’s theory of contestation58.
Emphasizing the importance of social discourses including both behavior and
justifications at the international level within specific policy areas in which norms are
applied and invoked provides insight into the various normative and non-normative
factors that inform the decisions of state actors and shape interest appraisals. Tracing the
55 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 1.
56 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 887-917.
57 See: Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics 50(2)
(1998), 328.
58 Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations’,
Review of International Studies 35(1) (2009), 175-193; Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation. (London:
Springer, 2014).
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contextual meanings and articulated salience of specific norms individually and over
cases provides a framework to address how norms evolve in relation to each other, the
erosion of existing standards of behavior, and their continued, diminishing, or even
resurging salience within wider normative context. As Theresa Reinold outlines,
constructivists have largely neglected to better explain how some norms are more
powerful than others, with variations in how they erode or strengthen59. While the
advancement and institutionalization of R2P has been highlighted by a growing number
of scholars, relatively little attention has been given to nonintervention as a legitimate
standard of conduct and action - tracing the promotion of nonintervention as a principled
policy decision through recent humanitarian crises and contestation surrounding mass
human rights atrocities in which the emergence of R2P has challenged the legitimacy of
nonintervention. This chapter concludes with an in-depth discussion of methodology,
case study selection, and analysis that will be developed through this thesis. Instead of
addressing the evolution of an emerging norm, this thesis addresses contestation through
cases of intervention and non-intervention the continued relevance of an internalized and
‘settled’ norm of nonintervention within a broader normative order through several
cases60. In addressing contestation, I draw from multiple sources for evidence including
institutionalized rules of multilateral organization, bilateral agreements, relevant
scholarship, and the legitimating practices of states through social practices defined as
discourses61. These elements provide the backdrop for addressing how norms such as
R2P and nonintervention inform the decisions of state actors, as well as how R2P has
shaped the modern international normative order in the face of nonintervention which
59 Theresa Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect (New York: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 10.
60 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 105.
61 See: Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.
International organization, 52(04), 887-917. 900; Wiener, A. (2009). ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use:
Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations’. Review of International Studies, 35(01), 175-
193, 176-177.
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may be elucidated through contestation as a lens to illustrate how the norms have
interacted and constructed a distinctly modern normative architecture.
Chapter 2 outlines the norm of nonintervention as an undergirding principle of the
modern international order and its contestation in relation to the emergence of R2P. From
a historic perspective, the norm of nonintervention has evolved into a deeply embedded
norm of international order through values and customs linked to conceptions of political
autonomy, sovereign equality, and self-determination. Far from static, it has evolved in
character and content throughout history, shaping the nature of sovereignty and
normative architecture of international order through the development of positive
international law and advent of the UN Charter system. Throughout the Cold War,
nonintervention gained a near absolute articulation in regard to the impermissibility of
force in the sovereign domain in relation to external conceptions of responsibility to
ensure intra-state human rights protection. Addressing the ethical defense of
nonintervention, sovereign rights of states are safeguarded by this norm - that actors will
respect the sovereign equality of states, their right to self-determination, and not violate
their communal rights through the projection of military force62. However, in recent cases
of egregious violations of human rights or cases of mass atrocities, a contested shift in the
salience of norms relating to international authority and human rights protection have
caste nonintervention as increasingly contingent, with the norm of R2P articulating a
responsibility for the international community to address intra-state mass atrocity crimes.
Outlining the R2P’s progression from the ICISS’s 2001 report through the 2005 World
Summit highlights shifts in the norm’s meaning and ultimately recognition through
unanimous institutional endorsement within the UNSC and UNGA. While this would
seem to construct a new normative architecture of international order that shapes the
62 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic
Books, 1977), pp. 86-91.
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interests of states, intervention for the protection of human rights or justified through R2P
have been sparse and inconsistent. Where R2P arguably should be implemented with
international protection measures in response to large-scale mass atrocity crimes, cases
have either not been addressed, or openly contested and yielded mixed responses. It is
hard to determine nonintervention’s and R2P’s true impact ‘behind the scenes’ - how
specific norms functionally shape the decisions of diplomats63. However, formal
inclusion in various international reports and institutional documents and invocation in
diplomatic and academic circles all illustrate R2P’s considerable cachet as an agenda or
doctrine to address mass atrocities. Tracing these invocations, this thesis outlines that the
norm of nonintervention has retained a high level of normative salience, which has
reciprocally shaped the meaning and implementation of R2P.
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 serve as empirical case studies of Sri Lanka, Libya, and Syria.
Addressing a range of mixed international responses, I trace international behavior and
justifications surrounding imminent or ongoing mass atrocity crimes in which R2P has
been invoked by NGOs, international institutions, and member states, while the target
state’s government rejects international intervention for humanitarian purposes. The cases
highlight how decision to intervene or non-intervene may reflect a wide number of
complex factors reflecting both military capability and political resolve, which are shaped
by normative considerations that can be traced through state behavior and justifications.
Addressing the normative structure of the international system, these empirical cases
enable an in-depth approach to the number of complex factors specific to particular cases.
Pitting competing conceptions of values and how to secure human dignity between
nonintervention and international civilian protection, each case traces the normative
contestation of nonintervention.
63 Luke Charters-Reid, ‘Responsibility to Protect at Ten’, Global Politics: An International Affairs
Magazine 27 Jan 2015 accessed 15 February 2015, http://globalpolitics.co.uk/wp/2015/01/27/responsibili
ty-to-protect-at-ten/.
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The first case in Chapter 3 addresses the final stages of Sri Lanka’s three decade long
civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in early
2009. Waging a final and decisive victory, unrestricted warfare led to the death of an
estimated 40-70,000 civilians64. Almost entirely un-answered by the international
community, R2P was invoked by various member states throughout the final months,
with nonintervention firmly upheld and the case never formally addressed by the UNSC,
UN Human Rights Council, and widely supported by member states celebrating the
government’s victory against a well-known terrorist organization. In sharp contrast,
Chapter 4 addresses the international response in Libya concentrating from February to
October 2011 – the beginning of popular protests to end of NATO’s mandate for military
action. Directly invoking R2P, the UNSC passed consecutive resolutions - ultimately
imposing a no-fly zone, arms embargo, and mandate to take ‘all necessary measures’ to
protect civilians on the ground65. Latent in its development to Libya as a distinct
revolution within the wider Arab Spring, the Chapter 5 case study of Syria slowly
devolved into crisis with the Assad regime clinging to power through the use of
widespread and indiscriminant weaponry including alleged chemical weapons. With a
kaleidoscope of domestic revolutionary and Islamic jihadists, the Syrian regime has
bombed civilian’s positions and leveled many of its own cities with the death toll now
over an estimated 200-250,00066. Focusing from the beginning of popular uprising
through mid-2015, the Syrian case study highlights the continued contestation of
nonintervention in the face of continued human rights atrocities and invocation of R2P –
64 Norah Niland, Inhumanity and Humanitarian Action: Protection Failures in Sri Lanka (Medford:
Feinstein International Center,Tufts University, 2014), p. 1.
65 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973’, UNSC, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf.
66 Somini Sengupta, ‘U.N. Finds Its Voice on Syria’s “Transition”’, The New York Times 17 August 2015,
accessed 18 August 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/world/middleeast/un-finds-its-voice-on-
syrias-transition.html?ref=world&_r=0.
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a case which various scholars and global leaders have called a blatant failure of the
doctrine.
The conclusion returns to my theoretical foundations and the role nonintervention has
continued to play in international relations, informing the decisions of international actors
through periods of imminent or ongoing mass atrocities. Adopting a theoretical
framework aligned with contestation, it is possible to elucidate contextual meanings and
address transformation and change – how norms shape the interests of international actors
and evolve through social and historical context. Through this framework, it is possible to
address the wide spectrum of normative and non-normative factors at play within specific
cases - a lens to help elucidate the salience of specific norms and how they inform the
decisions of state actors or are even used pragmatically to justify a broader range of
subjectively appraised interests. This lens also highlights how the interpreted meaning
and salience of specific norms change and influence further cases - providing perspective
to address patterned shifts in state behaviors and changes in the normative architecture of
international order. Through each of these cases, the invocation and relative salience
through implementation emphasize the persistent role of nonintervention in the
international normative order and the way in which R2P has challenged existing
conceptions of international responsibility and authority of international actors to protect
foreign populations from egregious abuse. While R2P has been transformation and
embedded itself in the normative architecture of the international system, nonintervention
has in many ways persisted, shaping its emergence and the responses of the international
community to cases of large-scale human rights atrocities.
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Chapter 1: The Importance of Norms
Having introduced the central research question, this chapter shifts to address the
theoretical and methodological foundations that will be developed through the remainder
of this thesis. First, this chapter outlines the definition of norms, interchange with
international law and relevance within international relations. Second, this chapter
outlines the theoretical assumptions surrounding the English School and Social
Constructivism highlighting the importance of both material and ideational factors in
shaping the interests of states. Third, aligned with a critical approach to social
constructivism, this chapter addresses the emergence and evolution of norms through the
‘life-cycle’ of norms and contestation1. Norms are contested through ‘social practices
defined as discourses’, which create, shape, and maintain norms, their implementation,
and elucidates their relative and contextual ‘meaning-in-use’2. This chapter ultimately
1 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’,
International organization 52(4) (1998), 896; Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation. (London: Springer,
2014), p. 3.
2 Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations’,
Review of International Studies 35(1) (2009), 176-177.
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moves to develop a methodological framework surrounding the contestation of
nonintervention through the emergence of R2P traced through a number of recent cases.
Definition and the Normativity of Norms
Through historic interactions, international political communities have created layers of
norms which function in providing context to particular actors and actions. Norms as live
‘meanings-in-use’ serve as intersubjective standards of appropriate behavior, providing
context and understanding to actors within a socially constructed reality in which both
material and ideational factors inform decisions3. How norms function or provide
normativity at the international level is their intersubjective nature through what actors
should do - clarifying or mapping out what is appropriate, or normatively accepted4.
What is considered appropriate in context is as Karin Fierke outlines, “a function of
legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social
structures”5. These normative structures then link the material and ideational to
conceptions of interests that actors pursue, serving as the intersubjective ‘rules’ by which
the international foreign policy ‘game’ is played6.
Until relatively recently, the preeminence of realism and neoliberal institutionalism as
theoretical approaches to international relations, limited the study of normative
3 Antje Wiener, ‘Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world politics’,
European journal of international relations 10(2) (2004), 189-234, 192; Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction’
in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5.
4 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995), p. 14.
5 Karin M. Fierke, ‘Constructivism’ in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), International
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (3rd Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 190.
6 Adriana Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law: A Critical Approach (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 27.
26
structures7. Within these neo-paradigms, norms are “positioned as the intervening
variable or ‘intermediate variable’ mediating between interest and political outcomes
with little or no independent explanatory power”8. Foreign policy decisions are
determined by material self-interest, structural incentives, and economic utility
maximization with the international political system ‘formed and maintained on the
principle of self-help’9. The interests and relative power of states determine outcomes,
framing rules and institutions as nominal elements of an anarchical structural reality.
These approaches to state interests and material-rational motivations cast international
rules as creations of the most powerful states, a means of manipulating the behavior of
others and disingenuously justifying their own actions10. As Stephen Krasner outlines,
“when they exist in the international system, they are instrumental, not deeply
embedded”11. Institutions and norms may then serve to make interactions more efficient,
but have negligible impact on the underlying interests or identities of states.
However, not all IR scholarship has embraced these neo/realist assumptions surrounding
a structural anarchy – highlighting more normative approaches and interchange with
international law. Louis Henkin’s work was in large part a response to dispel the
‘unrealistic’ assertions of ‘cynical realists’ as well as the dialogue de sourds between
7 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics’,
International organization 46(2) (1992), 391.
8 Annika Björkdahl, ‘Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections’,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15(1) (2002), 11; See: Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes
and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International organization 36(2) (1982),
185-205.
9 See: Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 91; Robert
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
Norton, 2001) among others.
10 Lee J.M. Seymour, ‘Let’s bullshit! Arguing, bargaining and dissembling over Darfur’, European Journal
of International Relations 20(3) (2014), 571-595.
11 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.
51-52.
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lawyers and diplomats12. Separated by distinct fields and vocabularies, an ideational
divide has long existed between international lawyers and political scientists.
“Disciplinary vanity, the lack of a common vocabulary, and the unwillingness of each
side to immerse itself in the academic culture of the other (due, among others, to the
decade-long dominance of the realist paradigm in IR) have hindered intellectual
rapprochement”13. The study of normative structures opens the pathway for interchange
that has largely been under-developed14. As Başak Çalı highlights, international legal 
scholars are largely concerned with regulation of international affairs, while international
relations focuses more on understanding and explaining. Yet, “Each discipline needs to
inform the other in order to be successful. This shows us that international law and
international relations can ask the same questions for different reasons”15.
Contrary to ideas of an anarchic world, states generally do follow international rules -
conducting their behavior in terms of agreed upon norms of conduct16. “Although the
strongest states are in a position to substitute brute power for legitimacy, what is
surprising is how rare this happens. Even the great powers seek approval from their peers
and domestic publics”17. Ian Hurd outlines three general factors for why states or other
entities obey rules: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. “An actor might obey a rule:
(1) because the actor fears the punishment of the rule enforcers, (2) because the actors
sees the rule as in its own self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is
12 Louis Henkin, How Nation’s Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Colombia University Press,
1979), p. 47.
13 Theresa Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect (New York: Routledge Press, 2013), p. 10.
14 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.
139.
15 Başak Çalı, ‘International law for international relations: Foundations for Interdisciplinary Study’ in 
Başak Çalı (ed.), International Law for International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.
11.
16 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.)
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (New South Wales, Australia:
Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 96-97.
17 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 32.
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legitimate and ought to be obeyed”18. Coercion exists as the fear of retribution,
punishment, or general loss, while self-interest relates to material gain in wealth, status,
or functional ability within a system. As a third element, legitimacy relates to the
appraisal of rules “as proper or appropriate by the actors whom they are addressed within
a socially constructed system of values and beliefs”19. Within a structural anarchy, the
‘stick and carrot’ of coercion and self-interest exist as the principle motivational factors –
with the material interests and relative power of states determining outcomes20.
However, instrumental cost-benefit analysis fails to recognize the moral, value, or belief-
based appraisals of actors as linked to their particular histories or identities. As Christian
Reus-Smit highlights, “Power is constituted in profound ways by non-material factors as
well, including beliefs, norms, and rules, and by the institutional structures and
communicative processes that embed and mobilize them”21. Joseph Nye’s Soft Power
furthers this conception that influencing the behavior of others involves much more than
hard material factors alone22. Credibility – attraction and persuasion based on values and
beliefs – rather than material power, may in fact be the ‘scarcest resource’ in modern
world affairs23. States do not abandon a level of Realpolitik self-interest in the presence
of international norms – but it is the alignment of power with normative principles
reflecting values, morals, and consensus of a community that condition interests and
shape legitimacy appraisals.
18 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization 53(2) (1999),
379.
19 Ramesh Thakur, ‘Law, Legitimacy, and the United Nations’ in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and
Vesselin Popovski, (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) p. 47.
20 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National identity in contemporary Europe’, International
Studies Quarterly 43(1) (1999), 85.
21 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’, International Politics 44 (2007), 162.
22 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p.
5.
23 Joseph S. Nye, ‘China’s Soft Power Deficit: To catch up, its politics must unleash the many talents of its
civil society’, The Wall Street Journal 8 May 2012, accessed 18 March 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842.
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Norms exist externally to agents, but are generated by agents as structural elements of
international society. Through an intersubjective ‘backdrop of norms’ agents derive
meanings and gain a contextual understanding of interests and the identities from which
they make reasoned decisions24. International norms can be identified in part through
regularity or patterns of behavior, acknowledgment between actors, or more formal
recognition in international law – ranging based on their character across a spectrum from
informal unspecific to formal and ‘institutionalized’ through inclusion in written positive
law which more fully developed with the process of liberal institutionalism beginning in
the nineteenth century25. Because norms also embody a quality of ‘oughtness’, states
explain and justify their conduct in terms of existing structures26. Inclusion in formal
conventions and institutions may serve to increase clarity or understanding, and ‘identify
meaning that is normative practice’, however, “documented language about norms
indicates no more than the formal validity of the norm, while its social recognition stands
to be constructed by social interaction”27. In other words, both understandings and the
consequences of action are not derived from an ‘objective reality’ but are ‘inherently
constructed and sustained by social practice’28.
What makes these normative interactions relevant relates to the nature of normativity and
its strategic impact on the foreign policy decisions and interactions among states. Serving
as guidance devices, norms shape the behaviors of states through their conditioning
24 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
25 Anthony F. Lang Jr., Nicholas Rengger and William Walker, ‘The Role(s) of Rules: Some Conceptual
Clarifications’, International relations, 20(3) (2006), 276; Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘Conflicting Rules: Global
Constitutionalism and the Kosovo Intervention’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3(2) (1999), 188.
26 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 892.
27 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 176, 179.
28 Monica Colombo, ‘Reflexivity and Narratives in Action Research: A Discursive Approach’, Qualitative
Socialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research 4(2) (2003) accessed 17 March 2015, http://www.q
ualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/718/1554.
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impact – a pathway-type of influence on the behaviors of states through shaping
conceptions of interests that are desirable and possible to pursue. “What is viewed as
appropriate or legitimate can affect the possible costs of different actions; the more
illegitimate a possible course of action appears to be, the higher the potential costs for
those who proceed on their own”29. International norms then condition foreign policy
decisions through the ideational and material costs of violation. “The crucial test of a
norm’s existence is thus not that members of the community never violate it. Rather a
norm’s strength is measured by the level of opprobrium community members attract from
their peers for engaging in behavior that violates the norm”30. Conceptions of normative
principles have power at the international level and link the material to the ideational –
strategically impacting the foreign policy decisions of states while forcing actors to
justify their behavior31. As Nicholas Wheeler asserts: “state action will be constrained if
it cannot be justified in terms of plausible legitimating reason”32. However, while norms
constrain, they also serve a crucial purpose to reciprocally empower actors. A rule that
prohibits the use of force outside of individual or collective self-defense influences the
legitimacy of those actors projecting force in self-defense. As Ian Hurd outlines:
The power of international law… comes not from its ability to differentiate rule
breakers from rule followers, but rather from its ability to shape the terrain for
political contestation in international relations… international law should be seen
29 Michael Barnet, (2011), ‘Social Constructivism’ in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.),
Globalization in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 159.
30 Paul D. Williams, ‘From Non-intervention to Non-indifference: the origins and development of the
African Union's security culture’, African Affairs 106(423) (2007), 258.
31 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colombia
University Press, 1977), p. 43.
32 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 4.
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as a resource that is used by states, rather than as a fixed standard against which
we can assess behavior33.
The UN authorization and pervasive legitimacy of the US-led invasion in response to
Iraqi aggression in Kuwait (1991) brought widespread support and monetary
contributions from countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia that underwrote the
venture34. In contrast, the pre-emptive, contentious, and illegal US invasion of Iraq
(2003) cost hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of US lives – inviting “not only
harsh reactions and violence from extremist Muslims and Arabs, but also severe criticism
from its own allies all over the world”35. Actors still may break even the most legitimate
or formal rules if they find them conflictual with their perceived contextual interests, but
the power to break rules is not the same as to make them. “Law and norms, therefore, are
not just instrumentally harnessed to the interests of powerful states”36. Existing norms
may conflict with actor’s appraised interests in specific cases – but state policy decisions
are carried out within a normative context, which conditions interest appraisals. States
thus take part in endless processes of legitimation in which they pursue their foreign
policy interests within a complex and elaborate artifice of normative structures – mapping
out actor’s understanding of international norms, institutions, and consequences of
particular action37. Addressing the theoretical assumptions of the English School and
social constructivism provides foundational insight into their theoretical relevance within
international relations and evolution of norms that will be developed in relation to
nonintervention and R2P.
33 Ian Hurd, ‘Is humanitarian intervention legal? The rule of law in an incoherent world’, Ethics &
International Affairs 25(3) (2011), 294.
34 Wayne Sandholtz, (2009) ‘Explaining International Norm Change’, in Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall
Stiles (eds.), International Norms and Cycles of Change. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 1.
35 Yasuaki Onuma, ‘International Law and Power in the Multipolar and Multicivilizational World of the
Twenty-first Century’ in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and Vesselin Popovski, (eds.), Legality and
Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) p. 151.
36 Roy Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 2.
37 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press 2005), p. 2.
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International Society and the English School
Scholars such as Bull, Wight, Vincent et al. of the English School have long addressed
the existence and normative character of the international system. “Never having yielded
to American rationalism, the English School had long emphasized the social aspects of
international life, such as the way in which culture conditions the identities of states, and
how social dynamics underlie the institutions that sustain international order”38. As a
theoretical approach to international relations, the English School stems from the
founding of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics in the 1950s39.
Its principle contribution is the notion of an international society, incorporating aspects of
three distinct traditions of international political theory: realism (Hobbes/Machiavelli –
international system); rationalism (Grotius – international society); and revolutionism
(Kant – world society) as interrelated political conditions that together ‘comprise the
subject matter of international relations’40. A society is said to exist “when a group of
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”41. The
38 Christian Reus–Smit, ‘Imagining society: constructivism and the English School’, The British Journal of
Politics & International Relations, 4(3) (2002), 488.
39 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR’. Review of International Studies,
27(3) (2001), 472. Butterfield and Wight, Diplomatic Investigations helped develop the focus on
international society, which continued in Hedley Bull, The Anarchic Society, and R.J. Vincent’s
Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) among other
‘foundational texts’.
40 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (eds.),
(London: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 7. This ‘triad’ approach emerged with Martin Wight, but has
since been further outlined and applied by authors such as A. Claire Cutler, ‘The “Grotain Tradition in
International Relations’, Review of International Studies 17(1) (1991); Timothy Dunne, ‘The Social
Construction of International Society’, European Journal of International Relations 1(3) (1995); and Barry
Buzan ‘The English School’; Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory
and the Social Structure of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) among others.
41 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13.
33
English School’s methodology reflects the ‘eternal debate’42 or “conversation between
these three positions, one whose original function was pedagogical”43. While the
motivations of states may at times reflect purely utilitarian material self-interest or a
revolutionist cosmopolitanism, international norms and institutions shape foreign policy
decisions within a society through their regulative impact44. These normative structures
are framed as inventions of state elites – “but nonetheless, they are creations, and thus
can be altered, amended or recreated”45. Both their construction and impact relies on the
appraisal of legitimacy derived from the level of shared values and culture of an
international society of states. As Nicholas Rengger highlights:
It is of course, the existence and character of international society that confers
legitimacy on particular acts in international affairs and the illegitimacy on others.
The immunity of diplomats, the normative force of international law, and
ultimately the coercive sanction of the international community as a whole is
manifested in and through, and only possible because of, the existence of
international society46.
An internal division within the English School can be distinguished between solidarist
and pluralist conceptions – reflecting the level or alleged depth of shared values and
culture at the international level47. Pluralists such as Robert Jackson take a ‘thin’ state-
42 Ole Waever, ‘International Society—Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?’, Cooperation and Conflict 27(1)
(1992), 98.
43 Timothy Dunne, Inventing International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 8.
44 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, 96-97. Wight further asserts that an
international society can only be described ‘in historical and sociological depth’ drawing close ties to
constructivism.
45 Nicholas J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond
International Relations Theory? (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 88.
46 Nicholas J. Rengger, ‘A City which Sustains All Things? Communitarianism and International Society’,
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 21(3) (1992), 359.
47 Bull introduced this division partially through his distinction between state-centric positive law of
Oppenheim and individual-centrism under a natural law trend of the twentieth century, which he identifies
as neo-Grotian. Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’ in Herbert Butterfield and
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centered focus, highlighting an international society of diverse values, morals, beliefs,
languages, political systems, and religions that are best secured through autonomy and a
high level of independence48. With limited shared culture or values at the universal level,
the moral or belief-based appraisals of states have limited international scope. The
interests of states and populations are then best secured through autonomy and
noninterference. In contrast, solidarists such as Nicholas Wheeler paint the international
society with a ‘thick’ level of shared common values and interests to include human
rights49. This allows for an expansive and universal view of basic human rights
protections, legitimating a more activist stance. “The emergence of solidarist norms
legitimating intervention would considerably broaden the category of exceptions and
would correspondingly weaken the principle of nonintervention”50. Through both
conceptions, much of the English School scholarship has addressed the relationship
between international order and justice – which lies at the center of the debate over
humanitarian intervention51. Insights of the English School provide an important
background surrounding the normative structure of international society and social
appraisals of actors.
Martin Wight (eds.) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (New South
Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 68.
48 See: Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
49 James Mayall, ‘Introduction’ in James Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United
National Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996). pp. 3-4.
50 S. Neil MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics (Oxford: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 350, 2002), p. 8.
51 Stanley Hoffman, Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Specifically addressing the divergence between international and
domestic political order – in the absence of central power, ‘how can there be both anarchy and order?’ This
relates to what Martha Finnemore calls, Bull’s ‘philosophical examination of the moral implications of
order’ - relating to the English School scholarship addressing the impact of morality and normative rules on
international politics in: Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 18.
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Building a framework surrounding contestation is premised on the notion that norms
serve as the legitimating elements of global governance52. This implicitly draws from the
appraisal of a relevant community or group of actors – at the international level, tied to
the conception of an international society or international security order. “An
international community exists to the extent that there is a shared understanding of what
constitutes legitimate behavior by the various actors in world affairs”53. While the
international community exists as a dynamic and diverse set of political communities,
processes of socialization have developed an international security orders that helps
“establish the core assumptions, beliefs and values of decision-makers about how security
challenges can and should be dealt with”54. The very notion of society presupposes
members that are bound by common rules and institutions – reflecting a ‘socialization’
aspect regarding the legitimacy of actors and their actions within international politics.
Rules and institutions from this approach have a primarily regulative effect, driving
collective cooperation and adherence. Through ongoing practices of contestation,
international society has constructed a complex lattice of normative structures, which
constantly evolves and conditions the interest appraisals of actors within an international
order reflective in the English School. Like bricks in a wall, each state functions as an
independent unit, but part of the whole bound together by a level of common mortar – the
values and interests of a constitutive society.
The Reversion to Norms: Social Constructivism
Drawing from similar conceptions of an international normative order, the English
School and social constructivism share a tradition of historicist and normative inquiry
with both serving as relevant lenses to address the evolution of the international
52 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, 3.
53 Thakur, ‘Law, Legitimacy, and the United Nations’, pp. 45-71.
54 Williams, ‘From Non-intervention to Non-indifference’, 256.
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normative architecture and how these changes shape state behavior. Both draw from
ideas that meaningful patterns of action serve as “not merely descriptive ‘arrows’ that
connect structure to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material and ideational
process that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or
transform structures’55. However, as Reus-Smit highlights, “What constructivists have
missed all together is the English School’s strong tradition of normative inquiry into the
relationship between order and justice in international relations”56. From this perspective,
norms and international laws are important because the “rules themselves often have a
fundamental moral dimension”57. Meaning that the salience of norms and their impact
may be derived from and elucidate ethical beliefs and considerations – with changing
conceptions of justice and order internationally shaping existing structures and behavior.
In contrast, the English School approach maintains a state-centrism with limited
analytical clarity surrounding how normative structures evolve from within and
externally to states including in relation to global civil society. Furthermore, as Shogo
Suzuki asserts, most English School studies “have not explored in sufficient depth how
these rules can also shape and define state interests and action”58. Social constructivism
helps fill this gap, through providing a lens to address how norms shape interests and
identities through their constitutive qualities, contestation, and their impact beyond state
actors59. While distinct approaches, discourse between the two draws relevant insights.
Addressing how norms are contested and shaped then serves as a means to address the
evolution of norms and relevance of a normative architecture on international order.
55 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, International Theory 3(1) (2011), 5.
56 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Constructivist Challenge after September 11’, in Alex J. Bellamy (ed.),
International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 83.
57 Eric Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), p. 5.
58 Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International
Society (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 6.
59 Timothy Dunne, ‘The New Agenda’ in Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), International Society and its Critics (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 69.
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Social constructivism as a theoretical approach to international relations examines the
ideational as well as material aspects of reality, drawing from a long history of
intellectual developments in philosophy, sociology, and social theory60. “Instead of
conceiving the international system in terms of distribution of tangible resources and of
‘invisible’ structures working behind the backs of the actors, constructivism views this
system as an artifice of man-made institutions, such as, but not limited to states”61. While
physical material exists in nature, the creation and use of ideas and objects do not occur
in a vacuum, but through intersubjective interactions that provide meaning. As Karin
Fierke highlights, “phenomena, such as states or alliances or international institutions,
that is, the collective subjects of international relations, may build on the basic material of
human nature, but they take specific historical, cultural and political forms that are a
product of human interaction in a social world”62. Social constructivism emphasizes the
importance of intersubjectivity and language within international relations. The influence
of history and social processes, which have in a very real sense constructed meaningful
identities and silhouette the legitimacy of particular actions at the international level.
Further outlined by Andrew Hurrell, constructivism:
[I]nvolves a number of central ideas: first, that, in contrast to rationalist theories,
we need to pay far more attention to the processes by which both interest and
identities are created and evolve, to the ways in which self-images interact with
changing material incentives, and to the language and discourse through which
these understandings are expressed; second, that it matters how actors interpret
the world and how their understandings of ‘where we belong’ are formed; and
third, that both interests and identities are shaped by particular histories and
60 Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism And International Relations’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and
Beth A Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 96.
61 Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change in International Politics: the Soviet
Empire's Demise and the International System’, International Organization 48(2) (1994), 222.
62 Karin M. Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 56.
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cultures, by domestic factors, and by ongoing processes of interaction with other
states63.
Drawing from this approach, ongoing interactions create and shape norms of conduct that
are both regulative and constitutive of actor’s interests and identities – serving as
references points from which actors derive meaning64. As Jeffrey Checkel outlines, from
a constructivist approach: “Norms are no longer a superstructure on a material base;
rather they help to create and define the base. For constructivists, agents (states) and
structures (global norms) are interacting; they are mutually constituted”65. This dynamic
highlights the dual quality of norms as both ‘structuring and socially constructed’66.
Applied at a macro level, constructivists distinguish between norms and institutions
through their level of aggregation – framing institutions as “relatively stable collection of
practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific
situations”67. This serves as useful means of illustrating more ‘complex norms’ such as
sovereignty, R2P, or institutions such as the United Nations an international level –
constituted by numerous substantive and procedural norms - an evolving mix of rules and
practices68. For constructivists, foreign policy decisions are not devoid of morality, and
they are made-meaningful and contextualized by international norms – all of which are
results and constitutive elements of a historically and socially constructed reality.
63 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’ in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.),
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 65.
64 Frank Hindriks, ‘Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology’, Erkenntnis, 71(2) (2009), 254;
Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 891.
65 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics 50(2)
(1998), 328.
66 Antje Wiener, ‘The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance Beyond the State: Sociological and
Normative Approaches to “Interaction”’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
10(1) (2007), 49.
67 Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect, 19; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The
Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, International organization 52(4) (1998), 948;
Peter Wilson, ‘The English School meets the Chicago School: the case for a grounded theory of
international institutions, International Studies Review 14(4) (2012).
68 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to
Protect 5(4) (2013), 386-387.
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Conventional and Critical Constructivism
While ‘competing conceptions’ of the content of norms may exist early on, more formal
recognition and incorporation in bilateral agreements or as institutionalized rules is seen
through linear approaches as the end point from which norms can be applied within a
positivist framework to address the impact of norms on state behavior69. Taking more
positivist assumptions, these models have been used to outline the emergence of new
norms trace growing acceptance and impact through changing the behavior of states.
However, positivist constructivists neglect what happens after norms are institutionalized
“domestically (in terms of how internalization may differ from state to state, or among
institutions in a single state) and internationally (in terms of future interactions that shift a
norm’s meaning and bring about conflicting interpretations)” which as a theoretical
framework has lacked detail into how or why norms change70.
In addressing this ‘reactive’ impact of norms within international relations, constructivist
scholarship has evolved with two widely recognized theoretical frameworks – a critical
and a conventional strand71. Constructivists from both approaches agree upon ontology –
the perception that “ideas, norms, rules constitute meanings which frame actors’ identity,
interests, and actions”72. Where these strands differ is the nature of intersubjectivity –
where meaning comes from or how meanings are constructed, which has implications on
how that meaning is applied. The conventional strand builds a theoretical base upon a
69 Ibid., 379
70 Ibid., 379; Wayne Sandholtz, ‘Explaining International Norm Change’, 1.
71 Ted Hopf, ‘Constructivism all the way down’, International Politics 37(3) (2000), 369-378; Ted Hopf,
‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International security 23(1) (1998),
176.
72 Audie Klotz, ‘Can We Speak a Common Constructivist Language?’, in Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik
Jorgensen (eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2001), pp. 223-235.
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positivist epistemology to create a more causal relationship between norms and state
behavior73. This approach holds intersubjective meanings and identities fixed for actors
such as states at any one point in order to address the impact of norms74. As Antje Wiener
emphasizes, the more conventional approaches’ “focus on reaction to norms is helpful to
indicate the influence of one fundamental norm over another… or, in focusing on specific
decision-making situations in which norms guide process of deliberation”75. This
highlights the structuring power of norms through their influence on state behavior76.
In contrast, critical constructivists ‘focus on the meaning of norms as constituted by and
constitutive of specific use’77. Karin Fierke refers to this as a more ‘consistent
constructivism’, “highlighting the inseparability of a social ontology and social
epistemology”78. Critical scholars do not see norms as causal, nor are norms static among
a given set of actors. Furthermore, identities cannot be viewed as fixed or given with
norms serving as explanatory variables impacting behavior. I embrace a critical lens in
that norms clarify or map out what is appropriate in context, or normatively accepted as
legitimate, but as norms emerge and are invoked, different actors may understand
meanings and significance in different ways based on context and identities which are
reciprocally shaped and far from given. While the weight of state actions shape normative
structures external to actors, the appraised meanings are subjectively interpreted and
applied by actors with different understandings. As Martha Finnemore outlines, “Most of
us are the products, and captives, of our own normative context, and, like the decision
73 Faye Donnelly, Securitization in the Iraq War: The rules of engagement in world politics (New York:
Routledge, 2013), p. 15.
74 Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics’, European journal of
international relations 3(3) (1997), 319-363; See: Katzenstein, ‘Introduction’, 5.
75 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 179.
76 Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground’, 329.
77 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 179.
78 Fierke, ‘Constructivism’, 196.
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makers we analyze, we take a whole range of ideas, beliefs, and contexts for granted”79.
Where identity and interests come from plays an important factor in how norms emerge
and constantly evolve.
Through a critical lens, I address norm contestation as a means of elucidating and tracing
norms as ‘meanings-in-use’ but also as an engine of normative transformation. I
emphasize the importance of language and how meaning and identities are produced and
changed. Norms as fluid meanings may be understood and applied subjectively – with
invocations expressing a range of salience or even pragmatic justifications leading to
foreign policy choices. This thesis seeks to explore the various factors that can be seen ‘at
play’ within specific context – how different norms are invoked and implemented.
Normative structures and their trail of justifications provide insight into how these social
facts have informed the decisions of actors. Crucially, agents pursuing their relative
interests may understand and apply norms through diverging lenses – and they do so as
actors with agency. This agency engenders power which means norms are neither causal
nor can they be understood apart from their contextually applied meaning. Addressing the
various normative and non-normative factors at play within any particular case then may
elucidate how these elements may inform actors.
Constructivist Norm Emergence and Diffusion
The construction of norms is a socialized process in which ideas are projected and
contested at the international level and may gain legitimacy or shared acceptance80.
79 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 4.
80 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into
Domestic Practices: Introduction’ in Thomas Risse, Steven C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power
of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
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Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s life cycle provides a particularly relevant
framework, outlining normative development through three stages of norm emergence,
cascade, and internalization81. ‘Norm entrepreneurs’ including individuals, states, and
organizations, introduce principled ideas into the domestic or international context –
framing and shaping debate in promotion towards greater acceptance82. These actors “try
not only to influence policy outcomes, but to transform the terms and nature of the
debate… They also promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt
new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards”83. Once a norm
gains a level of acceptance amongst international actors, it can be said to have become
‘nested’ – holding a substantive level of intersubjectively appraised legitimacy amongst a
relevant community of actors and recognition that it can frame debates and used as a
resource within specific global policy spheres84.
A nested norm shapes the boundaries of discourse and is promoted by actors, if gaining a
critical level of legitimacy, may gain acceptance towards a ‘tipping point’ and cascade
becoming internalized85. Whether or not the norm is accepted relies on social and
historical context as well as the alignment between the idea and what Amitav Acharya
calls norm localization: the process of ‘contestation between emerging transnational
norms, and preexisting normative and social order’ which can happen at various global
levels86. “The shared validity of norms is established through communicative action
during which different socioculturally determined preferences are adapted and changed
81 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 896.
82 Ibid.
83 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 2-3.
84 Alec S. Sweet, ‘What is a supranational constitution? An essay in international relations theory’, The
Review of Politics 56(03) (1994), 441-474.
85 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 896.
86 Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional
Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization 58(2) (2004), 241.
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based on the willingness to be persuaded by the better argument”87. Tracing a linear
progression, most norm entrepreneurs fail, but the successful emergence, nesting and
continued diffusion may lead to a critical mass of support in which diffusion cascades,
after which the norm is said to have internalized or been deeply embedded as a legitimate
standard of conduct at the international level88. When norms cascade to the point that
they are deeply internalized, they become the ‘prevailing standard of appropriateness’89.
This dynamic has been highlighted through various (generally constructivist)
frameworks: ‘cascades’90, ‘spirals’91, ‘boomerangs’92, and ‘cycles’93 – all emphasizing
the acceptance and impact of norms through their emergence, diffusion, and
internalization at the international level.
Norms of legal character have been identified and applied as formal or institutionalized
rules – largely pegged to the expansion of international law94. Robert Axelrod highlights
this connection through an evolutionary approach - emphasizing, “social norms and laws
are often mutually supporting. This is true because social norms can become formalized
into laws and because laws provide external validation of norms”95. Such rules also often
require a level of consensus through agreement within international conventions or
customary evolution through the patterned behavior of states paired with opinio juris or
87 Antje Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 45.
88 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics
(London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011), p. 11.
89 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 895.
90 Ibid., 887-917.
91 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
92 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional
politics’, International Social Science Journal 51(159) (1999), 89-101.
93 Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles (eds.), International Norms and Cycles of Change (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2009).
94 Lang Jr., Rengger, and Walker, ‘The Role(s) of Rules’, 276.
95 Robert Axelrod, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’, American Political Science Review 80(4) (1986),
1107.
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recognition of the rule as of binding legal character96. Once a norm’s meaning has been
institutionalized, this formal explication and recognition is seen as having a stabilizing
impact through both clarifying meaning and serving as a mark of the norm’s legitimacy
through diffusion to more formal acceptance. In this respect, “Law is both the path to
internalization and evidence of it, and therefore serves as a synonym for
internalization”97. Institutionalization then plays an important role in more formally
clarifying meaning, and providing a top down approach to greater normative diffusion
and habitualization.
The Contestation of Norms: Transformation and Elucidated ‘Meaning-in-Use’
While particular forms of constructivism seek to avoid causal claims, the contextually
applied meaning and salience of norms does play a role in (re)constructing the legitimacy
of specific forms of behavior and thus the interest appraisals of states. State policy
decisions that conflict or contradict constructed international norms may have substantive
consequences with high social and material costs. Linked to their enabling effect, the
influence of norms is also tied to the idea that for behavior to have a maximum effect in
any social context, utility and legitimacy of that action are closely bound98. Thus, both
the negative and positive consequences of behavior may be linked to normative
conceptions of the utility of specific forms of behavior, with the prevailing meanings and
contingent appraisals of norms existing as reference points or resources from which
actors derive consequences and serve as legitimate social aims which behavior is
designed to achieve. However, because state actors have agency, norms are among
various factors including non-normative considerations. “New or changed norms enable
96 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 24.
97 Sinclair, International Relations Theory and International Law, 175.
98 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 16.
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new or different behaviors; they do not ensure such behaviors” 99. Norms then direct
behavior and may be seen to have a conditioning effect in regard to specific foreign
policy decisions, through outlining what is appraised as possible and legitimate within the
‘zones of permissibility’ surrounding different types of behavior that strategically
empowers or constrains actors100. How norms shape identities, interests, and the
legitimacy of specific behavior is a function of contestation.
Embracing a critical approach to social constructivism, norms enable or constrain
behavior but are not causal, nor can they be separated from their contextually applied and
actor-subjective meanings. State actors with agency make decision within a normative
context. Material power and economic factors play an important role in international
relations, but are shaped by norms, which shape interests and identities reciprocally as
mutually constitutive. If norms gain a high level of diffusion and appraised legitimacy,
they are likely to shape the interests of states and be used as justifications of state actors.
Conversely, norms with a lower level of diffusion and acceptance, will likely have
limited influence on the behavior of states and limited invocation as justification.
However, “The existence of a norm [is] a matter of degree, rather than an all or nothing
proposition, which allows one to speak of the growth or decay of a norm”101.
Furthermore, the status of a norm as internalized or as an international legal rule does not
necessarily change its strategic influence, with costs or empowerment determined
contextually by social interaction.
99 Martha Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Colombia University Press,
1996), p. 158.
100 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘How do Norms Matter?’ in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Laws in
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (7th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp. 43-51.
101 Axelrod, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’, 1097.
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Contestation is a mechanism deserving greater attention theoretically and well as a
methodological framework to approach how norms inform the decisions of states – how
they are maintained, shaped, or displaced. From a linear or conventional approach, the
progression (i.e. ‘power’) of norms develops through continued invocation and state
behavior determining whether a norm has emerged and internalized – ultimately towards
institutionalization through opinio juris and embeddedness in international law. In
contrast, as Antje Wiener outlines, “The theory of contestation holds that the ultimate
goals regarding norm compliance in global governance is not about obtaining legality
(i.e. establishing the distinctive quality of a norm) but about legitimacy”102. Meaning that
the strength and influence of norms is contextual and not contingent on its status as a
legal principle or some sort of institutionalized quality, but rather its recognition as
normative in character. Normative salience is tied to appraised legitimacy at the
international level, whereby the norm shapes actors conceptions of interests –
‘establishing the normative quality of a practice’103.
Norms that have existed for centuries can evaporate, and with the introduction of new
ideas and technologies, norms can emerge that never existed – creating new interests and
enabling behaviors that previously didn’t exist. In emphasizing adherence to norms and
their structuring of behavior, social constructivists have tended to make norms static, or
trace their evolution through their causal implications for behavior, which as Matthew
Hoffman has criticized, constructivism has been ‘missing dynamism’104. While existing
literature and studies have emphasized the importance of individual norms and their
impact in global governance, social norms are important because they “structure
governance, not just because they provide common expectation and elicit conformance,
102 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, 67.
103 Ibid.
104 Matthew J. Hoffman, ‘Competition and Contestation in the Evolution of Social Norms’, Paper presented
at the Annual Convention of International Studies Association, Montreal, 17-20 March 2004, p. 2.
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but also because social norms engender contestation”105. These processes of contestation
are socially creative in themselves, through providing context for actors to coordinate
policies and structure debate. This contestation is also an engine of change that can
elucidate the relationship between competing norms and their contextual influence in
informing the decisions of actors.
As the mechanism of both normative emergence and change, contestation is an ongoing
and implicit social fact as well as approach to elucidating normative meanings – defined
as a ‘social activity that involves discursive and critical engagement’106. As new norms
emerge or resurge in international relations, they enter a complex normative context and
compete for legitimacy. Differing actors hold varying subjective interpretations of norms
and apply them differently in specific contexts which are illuminated through their
applied ‘meaning-in-use’107. What this highlights is the relationship between norms and
how norms compete, are shaped or maintained, and inform the behavior of actors. Norms
are not binary in their influence, nor are they stable, but vary between cases and contexts
with varying levels of salience. “It is precisely because norms are not objective truths, but
rather inter-subjectively held beliefs, that they can continue to be contested, and their
meaning shaped by practice and the broader social context in which they are situated”108.
As normative principles conflict or the behavior of actors are disjointed from normative
beliefs – across various global levels such as regional or sub-regional – actors appraise
and constantly re-appraise the legitimacy and relevance of specific norms aligned with
contextual situations and practices.
105 Hoffman, ‘Competition and Contestation in the Evolution of Social Norms’, 1.
106 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, 2.
107 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 182.
108 Welsh, ‘Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, 380.
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Contestation is inherent in the process through which actors subjectively interpret
intersubjective notions of appropriateness, act on the understanding (engendering
political outcomes), and, in turn, alter intersubjective notions of appropriateness.
Contestation is the engine of politics and mutual constitution itself and it requires
more analytic scrutiny as a mechanism for institutional change109.
Because the match between norms and specific situations are never perfect, or existing
rules conflict, norms are continually contested and thus shaped at the international and
sub-national levels. Rules must be sufficiently general in principle, while their
application approaches unique and distinct situations within an evolving political context.
As H.L.A Hart highlights: “Nothing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty a
penumbra of doubt when we are engaged in bringing particular situations under general
rules”110. As norms are applied, they become contested to match specific context. This
contestation also emerges between different norms and principles – highlighting that
numerous norm structures exist within any given society or order, in which ‘tensions and
contradictions are commonplace’111. As Friedrich Kratochwil highlights, “From
experience we know that effective regimes, such as constitutions, frequently show
important discontinuities between specific norms and higher principles, quite aside from
the fact that many of the higher principles are expressions of competing values”112. These
practices are ongoing, particularly resulting from the introduction of new rules, or when
conflicting interpretations of state behavior and normative principles are invoked. As
subjectively interpreted norms are applied to specific situations, actors apply their
understandings of their interests and justify their decisions according to prevailing norms.
109 Matthew J. Hoffmann, ‘My Norm is Better than your Norm: Contestation and Norm Dynamics.’ Paper
presented at the annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago,
Illinois, 28 February, 2007.
110 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 123.
111 Sandholtz, ‘Explaining International Norm Change’, 10.
112 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, 62.
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In a very real sense, these are moments of ‘strategic construction’ that maintain, shape, or
displace existing norms or seek to legitimize new or emerging norms as moments of
socially articulated ‘conflicting interpretations of values’113. Contestation is then a
mechanism that both illuminates the meanings of intersubjective facts, and serves as a
means to strategically transform existing or introduce new normative structures.
Particularly regarding the discursive side of contestation, Thomas Risse asserts,
diplomatic negotiations and public discourse plays an underdeveloped analytical role.
The current debate between social constructivism and rational choice fails to include a
logic of ‘truth seeking’ which highlights “a conscious process whereby actors have to
figure out the situation in which they act, apply the appropriate norm, or choose among
conflicting rules”114. As a topic long-addressed by international legal scholars, Martti
Koskenniemi emphasizes, “Engaging in the formalism of legal argument inevitably
makes public the normative basis and objectives of one’s actions and assumes the actor’s
institutional accountability for what it is that one is justifying”115. These interactions in a
very real sense are practices of legitimation through which, actors at various levels
attempt to persuasively justify their behavior - to pre-empt or persuade. “The relationship
between a putative norm and legitimacy is, though often overlooked, of great importance.
By definition, expressing adherence to a norm, whether legal or moral, constitutes a
means of legitimization”116. This serves as a means of rallying support for particular
action, or trying to reduce negative repercussion against or in response to particular
action.
113 Nicola P. Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, intervention and norm contestation: China’s stance on Darfur in the
UN security council’, Security Dialogue 41(3) (2010), 325.
114 Thomas Risse, ‘“Let's argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International organization,
54(1) (2000), 6.
115 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 111.
116 Aidan Hehir, ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to
Protect’, International Security 38(1) (2013), 150.
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Events that invoke contradictory norms generate disputes, in which actors must
collectively figure out, through argumentation, what the norms should mean. The
outcomes of those arguments inevitably modify the rules, whether by making
them stronger or weaker, clearer or more ambiguous, more specific or less117.
The justifications and behavior invoked at the international level provides an indication
of the legitimacy and acceptance of rules in specific policy domains118. Even ‘violations’
of existing or emerging norms may serve to strengthen or better consolidate their
meaning. While far from static, the conceptual boundaries of norms are not infinitely
elastic. As highlighted by Cristina Badescu and Thomas Weiss, these “abuses can help
clarify the scope of an emerging norm and thereby reinforce it”119. As behavior and
justification serve as socialized practices surrounding contestation, they shape existing
norms. Particularly in cases of conflicting normative principles, these interactions serve
to strengthen or condition the relative strength of particular interpretations. “Breaking
rules might also be seen as a necessary step in reinforcing rules at another level”120.
Behavior and justifications are not random practices, but are pursued for strategic and
reasoned social and political aims, which also serve to shape the normative context of the
international system. Under the weight of state behavior and justification as social
discourses, normative structures are illuminated in meaning and shaped in content.
Normative contestation serves as an instrument of change, but also as a means of
elucidating meaning at the international level. Norms may appear stable at any given
117 Wayne Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.
269.
118 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 105.
119 Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G.Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative
Spiral?’, International Studies Perspectives 11(4) (2010), 355.
120 Lang Jr., Rengger and Walker, ‘The Role of Rule(s)’, 287.
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point in time, but they are constantly evolving through their applied ‘meaning-in-use’121.
This contestation is both creative and destructive – leading to the emergence of new
norms or the modification of existing normative structures. “The assumption is that while
norms are always meaningful, their meaning is constituted through an interactive process.
Interpretation is thus derived from the social practice of enacting meaning that is used in
a specific context”122. As actors apply meanings and justify behavioral choices, the
normative bounds of international rules are outlined. “If norms evolve interactively, as
most constructivists would agree, then any process of contestation will reflect a specific
re/enacting of the normative ‘structure meaning-in-use’”123. Norms must be sufficiently
broad, but provide the boundaries of discourse and debate within any single situation.
This contestation may alter, maintain, or erode existing interpretations – resetting the
normative structure of future debate. This contestation occurs as actors subjectively
interpret and apply general norms to specific situations, but also in periods in which
subjective normative beliefs conflict. Particularly in periods of crisis or in which actors
are forced to articulate their behaviors or beliefs, the meanings-in-use are enhanced.
The contestation and application of norms is a historically contingent process,
highlighting the wider material and ideational factors that underwrite reasoned foreign
policy decisions and the impact of precedent within specific policy domains which
frames the context for future debate. “While contestation always involves dialogue
expressed through deliberation, the practice of contestation is contingent with regard to
context and involved agency”124. Thus, ongoing patterns of discursive and critical
engagement both shape norms and frame the wider normative context for future
contestation. The edited volume by Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles highlights the
121 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 176, 182.
122 Antje Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics, 4.
123 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 179.
124 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, 50.
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‘cyclical’ nature of normative context and argument. While norms appear fixed at any
give moment, they evolve cyclically overtime with periods of conflicting interpretations
and crisis triggering argumentation that modifies existing rule structures125. The idea that
norms hold a historical contingency whereby a norm may be illuminated in meaning at
discrete points in time, but shaped through societal changes and repeated use aligns with
Antje Wiener’s contention that, “While norms may acquire stability over extended
periods of time, they remain flexible by definition”126. Furthermore, the wider
international context provides insight into how different norms interact and are applied
historically within any particular case. This framework serves as a particularly relevant
means to better examine particular global policy areas from which conflicting subjective
interpretations of normative principles are invoked during times of crisis, which both
modify rules through periods of contestation and set the normative context for future
social practice. This type of cyclical path-dependency serves as a useful means of
illustrating recurrent patterns in specific issue areas in which social practices and
discourse serve as ‘norm shapers’ – conditioning normative structures for future
application127. The results of past actions or normative context can shape future political
behavior and context, strengthening or eroding particular norms through ongoing
practice. The idea being that when conflictual norms are applied, the resulting fallout or
negative impact may normatively condition repeated interaction as a ‘counter-norm’,
leading to gradual erosion or momentary weakening of particular ideas or norms.
The Contestation of Internalized Non-action: A Shifted Framework for Debate
125 Sandholtz and Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change.
126 Antje Wiener, ‘Contested meanings of norms: a research framework’, Comparative European Politics
5(1) (2007), 6.
127 Brian L. Job and Anastasia Shesterinina, ‘China as a Global Norm-Shaper: Institutionalization and
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect’ in Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard (eds.),
Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), p. 153.
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An important element of this thesis is the contestation of nonintervention as an action at
the international level. As Martha Finnemore outlines: “When states justify their
interventions, they draw on and articulate shared values and expectations that other
decision maker and other publics in other states hold”128. A contention is that the same
may be said for a proscriptive norm or a ‘prohibitory norm’ - an imperative to not act129.
As a foreign policy behavioral choice, like intervention, nonintervention serves as a
foreign policy decision with profound political consequences. Like any promoted action –
foreign policy analysts and decision-makers with agency take a reasoned approach to
appraisals of consequence. With moral basis in itself, nonintervention may be contested
as the legitimate decision and international norm. Rather than tracing social discourses of
a positive action, this thesis addresses the contestation of nonintervention as a negative
action.
Social activity or contestation surrounding non-action diverges in that much of
constructivist research has widely addressed why particular behavior takes place.
Research has widely addressed how normative development informs actors to take
positive steps, while this thesis serves to illustrate principled promotion of a non-action.
As Badescu and Weiss highlight, existing “literature provides a host of insights about
norm innovation in international society, but all stress the need for successful application
to concrete cases”130. Within complex normative and non-normative considerations,
where it appears the material or pragmatic considerations of states determine behavior, or
individual cases where it appears norms have limited impact on the behavior of states in
terms of operationalization, a prohibitory norm may still play an important role in
structuring the parameters for debate131. This illustrates that in cases where it could be
128 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 15.
129 Legro, ‘Which Norms Matter?’, 37.
130 Badescu and Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms’, 358
131 Hoffman, ‘Competition and Contestation in the Evolution of Social Norms’, 2.
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argued that states did not carry out a policy behavioral choice because such action was
devoid of material gains, norms could still be seen to be at work. Thus, particular
interventionist behavior could not take place because such actions would not bring
economic or material structural benefits. However, this norm as a nonintervention may
still be seen to be ‘at play’ in framing international debate as well as informing actors of
perceived material and ideological costs and utility benefits of particular choices.
Furthermore, nonintervention within international law serves as a deeply embedded and
internalized norm, what Mervyn Frost refers to as ‘settled’ – accepted by a plurality to the
extent that they are taken for granted132. Unlike arguments surrounding justification for
emerging norms, nonintervention exists as an established and internalized norm. As Ted
Hopf emphasizes, constructivists should be ‘agnostic about change in world politics’133.
“Studies of norm dynamics should account for a range of responses to new norms from
constitutive compliance to outright rejection, and the evolutionary and path-dependence
forms of acceptance that fall in between”134. Or further, as Jeffrey Legro highlights, “In
order to understand how norms operate, studies must allow for more variations: the
success or failure, existence or obsolescence of norms… analyzed in conjunction with
comparable cases of norm effectiveness”135. Instead of addressing the evolution an
emerging norm, this thesis addresses normative contestation through mixed-behavioral
cases of implementation and non-implementation elucidating the normative meaning and
continued relevance of the institutionalized and ‘settled’ norm of nonintervention136. This
provides a lens to address the persistence of nonintervention within the normative
architecture of international order and how it has informed agent’s decisions through the
emergence of R2P. During periods of humanitarian crisis in which nonintervention is
132 Frost, Ethics in International Relations, 105.
133 Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, 180.
134 Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’, 242.
135 Legro, ‘Which Norms Matter?’, 34.
136 Frost, Ethics in International Relations, 105.
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normatively challenged by an emerging norm, contestation will illuminate subjective
normative appraisals of individual actors, providing insight into how nonintervention has
informed the decision of international actors – tracing the contested legitimacy of
nonintervention through specific cases of imminent or ongoing recognized mass atrocity
crimes at the international level.
Methodological Framework: Normative Contestation of Nonintervention
Because both breaches of nonintervention and egregious failures to protect individuals
from mass atrocities at the global level bring ideational and material consequences, actors
are forced to justify their decisions, which are appraised by global actors in terms of their
legitimacy. Periods of mass atrocities provide particularly relevant windows to address
contestation and shifting character of nonintervention in relation to R2P due to the
spillover effects of such atrocities and these crisis exposure of conflicting interpretation
of values at the international level – how actors subjectively appraise situations and are
forced to justify their actions at the international level – most principally the UNSC.
Collectively, this evidence – particularly through periods of crisis - maps out the applied
‘meaning-in-use’ of nonintervention. As humanitarian ‘conscious shocking emergencies’
emerge, contestation outlines changes in the meaning and application of norms within
specific normative context – highlighting their ‘meaning-in-use’ and argumentation in the
international system relative to human rights protections and R2P137. During periods of
crisis, global actors are forced to respond quickly and justify their choices. “A situation of
crisis raises the stakes for norm interpretation as time constraints enhance the reduced
social feedback factor”138. Evidence from specific cases will primarily draw from social
discourses through periods of anticipated or ongoing humanitarian emergencies in which
137 Michael M. Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), p. 22; Badescu and Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms’, 355.
138 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 182
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R2P has been invoked, centred on relevant member states to each crisis and the UNSC as
the central vestige of international authority surrounding the projection of military force.
For this thesis, cases of recognized imminent or ongoing mass atrocities will be examined
through three case studies, which allow the discourses to be studied in sufficient detail.
Case Studies
My research methodology focuses on a number of case studies addressing the complex
factors influencing international behavior and how nonintervention played a role in
informing the behavior of actors. For this thesis, cases of recognized imminent or
ongoing mass atrocities will be examined. George and Bennett define a case study as “the
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical
explanations that may be generalizable to other events”139. Studies may be single, or
small number of cases (a ‘small-n’ study). A multiple case study “entails studying two
contrasting cases using more of less identical methods”140. The use of multiple-case
design allows examination of the different ways that the principle of nonintervention was
contested for comparison as well as potential sequential tracing through historic
examples. As noted by Robert Yin, contrasting multiple cases allows us to test a theory in
a number of different situations141. Contrasting multiple cases then has the potential to
allow better insight into the scope of events and circumstances, and can also increase the
methodological strength of the study142.
139 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004), p. 5.
140 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (4th Ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 72.
141 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th Ed.) (Los Angeles: Sage Publications,
2014).
142 Bryman, Social Research Methods.
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One of the main constraints of case study research involves generalizability143. As
Lijphart highlights, “the principle problem facing comparative method can be succinctly
stated as: many variables: small number of cases”144. As case study research contains a
large amount of detail about single or several cases, it makes it hard to apply findings to a
number of other settings. In order to minimize this, I have chosen to examine multiple-
case studies, which is one way in which generalizability of findings can be increased145.
Another potential disadvantage in case study research is selection bias, where researchers
choose cases that align well with their argument or hypothesis146. The cases of Syria,
Libya and Sri Lanka in this study were selected not because they were all examples of
when states chose not to intervene. Indeed, in Libya the opposite was the case. As is
explained in greater detail below, the cases were selected on the basis of other important
considerations. Though case study research has been criticized, they can be beneficial in
exploratory research147. Case studies offer the depth of exploration, and can allow a
variety of insights perspectives148. One main benefit of case study research is construct
validity149, as allows examination of a large number of variables, and provides a greater
understanding of a range of “contextual characteristics”150. This allows the researcher to
address more detailed understanding of what is occurring within the relevant situation151.
143 Dawn Burton, ‘The Use of Case Studies in Social Science Research’, in Dawn Burton (ed.), Research
Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers (London: Sage Publications Ltd,
2000).
144 Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’, The American Political Science
Review 65(3) (1971), 685.
145 Burton, ‘The Use of Case Studies in Social Science Research’.
146 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
147 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
148 Gary Thomas, How to do Your Case Study: A Guide for Students & Researchers (London: Sage
Publications, 2011).
149 Andrew Bennett, ‘Case study methods: Design, use, and comparative advantages’ in Detlef Sprintz and
Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (eds.), Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International
Relations (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 19-55.
150 Peter Swanborn, Case Study Research: What, Why and How? (London: Sage Publications, 2011), p. 30.
151 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, ‘Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation
for novice researchers’, The Qualitative Report 13(4) (2008), 544-559.
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Case Selection
The cases of Syria, Libya and Sri Lanka were selected to provide comparisons across
different incidents, while controlling for uniform characteristics. The conflicts in Syria,
Libya and Sri Lanka all occurred after the 2005 World Summit, when UN Member States
addressed and unanimously endorsed an articulation of the responsibility to protect
international populations from four mass atrocity crimes; genocide, crimes against
humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes within the SOD. With Sri Lanka occurring in
early 2009, the SOD paragraphs had already been unanimously endorsed by international
heads of government and state, as well as by the UNSC. Common across all three cases
were the invocation of R2P by NGOs as well as member states. As the humanitarian
crises unfolded, it became evident that mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against
humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes) had occurred in each case. They are also
demonstrations the government’s unwillingness or inability protect its population. All
three also have a level of regional variance with South Asia, North Africa, and the
Middle East with recognized imminent or ongoing mass atrocities committed in member
states illustrating a variance of regional actors and involvement.
All three highlight particularly relevant cases surrounding the legitimacy of governments
and their actions within the international system. Each involves egregious cases of
anticipated or ongoing mass atrocity crimes in which the state has violated individual
rights through the targeting or noncombatants or the indiscriminant use of force on mass
scale. These highlight cases where the regime has either lost monopoly on the use of
force through anarchic conditions within the territorial bounds recognized by the
international community, or in which the state retains dominance – but uses unrestricted
force or other strategies and as a means of quelling domestic insurrection that cause mass
atrocities. Individually, Uppsala’s Conflict Data Program on one-sided violence
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highlights Sri Lanka and Syria as several of the highest level of civilian casualties caused
by state actors in the past decade, while Libya serves as the most clear-cut example of a
UNSC mandated R2P intervention to date. These three also highlight cases of both action
and inaction surrounding the invocation of R2P and normative contestation surrounding
nonintervention.
Caveats and Considerations
While these are far from the only cases of recent mass atrocities, they provide a cross
section of sequential examples that have been highlighted as particularly relevant to the
emergence of R2P152. Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central
African Republic all provide examples, including others such as Colombia, and Gaza that
may be framed as fringe cases or slow-burning human rights atrocities that have been
highlighted as ‘structural atrocities’ and received little international attention as cases for
potential intervention. Perhaps the most blatant, Darfur, provides a recent case of mass
atrocities committed by a state actor. However, the Darfur crisis had escalated and
peaked from 2003-2004, prior to the more formal adoption of R2P at the 2005 World
Summit153. With the first case beginning in 2009, these three were selected to highlight
cases carried out or directly supported by state actors within the purview of the more-
recent normative context post-R2P recognition.
Case Analysis
152 See: Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015); Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) among others.
153 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 8.
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In each case, I examine the background and nature of atrocities to outline the context
surrounding imminent or ongoing mass atrocity crimes and invocation of R2P. I then
focus on the behavior and justifications of international actors, tracing the contestation of
nonintervention within each case. Particularly regarding international security and
intervention, “Contested interpretations are played out and compete on the international
states for the benefit of wider audiences and to persuade them, most prominently in the
UN Security Council”154. Tracing both the actions and justifications of states allows
examination of state behavior to provide insight into how nonintervention has informed
decisions in particular contexts. This is made difficult by the fact that “We can only have
indirect evidence of norms just as we can only have indirect evidence of most other
motivations for political action (interests or threats for example)"155. In relation to the
norm’s invocation and what constitutes a reference to specific norms, I take an expansive
view. While a matter of debate particularly surrounding R2P, the ‘responsibility to
protect’ for this thesis is also expanded to encompass references to the 2005 world
summit document, variations of (for example, ‘paragraphs 138 and 139’ or ‘the
responsibility of each state to protect civilians’), also surrounding ‘manifest failure’ to
protect populations from the four mass atrocity crimes156. As the distinctly modern
manifestation of an international ‘civilian protection norm’ there must be some direct
reference to R2P. However, this thesis is more concerned with the normative position that
even during cases of imminent or ongoing mass atrocity crimes, the contestation of
nonintervention as principled assertions in the face of such actions, which serves to
normatively insulate the external projection of force. This may be a reference to violation
of the UN Charter, non-use of force, or the articulated arguments that that the
international community has a principled obligation to refrain from intervention in such
154 Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, 8.
155 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 892.
156 Justin Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum’, International Affairs,
89(5) (2013), 1267.
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cases devoid of regime consent. These are highly contextual assertions of actors that a
norm of nonintervention should be upheld and implemented as an international standard
of behavior. Critically, not all justifications for inaction reinforce or illustrate the salience
of nonintervention as a norm, but could also reflect the pragmatic application of the
intervention norm articulated through R2P. This in itself provides a useful lens to address
the interaction between R2P and nonintervention with normative factors also existing
alongside competing norms and non-normative material and political factors – analysis
that requires an in-depth examination or relevant global actors and wider international
context surrounding any particular case of mass atrocity crimes.
In addressing the contestation of nonintervention, I draw from multiple sources for
evidence including institutionalized rules of multilateral organization, relevant
scholarship, and the legitimating practices of states through social practices defined as
discourses157. Evidence can be drawn from statements and resolutions within UN bodies
such as the Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Right Council and the
legitimating practices of states within those organs. While the principal vestige of
authority in the modern international security order, the Security Council is also “a key
venue for deliberation and justificatory discourse – a place where the rules about the use
of force are defined, debated, interpreted and reinterpreted”158. These sources exist in
greater context along a wider and growing body of conventions addressing human rights
and R2P including the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document which outline the
continued contingency of sovereignty on state legitimacy defined in terms of human
rights protections159. Greater clarity can also be drawn from a growing body of
157 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 900; Wiener, ‘Enacting
Meaning-in-Use’, 176-177.
158 Ian Johnstone, ‘Discursive Power in the UN Security Council’, Journal of International Law and
International Relations, 2(1) (2005), 73.
159 Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, ‘The Principle of Non-intervention’, Leiden Journal of
International Law 22(2) (2009), 345-381.
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scholarship and research surrounding humanitarian intervention, the Responsibility to
Protect, and its impact at the international level. R2P provides a particularly relevant case
in part due to the wide body of contributions, and connection between scholarship and
foreign policy within global organizations, institutions, and states. The ICISS report itself
emerged from a group of vocal researchers, states, and at request of UN officials such as
Kofi Annan - working closely among states and officials to create a relevant and
workable policy initiative. Scholars such as Jennifer Welsh, Francis Deng, and Samantha
Power among many others have addressed issues surrounding state responsibility and
military intervention, and also been active political players involved in policy discourse
and decision-making as the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor on the
Responsibility to Protect, Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, and US
Ambassador to the UN, respectively. As a longstanding issue in foreign policy, military
intervention and human rights protections have both been addressed thoroughly –
outlining the continued relevance and normative order surrounding the importance of
both nonintervention and the protection of populations from egregious violations of their
human rights. Through contestation of these norms across periods of crisis, it is possible
to illustrate how nonintervention continues to inform the decisions of state actors even in
the face of mass atrocities at the international level.
Tracing the continued contestation of nonintervention serves as an important lens to
address how the norm continues to inform the decisions of state actors, while illuminating
the modern boundaries of R2P. As the subjectively interpreted meanings of normative
principles conflict or the behavior of actors are disjointed from normative beliefs – across
various global levels– actors appraise and constantly re-appraise the legitimacy and
relevance of specific norms aligned with contextual situations and practices160. This
contestation serves as a means to illuminate the ‘meaning-in-use’ of specific norms as
160 Badescu and Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms’, 355.
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actors are forced to apply meanings, but also a mechanism of strategic construction, as
actors project their preferred interpretation of norms at the international level – a means
of legitimation161. When agent’s conceptions of justice diverge with intra-state
humanitarian crises – a normative paradox arises which yields contestation surrounding
how to best protect human dignity. This dichotomy is illustrated through the normative
contestation of nonintervention and international civilian protection as ‘conflictive
interpretations of values’162.
Conclusion
Examining both the material and ideational elements of reality, social constructivists
view norms as constitutive elements of reality. While states and other global actors still
pursue their relative interests, they do so in an international normative and legal context
that constrains and empowers state action while elucidating the normative bounds of the
international order. Through contestation, defined as social discourses, norms emerge and
are transformed. This shapes normative meanings, their relative strength, and sets part of
the normative context surrounding future debate. This is a historically and international
context contingent process, which also elucidates norms ‘meaning-in-use’ through the
application and invocation of normative meanings – particularly during times of crisis163.
Addressing the contestation of norms as conflicting interpretation of values – or the
disconnect between subjective appraisals – and intersubjective norms, elucidates meaning
and change of norms as they are applied in concrete situations. Norm contestation then
plays an important role in illustrating normative change at the international level as well
as how norms influence the decision of international actors. The following chapter will
161 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 176.
162 Wood, Heather Jacques, Taylor Nuttall, and Kendall Stiles, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ in Wayne
Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles (eds.), International Norms and Cycles of Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), p. 263; Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, intervention and norm contestation’, 326.
163 Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-in-Use’, 175-193.
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outline the norm of nonintervention, its importance as an undergirding principle of the
modern international system, and its contestation – specifically through the emergence
and ‘nesting’ of R2P.
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Chapter 2: The Janus Face of Nonintervention
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical foundations that will be developed
throughout this thesis tied to social constructivism and the English School. Norms as
standards of appropriate behavior provide meaning and context within a socially
constructed reality in which both material and ideational factors inform decisions. In
parallel, while these social constructions are shaped, they reciprocally shape the
international system. These norms are introduced, molded, and maintained under the
weight of state practice, which can be traced through social discourses. This second
chapter shifts to outline the norm of nonintervention and its persistence through the
emergence of R2P. The first section of this chapter outlines nonintervention and its
relationship to international order – an internalized norm of international society
entrenched in international law. Second, this chapter addresses the normative shift
surrounding human rights protection and emergence of R2P. Third, engaging relevant
literature surrounding the contentious impact of R2P in international relations, I assert
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that through the norm’s emergence, the salience of nonintervention has reciprocally
shaped and challenged the implementation of R2P – setting the context for further
analysis through three empirical cases.
International Order and the Norm of Nonintervention
The idea that sovereignty entails exclusive jurisdiction and the imperative to refrain from
coercive interference in the internal affairs of other’s is widely framed as the traditional
conception of statehood1. This formation is articulated under the principle of cuius regio,
eius religio, codified at the Religions Peace of Augsburg and later affirmed at the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648 ending the Thirty Years’ War in Europe2. From a realist approach
to international relations, there has been a tendency to frame this Westphalian conception
of sovereignty and its corollary of nonintervention as static, with state behavior mirroring
consequential interests of states rather than the influence of evolving normative
structures. Through the recurrent ‘violation’ of a static Westphalian sovereignty
throughout history, Stephen Krasner asserts that the international system is best
conceived as ‘Organized Hypocrisy’3. However, English School scholarship has long
disputed these rigid assumptions, with the past several decades also yielding a rise in
critical legal and predominantly constructivist scholarship challenging this dehistoricized
conception of sovereignty and its supposed traditional corollary of nonintervention4. As
Charles Kegley et al. outline, “to accept this traditional definition of nonintervention
invites the fallacious conclusion that the meaning of intervention – the illegal coercive
interference of one sovereign state in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state – is
1 J. Brian Hehir, ‘Intervention: From theories to cases’, Ethics and International Affairs 9(1), 6.
2 Philip Windsor, ‘Superpower Intervention’ in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 45.
3 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
4 Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2014), p. 56.
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invariant overtime”5. Sovereignty may be broadly conceived as political autonomy within
delimited territorial boundaries, but its constitutive meaning shifts and reflects societal
transformations. These norms may vary in interpretation and salience among members,
but their regulative influence as inter-subjective standards serve to condition international
actors and as a means to appraise international behavior. With changes in the
undergirding beliefs and values within an international society, this normative order
could shift, conditioning different interpretations of what constitutes legitimate behavior.
The frontiers protected by the principle of nonintervention are unclear at any one
time, they vary over time, and they are defined differently by different
statesmen… But the idea of frontier remains a helpful one, not least for
international law, in establishing a convention that there are frontiers which states
must have good reason to cross6.
Drawing from an English School approach, an international normative architecture has
developed historically amongst political communities and projected globally with the
expansion of international society. Through a minimum level of shared values and beliefs
in the maintenance of international order, a society is formed in which the behaviors of
states reflect neither purely Hobbesian realism nor Kantian liberalism, but are regulated
by norms and institutions7. Amongst these norms as Hedley Bull outlines, intervention,
“is generally believed to be legally and morally wrong: sovereign states or independent
political communities are thought to have the right to have there spheres of jurisdiction
5 Charles W. Kegley Jr., Gregory A. Raymond and Margaret G. Hermann, ‘The rise and fall of the
nonintervention norm: Some correlates and potential consequences’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
22(1) (1998), 82.
6 R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),
pp.15-16.
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colombia
University Press, 1977), p. 13.
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respected, and dictatorial interference abridges that right”8. This normative argument
stems from the moral utility of nonintervention with both an internal and external
dimension. Externally, intervention is seen as a provocation of global instability with the
projection of force having a tendency to strain relations between states, contributing to
wider international conflict. While the principle also has an internal dimension, providing
political communities autonomy to develop institutions and societies reflective of their
relative values and beliefs. As pluralists emphasize, because there is a minimal level of
shared values and beliefs, expansive interpretations of justice attached to ethics and
universal human rights may have limited legitimacy and negative influence on
international order which international society functions to preserve9.
As R.J. Vincent outlines, that principle of nonintervention rests upon “placing order
between states before justice for the responsibility of making a decision as to whether an
actor or institution within any of them is just or unjust”10. The rationale for humanitarian
intervention is then often cyclically conflictual – meaning that the vitiation of sovereignty
for the benefit of individual rights may actually weaken and potentially destabilize
international order, which undermines collective human security. It is “within states that a
platform of order is established on which the justice we associate with the notion of
human rights might be based. So anything that threatens order threatens also the
possibility of achieving justice”11. Ideally, nonintervention serves as a means to protect
political communities – a conception of international society in which different cultures,
religions, and value-sets may exist within distinct political communities that may best
8 Hedley Bull, ‘Introduction’ in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984), p. 2.
9 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 6.
10Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, p. 344.
11 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), p. 114.
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reflect and protect their domestic populations12. As Michael Walzer argues, the value of
this order is in part embedded in the idea of ‘communal integrity’ which “derives its
moral and political force from the rights of contemporary men and women to live as
members of a historic community and to express their inherited culture through political
forms worked out amongst themselves”13. The rationale for any intervention must then be
restricted at a necessarily high level14. These ‘statist’ arguments often echo John Stuart
Mill’s classic essay (1859) ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ which provided two
primary bases or rationale for nonintervention: referring to how intervention ‘undermines
the authenticity of domestic struggles for liberty’, and that the exportation of freedom
through intervention would be unstable or untenable15. If an intrastate conflict is entirely
‘native’, then those within the state should have the ability to seek stability and liberty
without foreign interference, for “if they have not sufficient love for liberty to be able to
rest it from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other
hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent”16. As inherently
authoritative, the projection of force often plays a critical role in domestic political
outcomes. With foreign militaries propping up existing regimes, or leading to regime
change through their support of particular domestic actors, the resulting institutions and
leadership may then not reflect domestic legitimacy – contributing to further instability.
The norm of nonintervention may then be pegged to the argument that conceptions of
justice surrounding particular behavior, actors, or institutions within states cannot be
12 Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), p. 214; Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty’, The
International Journal of Human Rights 6(1) (2002), 92.
13 Michael Walzer, ‘The moral standing of states: A response to four critics’, Philosophy & Public Affairs
9(3), 211.
14 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic
Books, 1977), p. 107.
15 Michael W. Doyle, ‘International ethics and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Studies Review
13(1) (2011), p. 76.
16 John Stuart Mill, ‘A few words on non-intervention’, New England Review (2006) [1859], 260.
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determined externally. But as Nicholas Onuf highlights, a strict adherence to
nonintervention takes for granted the existence of at times conflictive values and beliefs
of the international order, which assumes its own normative form17. This highlights the
duality of the modern international society, with the norm of nonintervention ensuring
international order as a means of protecting human rights, and in doing so, normatively
insulating outside actors from coercive interference that at times may serve to protect
human rights. What Nicholas Wheeler highlights as ‘exposing the conflict between order
and justice as its starkest’18. However, hinting at the potential for normative
interventionary practice for humanitarian or other purposes, Hedley Bull caveated, “If,
however, an intervention itself expresses the collective will of the society of states, it may
be carried out without bringing that harmony and concord (of the society of sovereign
states) into jeopardy”19. In this respect, rather than human rights and nonintervention as
dichotomous principles, their interaction emphasizes how the values, beliefs, and
practices of states have constructed an international normative architecture reflective of
conceptions of how best to secure international order. As Anthony Lang outlines, “Here
arises a dilemma, not one between amoral politicians and moralistic humanitarians, but
one between competing moral claims about the nature of responsibility and political
community”20. International rules and institutions then serve as contested manifestations
of values surrounding how best to secure and sustain international order, which is
reflective in the normative development of an international architecture and its regulative
impact on state behavior.
17 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Normative Framework for Humanitarian Intervention’ in Anthony F. Lang Jr. (ed.), Just
Intervention (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), p. 35; Krasner, Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy, 21
18 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 11.
19 Hedley Bull, ‘Conclusion’ in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984), p. 195.
20 Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘Humanitarian Intervention- Definition and Debates’ in Anthony F. Lang Jr. (ed.),
Just Intervention (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), p. 2.
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Far from detached from conceptions of the protection of human dignity, the first widely-
cited articulations of reciprocal non-interference were linked to individual rights through
accounts of natural law within the work of Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel21.
It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all
have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the smallest
right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that can belong to
a nation, sovereignty is doubtless, the most precious, and that which other nations
ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury22.
Framing the current international system as one based on contingent norms, the historic
evolution of nonintervention highlights its ‘essentially relative’ character – shaped by and
shaping the normative conceptions and behavior of state actors23. As Tom Ruys argues,
“up until the nineteenth century, the predominant conviction was that every State had a
customary right, inherent in sovereignty itself, to embark upon war whenever it
pleased”24. The projection of force to collect foreign debts, rescue one’s own nationals,
and war plunder were all recognized practices until norms shaped the behavior of states25.
Along with the development of positive international law through into the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, intervention became ‘progressively illegal’, coming to underwrite the
modern international system as a deeply entrenched and internalized norm that states will
21 Onuf, ‘Normative Framework for Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 35; Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized
Hypocrisy, 21
22 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and
Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and
on Luxury, Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (eds.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), p. 289.
23 Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, ‘The principle of non-intervention’, Leiden Journal of
International Law 22(2) (2009), p. 381.
24 Tom Ruys, “Armed Attack” and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
25 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention.
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refrain from coercive interference in each other’s affairs26. While many frame the
traditional conception of Westphalian sovereignty with a static or absolute correlative of
nonintervention, it was not until the twentieth century that nonintervention was firmly
‘established as a sacrosanct and unconditional principle of international law’27. Through
periods of upheaval and crisis, the growing destruction of warfare, disruptive impact of
intervention for societal development contributed to expansive definitions of aggression –
paralleling a more absolute conception and articulation of nonintervention. Grounded in
conceptions of sovereign equality and self-determination following two world wars and
process of decolonization, nonintervention was tied to human rights through the creation
of the UN28.
An expansive definition of aggression to include the ‘threat’ as well as the use of force
was included in the drafting of the UN Charter in San Francisco at the request of several
smaller states including Bolivia and Norway – “designed to ensure there were no
loopholes”29. Among the concerns was the right to determine their own domestic
institutions and forms of government, free from outside interference. Within a decade of
signing the UN Charter, the General Assembly affirmed a universal conception of
sovereign independence with non-contingent rights on intra-state capacity to govern30.
Framed as a type of ‘Charter Liberalism’ embracing agnosticism towards the internal
practices or regime characteristics of states, “laudable objectives – such as the promotion
of human rights, justice, and social progress – were equally included among the purposes
26 Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ in Patrick Hayden (ed.), The Ashgate Research
Companion to Ethics and International Relations (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p. 135.
27 Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect, 56.
28 Christian Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 201.
29 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 49.
30 Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect, 150; Jean L. Cohen, Globalisation and
Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), p. 175.
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of the United Nations; however, theses were to be realized by peaceful means – their
pursuit did not justify the use of force”31. With increased UN membership through the
1950s, the process of decolonization took hold, along with diffusion of nonintervention as
universal norm.
The UN Charter comprehensively proscribes intervention outside of self-defense under
Article 51 and Chapter VII enforcement measures adopted by the Security Council under
Article 42 in response to ‘international threats to peace and security’. Article 2(4)
outlines: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any states, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. Furthermore, Article
2(7) asserts: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’
which defines not only the boundaries of state authority, but the limits of international
jurisdiction. The UN Charter thus explicitly bans the international threat or use of force,
and further restricts the UN from intervention in the internal affairs of states.
The UN General Assembly repeatedly affirmed the prohibition of intervention with a
parallel articulation within customary international law outlined by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)32. In December 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, with its substantive section affirmed in
the 1970 UN Friendly Relations Declaration:
31 Theresa Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect (New York: Routledge Press, 2013), pp.
54-55.
32 Marc Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.
60.
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No state or Group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against
the personality of the State or against its political, economic or cultural elements,
are in violation of international law33.
Regional organizational charters also outlined parallel assertions including; Articles 19
and 21 of the Organization of American States, Title I of the Treaty of the European
Union, Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 2(2) of the Charter
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation, Pact of the League of Arab States, and
Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference34. As early as 1949, ICJ affirmed
the customary international legal principle of nonintervention and it non-contingency
amongst existing international institutions:
[T]he alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such
as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever
be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international
law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would
take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of
international justice itself35.
33 UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution 2625’, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625, 24 October
1970; also see: UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution 2131’, UN GAOR, 20th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/20/2131,
21 December 1965, para. 2.
34 Jamnejad and Wood, ‘The principle of non-intervention’, 363-364.
35 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania, Corfu Channel Case, International
Court of Justice (1949), rep. 4, p. 35.
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Particularly in the Nicaragua v United States of America case in 1986, the ICJ made it
clear that customary international law does not allow for ‘justified’ cases of intervention
in support of ‘political or moral values’ – “For such a general right to come into existence
would involve a fundamental modification of the customary law principle of non-
intervention”36. Nonintervention thus transformed as a constitutive norm of state
sovereignty, becoming internalized internationally – deeply embedded within
international law and international societal conceptions surrounding the legitimate
application of force. Far from a powerless intermediary variable, nonintervention served
as the ‘prevailing standard of appropriateness’ with intervention outside of self-defense
and UNSC chapter VII authorization in response to international threats acknowledged as
illegitimate37.
Consequently, throughout the Cold War, this norm of nonintervention conditioned state
interests, framing debate and providing a salient block against articulations of a state right
or international responsibility or right to project force outside of collective self-defense.
Intervention’s still occurred, but of those cases from 1945-1990 widely referred to as
humanitarian in nature or outcome – all three were largely incidental to wider strategic
interests of intervening states and were justified in terms of prevailing norms38. While a
number of interventions functionally ended mass human rights atrocities referring to
ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity they illustrate the
normative salience of nonintervention with international actors widely condemning the
actions of intervening states and in cases pushed for international or regional sanctions39.
Furthermore, when force was projected overtly and covertly throughout the Cold War,
36 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
International Court of Justice (1986), p. 106, para 206-207.
37 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’,
International Organization 52(4) (1998), p. 895.
38 Brad R. Roth, Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement: Premises of a Pluralist International Legal
Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) , p. 237.
39 Wheeler, Saving Strangers.
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the range of interests pursued reflected the ideological and material power realities of the
superpowers with the breaches provoking “such fierce controversy and so much
nationalistic passion that their net effect was to reinforce, not negate, the norm of non-
intervention”40. While cases of regime consent proved politically less contentious, the
existing normative international order affirmed nonintervention41. However, the 1990s
seemed to herald a normative shift, with the influence of human rights norms promoting
intervention in areas previously restricted.
The Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect
The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the perceived nature of sovereignty, with the
legitimacy of individual states increasingly tied to the state authorities’ capacity and
willingness to protect its population from egregious abuses. The promotion of liberal
institutionalism and democratization unleashed a wave of commissions and intellectual
activity advocating the language of humanitarianism and strengthening of the UN’s role
in international security politics42. The rapid development of non-government
organizations (NGOs) and their work in promoting liberal human rights norms also meant
that while intra-state crises were far from new, they became harder to ignore and easier
for domestic populations to endorse43. The nature of threats also shifted with the decline
of Soviet power and greater emphasis placed on intra-state structural and development
concerns44. As John Ikenberry outlines, “The threat to international order was no longer
40 S. Neil MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics (Oxford: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 350, 2002); Ramesh Thakur, ‘Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the
Responsibility to Protect: Experiences by ICISS’, Security Dialogue 33(3) (2002), 329.
41 D. J. B. Trim and Brendan Simms, ‘Towards a history of humanitarian intervention’, in Brendan Simms
and D. J. B. Trim (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), pp. 1-24.
42 Michael Barnett, The International Humanitarian Order (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 21.
43 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
44 Benjamin E. Valentino, ‘The true costs of humanitarian intervention: The hard truth about a noble
notion’, Foreign Affairs (2011), 61.
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great-power war, as it had been for centuries, but violence and instability emerging from
weak, failed and hostile states residing on the periphery of the system”45. The number of
intra-state relative to inter-state conflict deaths and internally displaced populations
(IDPs) had skyrocketed, with war refugees in the tens of millions46. The UN’s Special
Advisor on IDPs Francis Deng among others challenged statist conceptions of
sovereignty through pegging the legitimacy of states to their capacities to protect
populations:
Sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be
held accountable. And they are accountable not only to their national
constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by
effectively discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can
legitimately claim protection for its national sovereignty47
Traditional conceptions of sovereignty were seen to be eroding through the promotion of
human rights norms and processes of globalization48. In this wake, UN institutional focus
highlighted shifting emphasis from inter-state conflict to intra-state structural concerns,
peacekeeping and peace enforcement initiatives that included the use of military force49.
As David Malone highlights, the early 1990s marked ‘a period of euphoria’ surrounding
the UN, peacekeeping, and peacemaking activism50. Following protection measures in
45 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 222.
46 Robin Cohen and Francis Mading Deng (eds.) The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally
Displaced (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1998), p.1.
47 Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartman,
Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute,
1996), p. 1.
48 Cohen, Globalisation and Sovereignty, p.159.
49 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, p. 52; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis,
‘Peacekeeping Operations’ in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the United
Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 324.
50 David M. Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 11.
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1991 for the Kurds in Northern Iraq, French President François Mitterrand declared, “For
the first time, non-interference has stopped at the point where it was becoming failure to
assist a people in danger’51. The UNSC authorized unprecedented action - the recognition
of failed states as potential threats to international peace and security in Somalia 1992,
efforts to militarily disarm and build institutions in Cambodia 1992-93, and the approval
of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect populations in Bosnia 199352. From a range of
policy areas, the rights of states were argued as increasingly contingent on stable
governance and protection of basic human rights53.
Non-interventions also played a substantial role in the development of a more solidarist
approach to humanitarian intervention. In 1994, nearly a million were killed in roughly
three months during the Rwandan Genocide. As Michael Barnett highlights, the UN –
most prominently the P5 – responded with what is best categorized as ‘willful ignorance
and indifference’54. Looking on in silence, the UN Security Council reduced
peacekeeping forces and stood idle as reports surfaced regarding the scale and nature of
atrocities55. A year later in 1995, UN peacekeepers in Bosnia failed to prevent to mass
murder of over eight thousand men and boys within the UN declared ‘safe area’ of
Srebrenica. While a UN mission had already been in place, the mandated scope and
extent of protection had failed a civilian population – further shifting international
emphasis towards the promotion of greater protection measures.
51 Kofi Annan, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention in the Twenty-First Century’ in Samantha
Power and Graham Allison (eds.), Realising Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 311.
52 James Mayall, ‘Introduction’ in James Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United
National Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), pp.1-24; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 251-252.
53 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan 246.
54 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (New York: Cornell
University Press, 2002), p. 4.
55 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow
Books, 2003).
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The Kosovo Crisis in 1999 proved a ‘watershed event’56. Stalled at the UNSC by implicit
Chinese and Russian vetoes, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened
without authorization in response to ongoing ethnic cleansing committed by the Belgrade
authorities. US President Bill Clinton took a particularly active stance, with UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair asserting: “the principle of noninterference must be qualified in
important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter”57. However,
the intervention highlighted a central problem; without a case of self-defense, regime
consent, or Security Council authorization, the military force projection was a violation
of international law and undergirding normative structure of international order58. As
Ramesh Thakur outlines, NATO military actors in Kosovo without UNSC approval faced
a triple policy dilemma: (1) A strict adoption of nonintervention in the interest of self-
determination and sovereign inviolability provides state authorities with a seeming
license to kill that at times included external complacency in cases of intra-state mass
atrocity crimes, while (2) the only legal means of projecting force remains the UN
Security Council – placing international authority and potential ‘policy paralysis’ within
the strategic interests of the Permanent Five. But (3) to act without Security Council
approval violates international law and threatens to undermine international order59. The
post-action Kosovo Commission famously asserted that the intervention was ‘illegal but
legitimate’ or an act of principled non-compliance in which adherence to existing rules
56 Doyle, ‘International ethics and the Responsibility to Protect’, 79.
57 Tony Blair, ‘The Blair Doctrine’, speech given to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Chicago, 22
April 1999, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/; William Clinton,
‘Remarks by the President to the KFOR Troops’, speech given at Skopje, Macedonia Airport, 22 June 1999,
http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/ WH/New/Europe-9906/html/Speeches/990622d.html; Doyle,
‘International ethics and the Responsibility to Protect’, 79.
58 Doyle, ‘International ethics and the Responsibility to Protect’, 79
59 Ramesh Thakur, ‘Law, Legitimacy, and the United Nations’ in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and
Vesselin Popovski (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), p. 53.
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would have been an illegitimate stain on the conscious of mankind60. To the General
Assembly in 1999, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan asserted:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use
of force in absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask… in the context
of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition
of states had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population but did not
receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside
and allowed the horror to unfold?61
If the projection of military force for the protection of fundamental rights was legitimate
under specific circumstances, the international community needed greater clarity
surrounding what thresholds or criteria existed. Emphasizing ‘sovereignty as
responsibility’ drawing from Francis Deng and other’s, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan endorsed, and Canada supported, the creation of an International Commission on
State Sovereignty (ICISS) to establish ‘clearer rules, procedures, and criteria for
determining whether, when and how to intervene’ that could be embraced by the
UNGA62. Led by Australia’s former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Algerian
diplomat, Mohammed Sahnoun, the Commission was overseen by an advisory board to
ground their report in political realities as well as its own research directorate – leading
various global roundtables in cities such as St. Petersburg, Washington DC, New Delhi,
60 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict International Response,
Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4.
61 UN Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General presents his Annual Report to General Assembly’, Press
Release SG/SM/7136, GA/9596, 20 September 1999, accessed 5 May 2015, http://www.un.org/press/
en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html.
62 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 11.
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and Beijing which shaped the positions of commissioners while providing a ‘cross
regional testing ground’ for ideas and proposals leading up to the report’s release63.
In 2001, the ICISS released their report, entitled the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which
argued that as sovereign actors, state rights are contingent on the responsibility to protect
their populations. Grounded in existing international law and the just war tradition, the
report provided a framework of rules and conditions surrounding state responsibility and
cases in which the responsibility shifts to the international community64. Outlining a
three-fold responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild, prevention was highlighted as ‘the
single most important dimension’ with subsequent positive and negative instruments to
ensure civilian protection ranging from political pressure, economic tools, to the
projection of force65. Under the most severe conditions, the report outlined two ‘threshold
criteria’ or circumstances in which military intervention might be justified for human
protection purposes, (1) to “halt or avert: large scale loss of life, real or apprehended,
with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation” or alternatively, (2) in cases of “large
scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced
expulsion, acts of terror or rape”66. Acknowledging that military force should only be
used in those most exceptional cases, the framework embraced a set of precautionary just
war principles including right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort,
proportional means, and reasonable prospects67.
63 Alex J. Bellamy, A Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2009), pp. 43-48; Marc Pollentine, ‘Constructing the Responsibility to Protect’ (PhD diss.,
Cardiff University, 2012), p. 115.
64 Anthony F. Lang Jr., ‘Conflicting Rules: Global Constitutionalism and the Kosovo Intervention’, Journal
of Intervention and Statebuilding 3(2) (2009), 185-204.
65 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, xi.
66 Doyle, ‘International ethics and the Responsibility to Protect’, 79; ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, p.
32.
67 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 32-37.
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Shifting the debate from an external right to intervene to the internal responsibilities of
governments, R2P was expanded to address root causes and criteria for when and under
what authority humanitarian intervention could be more legitimately carried out –
drawing directly from and emerging to shift – the international normative context
surrounding human rights protection. As Gareth Evans asserts, “the whole point of
embracing the new language of ‘the responsibility to protect’ is that it is capable of
generating an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscious-shocking cases in a
way that ‘right to intervene’ language could not”68. Having failed to respond adequately
in Rwanda, Srebrenica, or authorize protection measures in Kosovo, the ICISS forwarded
a set of rules and criteria that could be embraced by the international community. Resting
the normative impact of R2P on existing institutional mechanisms, the legality and to
large part, legitimacy rests on the political will of the P5 to address specific crises and
military capacity of regional actors or those international powers with the ability to
project force globally.
The question of authority proved a particularly ‘thorny issue’69. Emphasizing that the
ongoing legitimacy of the UNSC is tied to its capacity to respond to international threats
– which implicitly includes civilian protection measures – the ICISS proposed a
voluntary agreement among UNSC members to not veto majority backed R2P resolutions
unless their vital national interests are at stake70. The report further highlighted the
General Assembly’s ‘Uniting For Peace’ resolution of 1950, and potential for regional or
sub-regional input surrounding authorization – leaving the possibility of ‘coalition of the
willing’ questions without UNSC authorization in-part ambiguous, as well as
responsibility surrounding non-intentional killings, de-facto civil war circumstances,
68 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All (Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2009), p. 65.
69 Alex J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds (New York:
Routledge, 2011), p. 9.
70 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.
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removal of democratically elected regimes, and natural disasters71. However, the
Commission ultimately concluded, “As a matter of political reality, it would be
impossible to find consensus, in the Commission’s view, around any set of proposals for
military intervention which acknowledge the validity of any intervention not authorized
by the Security Council or General Assembly”72. The R2P report was both evidence of
changing international understandings surrounding civilian protection in relation to
international order, and contested as a means to build greater consensus surrounding how
the international community could better respond to halt or avert large-scale atrocities.
Released in the turbulent post-9/11 environment of the Global War on Terror, R2P faced
widespread skepticism surrounding humanitarian justifications underwriting the
preemptive invasion of Iraq. However, norm entrepreneurs continued to promote its more
formal institutionalization73. In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, the UN
Secretary-General established the ‘High Level Panel on Threat, Challenge and Change’
in 2004 to address potential institutional reform74. As a panel member, Gareth Evans and
other R2P norm entrepreneurs worked alongside Secretary-General Kofi Annan and were
able to develop momentum towards greater institutionalization of R2P75. These actors
ensured the principle’s inclusion in the High Level Panel’s findings as well as the
Secretary General’s report In Larger Freedom leading up to the World Summit. The High
Level Panel endorsed an ‘emerging norm that there is a collective international
responsibility to protect’, further asserting:
71 Ibid., pp. 47-50; Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Catalyzing Debate
and Building Capacity’ in Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard (eds.), Implementation and World Politics:
How International Norms Change Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 128-129.
72 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 6,37
73 Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty’.
74 Bellamy, A Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, p. 76.
75 Pollentine, ‘Constructing the Responsibility to Protect’.
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In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the
privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions
may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of
State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to
protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider
international community76.
The 2005 World Summit marked the sixtieth anniversary for the UN and was widely
attended by heads of government and state to recognize the achievements of the UN and
negotiate potential UNSC and wider institutional reform. Leading into the final stages of
the World Summit, the General Assembly President at the time, Gabon’s Jean Ping, “with
strong encouragement from Kofi Annan, a small group from the Secretariat worked
throughout the night playing Solomon – in essence removing brackets or making
compromises on proposed language”77. Continuing work on the initial draft to reflect
changes with the ongoing discourse and debates among delegations, paragraphs within
the final proposed Outcome Document included a modified R2P that reflected
negotiations and stronger consensus surrounding the norm’s meaning78. As an outlined
period of normative contestation, the draft’s articulation drew upon the ICISS report, but
shaped the norm aligned with the argumentation of international actors reflective of
international beliefs and values. These actors ensured that the norm was addressed and
embedded in the normative architecture of an international order through
entrepreneurship amongst international leaders, affirmed through widespread consensus
surrounding the norm’s clarified meaning. As Thomas Weiss highlights, what emerged
76 The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A more secure world:
Our shared responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change’, UN Doc. A/59/565 (New York: United Nations, 2004).para, 203.
77 Stephen John Stedman, ‘UN transformation in an era of soft balancing’, International Affairs 83(5)
(2007), 941.
78 Pollentine, ‘Constructing the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 157.
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was ‘R2P light’, yet, even still, “R2P was one of the few substantive items to survive
relatively intact the negotiations at the World Summit”79. Specifically addressed in two
core paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (SOD):
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate,
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration
of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit
79 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 117.
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ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts
break out80.
Unanimously endorsed at the largest gathering of international heads of government and
state to date, the SOD was later adopted by the General Assembly with the paragraphs
directly referenced and unanimously endorsed by the UNSC six months later in
Resolution 1674 (2006). As the UN Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect would later outline, what emerged was an institutionally
recognized and unanimously endorsed norm framed within three equally weighted non-
sequential pillars81. The first pillar outlines that states have a responsibility to protect
their own populations from specific mass atrocity crimes including genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement – defined
by the Secretary General as the ‘bedrock’ of R2P derived from existing international
law82. The second pillar relates to the international responsibility to ‘assist and
encourage’ member states in meeting their responsibilities to protect through
international assistance and capacity building. Measures under pillar two could include
the entire spectrum of foreign policy tools but only with ‘an active partnership between
the international community and the state’ situating pillar two explicitly in state
consent83. Pillar three outlines the international community’s responsibility to take timely
and decisive action in response to the four crimes specified in pillar one, through
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means and on a case-by-case
80 UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., UN Doc.
A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.
81UN Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’,
UN GAOR, 63rd Sess., UN Doc. A/63/677, 12 January 2009, p. 2.
82 Ibid., p. 8.
83 Ibid., p. 15; Alex J. Bellamy, ‘A chronic protection problem: The DPRK and the Responsibility to
Protect’, International Affairs 91(2), 226.
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basis ‘should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing
to protect their populations’, implement collective measures under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter84.
Institutionalization and Normative Impact
R2P and humanitarian intervention as a practice serve as distinct concepts. However, the
two, as Carsten Stahn outlines, “coincide in their rejection of sovereignty as a shield
against the principle of non-intervention”85. The argued influence of R2P has been
heralded by many as an erosion of traditional conceptions of sovereignty, with expansive
normative obligations that embrace the language of global responsibility that transcends
international borders. Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins assert, the normative evolution of R2P
“has made non-intervention in the face of mass atrocity crimes less likely. The legitimacy
accorded to R2P is sufficiently broad and deep to mean that it is more difficult for states
to continue with ‘business as usual’ when mass atrocity crimes are occurring”86. While
the UN’s Office of the Special Advisor on R2P boldly asserts: “Sovereignty no longer
exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that
holds States accountable for the welfare of their people”87. This has also expanded to
international legal scholarship. As Ruti Teitel echoes, R2P serves as evidence of and
continues to advance a paradigm shift toward ‘Humanity’s Law’ in which the normative
undergirding of international order has transitioned from state security to conceptions of
human security88.
84 UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’.
85 Carsten Stahn, ‘Between Law-breaking and Law-making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and “What
the Law Ought to Be”’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 19(1) (2014), 30.
86 Dunne, T., & Gifkins, J. (2011). Libya and the state of intervention. Australian Journal of International
Affairs 65(5), 519.
87 UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, United
Nations, accessed 5 July 2015, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.
88 Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4.
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However, while R2P has permeated international discourse, its inconsistent
implementation in terms of intervention has been a sign for many critics of its inability to
build effective responses to mass atrocity crimes. Thus, R2P has been framed as largely
failing through the Darfur Region of Sudan, Syria and slower-burning structural atrocities
globally, with many scholars and policymakers questioning its actual impact89. As Aiden
Hehir asserts, “While the term ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and its abbreviation ‘R2P’ have
very quickly pervaded political discourse, both lack substance and are little more than
slogans employed for differing purposes shorn of any real meaning or utility”90. While
R2P might have some distant or nominal normative value, without meaningful
institutional change to separate humanitarian aims from the political will of the P5, or
development of an independent military force, R2P’s enforcement ‘remains a matter of
political will which is by definition transitory and context specific’91. R2P’s track record
for acting as a ‘moral lever’ has then been questionable and likely to be heavily impacted
by the rise of Russia, China, and other BRICS (i.e. Brazil, India, and South Africa)92. The
‘politicization’ of the UNSC, and lack of military resources then highlight a continued
failure of existing institutions to consistently address international requirements for
international peace and security93. However, while the projection of force internationally
does reflect politicized decisions, an independent judiciary or military force to address
such crises would arguably emerge through the recognition that existing institutions
continue to deliver illegitimate outcomes. If cases of interventionary practice aligned with
89 Alex De Waal, ‘Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 83(6) (2007),
1039-1054; Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, ‘Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, 2000-2009: Massive human rights
violations and the failure to protect’, Human Rights Quarterly 32(4) (2010), 898-920.
90 Aidan Hehir, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: “Sound and fury signifying nothing”?’, International
Relations 24(2) (2010), 219.
91 Aidan Hehir and Anthony F. Lang, ‘The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the
International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect’, Criminal Law Forum 26(1) (2015), 162.
92 Robert W. Murray and Aidan Hehir, ‘Intervention in the emerging multipolar system: Why R2P will
miss the unipolar moment’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6(4) (2012), 387-406.
93 Hehir and Lang Jr., ‘The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the International Criminal
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R2P delivered outcomes reflective of international values and beliefs, or noninterventions
failed to ensure conceptions of order and justice, then R2P could arguably gain further
momentum. As the UN’s first Special Advisor on R2P outlined:
[R2P’s] greatest contribution over time may lie less in setting rules and guidelines
for inter-governmental mechanisms of follow and more in influencing the
conceptions of interests, doctrine and strategy within national capital, and hence
voting patterns in international bodies. If influential states do not reconsider their
national interests and values because of the growing prominence of R2P in public
and political circles, them posting rules for the Security Council and other inter-
governmental bodies to follow would make little difference. If national values and
perspectives change because of R2P, however, the rules and guidelines would
hardly be needed94.
As normative beliefs change overtime, institutionalized rules lag behind and often
conflict with perceptions of legitimacy. As Andrew Loomis highlights, “beliefs about
acceptability of behavior evolve according to a different schedule than the law,
percolating from the collective conscious of the body politic”95. This underlines a link
between natural law and the development of positive law – formalized recognition of
acceptance or ‘institutionalization’ and means of bestowing legitimacy to norms96.
Outlining R2P’s progression over the decade from the report’s emergence from 2001-
2010, Jutta Brunée and Stephen J. Toope highlight that R2P could be argued as an
94 Edward C. Luck, ‘Sovereignty, choice, and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to
Protect 1(1) (2009), 21.
95 Andrew J. Loomis, ‘Legitimacy Norms as Change Agents: Examining the Role of Public Voice’ in
Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and Vesselin Popovski, (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global
Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 88.
96 Christine Chinkin, ‘Rethinking Legality/Legitimacy after the Iraq War’ in Richard Falk, Mark
Juergensmeyer and Vesselin Popovski, (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 220.
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emerging legal norm through a recurrent mixture of state practice and opinio juris
(recognition of legally binding character) – embedding R2P in customary international
law. Specifically approaching ‘generality, clarity, consistently and constancy over time’
as a means to approach its legal development, they conclude that “if there is no
congruence between norm and action, no practice of legality, we will have to conclude
that the responsibility to protect has not yet emerged as a legal norm”97. In similar vein,
Theresa Reinhold asserts that because of lack of conceptual clarity and inconsistent
practice ‘the responsibility to protect has clearly not evolved into a norm’98. Echoing
Hedley Bull’s 1984 discussion of humanitarian intervention, even the refinement of the
threshold principles to the four mass atrocity crimes has done little to articulate the exact
thresholds levels are or what constitutes ‘manifest failure’ of human rights99. Similarly,
Monica Serrano and Thomas Weiss assert, relating the substantive (textual) and
procedural (institutional) clarity surrounding actors and actions required in which the
current regime of R2P falls short which may impact its future cascade requiring clearer
operational specificity100. However, the fact that is has not been recognized as a
customary legal norm or positive legal development does not mean it has lacked
emergence or been devoid of legal character as a ‘social fact’101.
Drawing from Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘life cycle’ norms, R2P ‘emerged’ with the
entitled ICISS report in 2001 and was ‘institutionalized’ within the 2005 World Summit
97 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen T. Toope, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the use of force: Building
legality?’, Global Responsibility to Protect 2(3) (2010), 209.
98Theresa Reinold, ‘The responsibility to protect – much ado about nothing?’, Review of International
Studies 36(S1) (2010), 74.
99 Hedley Bull, ‘Conclusion’ in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984), p. 195; Adrian Gallagher, ‘What constitutes a “Manifest Failing”? Ambiguous and inconsistent
terminology and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Relations 28(4) (2014), 428-444.
100 Monica Serrano and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘R2P’s unfinished journey’ in Monica Serrano and Thomas G.
Weiss (eds.), The International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P Cause? (New York:
Routledge, 2014), p. 243.
101 Welsh, ‘Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, p. 135.
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outcome document102. The ICISS report forwarded a set of criteria and rules –
introducing specific wording and recognition of R2P. Between 2001 and 2005, the
process of negotiation and then formal acceptance of the Outcome Document can be seen
as having enabled states to provide greater clarity surrounding the norm’s content, scope,
and what procedures could be used to coordinate more effective responses103. With
consecutive works tracing the norm’s emergence and impact on the decisionmaking of
states and institutional organs through humanitarian atrocities, as Western and Goldstein
outline, “The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict
management strategies that include today’s most robust peacekeeping operations and
increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanism”104. Through its
unanimous endorsement, permeation of international discourse surrounding human rights
protection, and implementation, the norm has been ‘nested’ within the normative
architecture of international order. The normative influence of R2P has increased the
international attention given to mass atrocity crises, contributing to early-warning
mechanisms, institutional developments in the UN, and informed actors internationally
surrounding their responsibilities for international populations rather than simply their
own. Meaning, when an imminent or ongoing crisis is recognized, the international
community has a responsibility to appraise the contextual nature and level of atrocities
and decide – most centrally in the UNSC, regional organizations, and those with the
potential to influence civilian protection measures – the viable and politically acceptable
policy options. In this respect, the norm has served as a doctrinal framework and resource
to address mass atrocity crimes – a ‘discretionary entitlement’ to appraise imminent or
102Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’.
103 Jennifer, M. Welsh, ‘Norm contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to
Protect 5(4) (2013), 379.
104 Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, ‘Humanitarian intervention comes of age: Lessons from Somalia
to Libya’, Foreign Affairs 90 (2011), 49.
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ongoing mass atrocities and respond through those measures authorized by the UNSC105.
From this approach, R2P can be seen to have gained a high level of attention and
legitimacy at the international level in terms of what states are responsible for as well as
the obligations of the wider international community within existing institutions106.
Rather than institutionalization at the end of a linear pathway, my theoretical assumptions
aligned with critical constructivism and contestation ties R2P’s salience to its appraised
legitimacy at the international level, whereby the norm’s salience is a function of
“establishing the normative quality of a practice”107. The Responsibility to Protect as a
doctrine has multiple proscriptions to different actors relating to the First pillar
responsibility of individual states to protect their populations from genocide, ethnic
cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, Second pillar relating to the
international community’s responsibility to aid states in the early identification and
defusing of potential atrocities, and the third pillar of the international community to
respond on a case-by-case basis through the UNSC under state’s ‘manifest failure’ to
secure its population from such egregious abuses108. This distinction between an
institutionalization approach and one based on contestation serves as a particularly
relevant framework surrounding R2P due to its character and ‘complexity’ as a norm,
from which “there is continuing contestation within international society about how and
to what degree R2P should be operationalized, and – more fundamentally – about the
legitimacy of R2P’s content”109. Along this line, Antje Wiener frames R2P’s influence
through contestation between different types of norms. Where ‘fundamental norms’ such
105 Frank Berman, ‘Moral versus legal imperatives’ in Charles Reed and David Ryall (eds.), The Price of
Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 161; Luke
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International Relations, 2014), p. 47.
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107 Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (London: Springer, 2014), p. 67.
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as widely-shared human rights norms, and ‘standardized procedures’ relating to specific
procedural rules such as Article 2(4) at times conflict highlight ‘legitimacy gaps’ where
contestation fills the space and ‘organizational principles’ such as R2P arise as resources
which may be applied to bridge the gap on a ‘case by case basis’110. The contestation
processes through the invocation of organizational principles then serves a practical
purpose with ‘meta-organizing’ utility and as a useful way to frame R2P as a resource
used when actors have ‘different understandings of the norm of nonintervention’111.
R2P’s Third Pillar articulation that intervention serves as a legitimate response in the
most severe cases of mass atrocity crimes pits the normative structures against each other
– with contestation highlighting clashing normative beliefs or values surrounding the
content of an international order.
The Contestation of Nonintervention
The contestation of nonintervention serves as an underutilized lens in relation to the
emergence and implementation of R2P. Across domestic, regional, and international
orders, nonintervention has been shaped in its meaning, which can be traced through
social discourses – elucidating the boundaries of legitimate behavior at the international
level. Through recent periods of egregious human rights abuses, the norm of R2P has
been argued as failing to build consistent responses, with the politicized decision of the
UNSC and lack of a standing military force to address such crises contributing to a
failure to intervene in cases of mass atrocity crimes112. This has been largely attributed to
political or alliance interests and lack of material motivations of states to risk lives and
110 Wiener, A Theory of Contestation, p. 37.
111 Ibid., p. 3.8
112 Aidan Hehir, Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention
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economic resources to save foreign populations113. However, this dynamic may also
reflect an enduring salience of the norm of nonintervention. The challenge is to parse
through the complex considerations of individual cases and trace how normative factors
have informed the behavior of state actors.
From a regional perspective, as Amitav Archarya outlines, the norm of nonintervention
within Southeast Asia has served ‘the single most important principle underpinning
ASEAN regionalism’114. Plagued historically by weak state constructs and ethnic
conflict, the source of regional instability has largely been seen as permeating from
within states, with foreign interference from global powers and neighbors historically
seen to decrease regional stability. “No framework for regional security cooperation
could be meaningful for ASEAN unless it countered the internal enemy and enhanced
regime security”115. In contrast, the detrimental impact of coup d’états and genocides
among other intra-state atrocities within Africa have been seen to have a detrimental
effect on regional stability, propelling recognition of a normative order which accepts
more expansive articulations of regional authority to address intra-state crises116. In the
Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in July 2000, Article 4h outlines a right of
the AU to intervene ‘in respect of grave circumstances: war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity’. Thus, the boundaries of nonintervention may vary contextually,
weighing heavily on how norms are interpreted and applied. How this norm is promoted
at the international level provides insight into constraints or strategic empowerment
norms place on the decisions of states, which has been reflective of international behavior
surrounding R2P.
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Tracing the interaction between these norms highlights how the norm of nonintervention
has persisted – informing the behavior of states through continued cases of mass atrocity
crimes in which R2P has been invoked. From the very beginning of R2Ps development,
the norm has faced normative friction from nonintervention as an internalized norm. The
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s name had to be
changed along with its promoted conception of ‘R2P’ reflecting the influence of
nonintervention. Proposed by Canada’s Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy as the
‘Commission on Humanitarian Intervention’, the emphasis had to be shifted to the
responsibilities of states to transcend aversion fostered by a majority of international
actors117. Once introduced in 2001, the report was met with a range of responses from
skepticism to outright hostility. However, aversion was not widely attached to the
conception that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from egregious
abuses, or that the international community has a responsibility to assist and help states
address the root causes of such crises. What was widely contentious related to the
potential projection of force, threshold criteria, and authority that could be legitimate to
carry out protection measures at the international level118. With too expansive a set of
criteria in the ICISS report to include threats to populations from natural disasters,
diseases, or non-democratic forms of government, R2P was framed as a catchall and
potentially dangerous provocation of global instability119. Permanent members of the
Security Council showed a high level of suspicion, while members of the global South
within the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement vehemently opposed any normative
development that enabled the potential for unilateral intervention even for humanitarian
purposes – widely casting R2P as a neo-imperial shroud even if framed in terms of
117 Brunnée and Toope, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the use of force’, 194; Bellamy, A Responsibility
to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, p. 36.
118 Bellamy, A Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, p. 36.
119 Robert A. Pape, ‘When duty calls: A pragmatic standard of humanitarian intervention’, International
Security 37(1) (2012), 41-80.
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human rights120. This dynamic can be attributed to a range of factors reflecting not only
the norm of nonintervention, but also the pragmatic desire of states to limit obligations to
intervene under R2P or provide an expansive normative basis for intervention by stronger
international powers.
In 2002, after the report was initially discussed by the Security Council, the US among
others were ‘noticeably unenthusiastic’, while “there was widespread opinion in the
meeting that if new situations emerged… the five permanent members of the broader
Council would lack the political will to deliver troops and would limit themselves to
condemnatory resolution”121. The concerns of many states seemed to be affirmed with the
illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was justified in part by Western powers through
humanitarian rationale122. This created what many framed as a ‘poisonous atmosphere’
with timing playing a major role in how R2P was shaped and constrained123. The Indian
Ambassador to the UN challenged the concept’s title of R2P as ‘patronizing and
offensive’, China announced its ‘deep reservations’, while Russia followed with its
condemnation of an idea that it argued was already covered within existing law and
institutions124. In January 2005, the 115 Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement
asserted their “rejection of the ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no basis
either in the UN Charter or in international law”125. Even more assertive proponents of
civilian protection at the international level such as the United States, echoed concerns
surrounding any responsibility that implied a duty for states to intervene – asserting that
120Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty’.
121 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Conclusion: The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention in International Society’
in Jennifer M. Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp. 185, 210.
122 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Why are we in Iraq?; (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)’, The New York Times, 7
September 2003, accessed 7 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2003/09/07/magazine/why-are-we-in-
iraq-and-liberia-and-afghanistan.html; Gareth Evans, ‘When is it right to fight?’, Survival 46(3) (2004), 63.
123 Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, p. 125.
124 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect , p. 23.
125 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary
International Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 521.
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any responsibility to protect should be framed as a moral responsibility rather than legal
obligation126. This illustrates the two sides of the R2P argument in that some actors were
concerned for the potential expansion of international law which provided a right to
intervene, while others seemed apprehensive surrounding any potential obligation that
required risking lives and resources – in part, illustrating the normative basis of
nonintervention as a rule and shaping the articulation of R2P. Where these dynamics was
particularly influential was through negotiations leading up to the 2005 World Summit
and its articulation in the SOD.
While unanimously endorsed by global heads of state and government at the 2005 World
Summit, negotiations and strategic bargaining recast a roughly 80-page document into a
few consolidated paragraphs. Criteria surrounding the use of armed force and just war
principles were entirely dropped with the idea of General Assembly or regional
organizational authorization (any authority outside of the UN) to legitimize coercive
military measures, unambiguously removed. Furthermore, those just cause threshold
criteria were changed from ‘large scale loss of life’ under the two wider categories, to
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It is important to
note that the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were already
embedded in existing international law before the SOD negotiations – with ethnic
cleansing widely constituting one of the other three crimes127. Thus, while framed as
‘revolutionary’, R2P’s inclusion in the SOD was widely endorsed “precisely because it
was not seen as transformational”128. Removing much of the ICISS report’s substance,
the exclusion of the just war criteria, refinement of the ‘threshold requirements’, and
affirmation of existing institutional framework meant that the norm articulated little
126 John R. Bolton, ‘Letter from the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
regarding 2005 World Summit Outcome Document’, 30 August 2005, accessed 16 May 2015,
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php ? module=uploads&func=download&fileId=219.
127 UN Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 5.
128 Welsh, ‘Norm contestation and the Responsibility to Protect’, 373.
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diminution of nonintervention. Even still, as Alex Bellamy outlines, much of the
international community remained skeptical after 2005 – seen to having only ‘mimicked’
support at the World Summit or having believed that it had been ‘watered down so much
as to make it practically meaningless’ – affirming the Security Council as the only
legitimate authority while addressing crimes already seen as existing within international
law129.
Immediately following the World Summit, several states, particularly within the G77 and
Non-Aligned Movement echoed their outright hostility. India, Cuba, Sudan, Venezuela,
Pakistan and Nicaragua among others argued after the World Summit that they had not
in-fact endorsed the norm, but rather agreed for further discussion130. As Olivier Corten
highlights surrounding the SOD:
A review of the debates over the adoption of the text further confirms the extreme
reluctance of States to admit the possibility of a right of humanitarian
intervention. Upon examination it can be observed that the balance of power at
the turn of the century has not only not been challenged but has become
accentuated in the sense of insistence on compliance with the collective security
mechanisms provided for by the Charter131.
While the spectrum of non-coercive measures including diplomatic condemnation,
economic sanctions, and peacekeeping or other activism with regime consent have been
widely embraced in a number of cases with invocation of R2P. However, as humanitarian
crises have emerged, the international community has recurrently disputed the legitimacy
129 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, p. 25.
130 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect- Five years on’, Ethics and International Affairs 24(2)
(2010), 143-169.
131 Corten, The Law Against War, 521.
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of intervention, asserting the necessity for peaceful resolutions tied to government
consent. Although at times blurred particularly surrounding ‘coerced consent’ or failed
governance in which the state-authority is unclear, recent cases of implementation have
largely affirmed nonintervention through requiring the consent of the recognized state
authorities132. The consensus underwriting the 2005 SOD as well as state behavior since
affirms this interpretation – through making economic sanctions and peace operations
with government consent or diplomatic measures more decisive through early warning
mechanisms. As Alex Bellamy highlights, although the UN has only recently begun to
develop more explicit mechanisms bringing ‘atrocity prevention and human protection
lens to bear in policymaking’, there is some evidence that the “establishment of modern
early-warning, assessment and convening capacities can have a positive effect on policy
planning and decisionmaking”133. Furthermore, Alexandra Stefanopoulos and George
Lopez outline, through R2P’s development, there has been an evolutionary shift of
targeted sanctions – becoming smarter in what and whom they target as well as directed
in scope at the four mass atrocity crimes outlined in the SOD since 2005134. Ongoing
contestation has then served as a means of functionary shaping and clarifying the norm’s
meaning and scope across international society, which has been reflective of state
behavior.
Through this lens, the invocation of R2P outlines a seeming solidarist acceptance of the
first and second pillars. In many ways, the first pillar is an affirmation of nonintervention,
articulating that responsibility to protect exists firmly with the state. This illustrates a
132 Ian Johnstone, ‘Managing consent in contemporary peacekeeping operations’, International
Peacekeeping 18(2) (2011), 168-182; Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The new politics of
protection? Cöte d’Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 87(4) (2011), 825-
850.
133 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The exception and the norm’, Ethics and
International Affairs 25(3) (2011), 264.
134 Alexandra Dos Reis Stefanopoulos and George A. Lopez, ‘From coercive to protective tools: The
evolution of targeted sanctions’ in Monica Serrano and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), The International Politics
of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P Cause? (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 48-66.
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thick acceptance of state government’s obligation to protect their populations from
egregious abuses of their human rights – at least in the specific area of mass atrocity
crimes defined as genocide, ethnic cleansings, crimes against humanity and war crimes
attached not only to the moral value in limiting such behaviors, but their detrimental
impact to wider international order through their spillover effects. Furthermore, aligned
with Pillar two, when states have requested outside assistance from the international
community in response to atrocities committed within its borders, the projection of force
has been arguably less politically contentious as Mali and Yemen among others have
illustrated, with international support mirroring force contributions from regional and
international powers. Among those cases in which R2P has been invoked within UNSC
resolutions, almost all of its roughly thirty explicit references have been in categorical
resolutions, or when dealing in specific cases relating to Pillar one with iterations of
‘primary responsibility rests with the state’135. Several have also emerged under Pillar
two, with the UNSC invoking R2P with the authorization of several international peace
missions - in South Sudan under Resolution 1996 (2011), in Mali under Resolution 2085
(2012), and the Central African Republic under Resolution 2149 (2014) tied to
recognized state authority consent136. The principle third pillar applications have been
addressed perhaps most clearly through diplomatic and economic sanctions to include
ICC referrals with the only explicit case of UNSC authorized intervention under Pillar
three Libya in 2011, and to a lesser extent ‘reaffirming the primary responsibility of each
state to protect its civilians’ in Resolution 1975 (2011) authorizing civilian protection
measures for an existing peacekeeping force in response to an emergent crisis in Cote
D’Ivoire in 2011. However, contestation has continued to encircle arguments against
expansive normative developments creating permissive expansion of rules regarding the
135 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P’,
last modified 28 May 2015, http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335.
136 See S/Res/1996 8 July 2011; S/RES/2085 19 December 2012, S/RES/2149 10 April 2014.
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projection of force – highlighting how the norm of nonintervention may serve as a lens to
address inconsistent protection measures under R2P.
The first case of mass atrocity crimes to fall under the purview of R2P was Sudan in
2003. R2P was argued by the Sudanese regime as a ‘Trojan Horse’ or in essence a neo-
imperial form of interference in sovereign affairs laundered in the terminology of human
rights137. Even still, international actors widely condemned the regime for its failure to
protect and responded with a spectrum of measures including UNSC resolutions directly
invoking R2P, economic sanctions, and referral of the situation to the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Under the weight of unheralded domestic activism through NGOs
such as the Save Darfur Coalition with millions of supporters and leading public figures,
the United States and other Western powers were cited for having failed to halt the
crisis138. However, Sudan did reflect growing legitimacy of R2P through vocal
condemnation and a spectrum of coercive measures. The US in particular played a major
role in implementing sanctions, pushing within the UNSC and other bodies for greater
coercive action, and playing an important mediating role in the conflict139. While the lack
of humanitarian intervention in Sudan has been attributed to political alliance interests,
concerns for wider destabilization in regional countries bordering Sudan, and Western
troop contributions already warn thin across Afghanistan and Iraq, the norm of
nonintervention can also be seen as pushing back on the emerging norm of R2P – with
the projection of military force for humanitarian purposes devoid of regime consent
argued as an illegitimate behavior by a wide body of international actors140. When the
UNSC did authorize a peacekeeping mission citing R2P in Resolution 1706 (2006), the
137 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan horse? The crisis in Darfur and humanitarian
intervention after Iraq’, Ethics and International Affairs 19(2) (2005), 31-54.
138 De Waal, ‘Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect’.
139 Lee J. M. Seymour, ‘Let’s bullshit! Arguing, bargaining and dissembling over Darfur’, European
Journal of International Relations 20(3) (2014), 572.
140 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All, p. 62.
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deployment of troops was marked as conditional on government consent, which was not
forthcoming. A year later, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1796 (2007). While this
resolution did bring about a joint UN-AU peacekeeping mission to end violence in
Darfur, it was only with acceptance from the Sudanese government. Under the opposition
of China and Russia in the UNSC and wider number of international powers to the
foreign projection of military force, the crisis in Sudan resulted in mass atrocity crimes,
with the UNSC authorized lacking consensus for intervention under R2P.
International responses to humanitarian crises in which R2P has been invoked illustrates
more than a failure of norms to influence state behavior, but rather outlines how R2P
exists alongside both normative and non-normative considerations141. Whether
intervention occurs in cases of egregious human rights violations is subject to a host of
factors attached to the parallel elements of political resolve and military capability. The
force requirement to intervene internationally is crucially limited to a number of powerful
states concentrated around the P5 as well as institutional actors and regional bodies
relative to each case. One comprehensive study found that “even when there is political
will, forces capable of humanitarian intervention missions may not be available”142.
Military overstretch of those powers with international force projection capabilities then
provides contextual constraints to individual cases. While the AU, EU, US, ECOWAS,
NATO, and UN in particular have more recently developed greater operational planning
strategies for intra-state peacemaking and civilian protection operations – in itself a sign
of R2P’s salience – the nature of the current international system places very real
physical constrains on humanitarian intervention143. Furthermore, even when military
capacity and political will are met at the international level, there are cases in which
141 Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?, p. 231; Welsh, ‘Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, p.
137.
142 Victoria K. Holt, The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the operational capacity for civilian
protection (Washington D.C.: Stimson Centre, 2005), p. 10.
143 Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, p. 19.
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imminent or ongoing mass atrocity crimes would not lead to an alleviation of human
suffering and perhaps make the situation worse. As Roland Paris outlines, any
interpretation of case-by-case basis and manifest failure must address each crisis
independently. Even with removal of the Just War principles from the SOD, any
intervention under R2P is inherently linked to considerations of proportionality and
reasonable prospects, in which “faithful application of the R2P principles may entail
decisions to forgo intervention, even in the case of a looming or ongoing mass atrocity. A
measure of selectivity, based on the calculations of expected consequences, already
seems to be built into the doctrine”144. The decision to intervene then must reflect a
consequentialist approach that requires a level of implicit inconsistency and recognition
that projecting military force will not solve every case of imminent or ongoing mass
atrocity crimes. As Kudrat Virk highlights, “the matter – to intervene or to not intervene
– is not reducible to a stark, dogmatic choice between sovereignty and human rights, but
also concerns the best means to achieve humanitarian outcomes”145. From this approach,
intervention serves as a ‘false test’ of diffusion, with even the norm’s internalization far
from a causal factor in agent’s response to mass atrocities146.
Addressing recurrent cases of imminent or ongoing mass atrocities highlights the
expansive normative and non-normative considerations surrounding the projection of
force. With domestic factors, alliance interests, material power considerations, and norms
such as R2P, various contextual elements influence conditions leading to specific policy
decisions. However, tracing the social discourses through recurrent cases has provided a
144 Roland Paris, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect” and the structural problems of preventive humanitarian
intervention’, International Peacekeeping 21(5) (2014), 578.
145 Kudrat Virk, ‘India and R2P’s burdens of dissent and accommodation’ in Monica Serrano and Thomas
G. Weiss (eds.), The International Politics of Human Rights: Rallying to the R2P Cause? (New York:
Routledge, 2014), p. 133.
146 Martha Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’ in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1996), p. 158.
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lens to address how specific norms have informed the decision of international actors.
Through these cases, R2P has been articulated as a normative practice, reflective of a new
normative architecture in which imminent and ongoing mass atrocity crimes have been
addressed and matched with international responses. However, these cases also highlight
how nonintervention as a norm has also been invoked, with force projection without
regime consent argued as a practice that would not yield positive humanitarian outcomes
or secure wider international order as a standard of behavior. Normative contestation
between the two has illustrated discrete periods of legitimation in which the boundaries
of specific norms within a normative architecture have been illuminated in relation to
each other. This helps provide insight into how norms are shaped through the interaction
with conflicting structures, behavior as well as outcomes shaping future interactions.
Conclusion
The Responsibility to Protect exists as a modern manifestation of international
conceptions surrounding the moral basis of the state and legitimacy of international
protection measures. As many scholars have outlined, this development may illustrate the
erosion of traditional conceptions of sovereignty through a refined scope of the norm of
nonintervention147. However, while the emergence of R2P has been highlighted by its
incredible speed – gaining a substantive hold within the popular political lexicon
surrounding human rights protections – the contestation of nonintervention has
reciprocally shaped R2P’s meaning and serves as a lens to address ongoing state practice.
Focusing on the post-2005 period after the inclusion of R2P in the SOD with more
clarified institutionalized meaning, several major cases illustrate egregious violations of
147 See: Jamnejad and Michael Wood, ‘The principle of non-intervention’, p. 348; Joel P. Trachtman, The
Future of International Law: Global Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 118.
Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 31; Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in
Theory and Practice (2nd Ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 250.
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one or more of the four mass atrocity crimes. While Sri Lanka, Libya, and Syria are far
from the only cases of global human rights violations, they serve as a relevant cross
section with cases of both action and inaction in various global regions with definite
cases of mass atrocity crimes. Tracing the contestation of nonintervention through these
recurrent cases illustrates the norm’s continued salience, informing the decisions of state
actors amongst other complex considerations and outlining the modern conceptual
boundaries of R2P.
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Chapter 3: Sri Lankan Tigers
Addressing the contestation of nonintervention, this chapter serves as the first empirical
case study of anticipated or ongoing mass atrocity crimes in which NGO’s and Member
States have invoked the international responsibility to protect. In early 2009, the Sri
Lankan government waged the final stages of its three decade long civil war against the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) with unrestricted warfare
leading to the death of an estimated 40-70,000 civilians1. Focusing on the period of
concentrated civilian atrocities from January to May 2009, the Sri Lankan Army used
high-caliber weaponry and widespread shelling against civilian and humanitarian
positions as well as within consecutive government demarcated No-Fire Zones2. While
the necessity for civilian protection was emphasized by member states throughout the
1 Norah Niland, Inhumanity and Humanitarian Action: Protection Failures in Sri Lanka (Medford:
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2014), p. 1.
2 U.S. Department of State, ‘Report to Congress on Incidents During the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka’, 22
October 2009, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131025.pdf.
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final months, UN institutional organs never formally addressed the atrocities during the
crisis. This chapter first outlines the background to the conflict and nature of human
rights violations through the final stages of the government’s campaign – setting the stage
surrounding those domestic factors that contributed to the government’s final campaign
and positions of international actors. The chapter then transitions to address the
international response. Tracing potential justifications for how nonintervention was so
firmly sustained as an international norm, the chapter highlights the limited knowledge of
conditions on the ground, UN institutional failures, and political environment of the
Global War on Terror (GWOT) with greater-regional support for the government’s
campaign. Apathy and opposition in the UNSC paralleled limited discourse surrounding
R2P, with international failure to address the crisis in terms of substantive protection
measures.
Historical Background to the Conflict
Sri Lanka has roughly twenty million inhabitants representing four of the major world
religions and indigenous populations tracing their roots across the globe. In the last
complete census carried out by the Sri Lankan government in 1981, the majority of Sri
Lankans (74 percent), were Sinhalese-speaking Buddhists, with a further 18 percent
Tamil-speaking Hindus, and the remainder mainly Tamil-speaking Muslims and
Christians3. While Sri Lanka’s insecurity is often framed in terms of historic ethnic
antagonism, conflict generated by the process of postcolonial state building is in many
ways more pervasive – illustrating decades of sectarian discrimination, clientelism, and
majoritarian consolidation of government power4.
3 Sarah Holt, Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 49.
4 Edward Newman, Understanding Civil Wars: Continuity and Change in Intrastate Conflict (New York:
Routledge, 2014), p. 147.
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Following independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was heralded as a success story for peaceful
transformation to a postcolonial democracy – gradually devolving into a conflict-affected
state5. As Professor Sumantra Bose outlines, “the post-colonial Sri Lankan state advanced
the idea of a monolithic, unitary sovereignty, but without a corresponding development of
equal rights over the exclusive right of the ‘majority community’”6. The limited
constitutional mechanisms that had existed to secure minority rights were removed as
new constitutions, constitutional amendments, and laws were shaped to majority
Sinhalese’ interests7. Individual laws were particularly contentious, serving to limit Tamil
employment and place a quota on the number of Tamil students in national universities8.
The ‘Sinhala Only Act’ emerged in 1956, changing the official language from English to
Sinhalese, while a further Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1978 removed civil liberties
and allowed long-term detentions under emergency regulations9. Serious outbreaks of
ethnic rioting in 1977, 1979, and 1983 led to thousands of Tamil deaths, which paralleled
government-imposed regulations that removed civil liberties, as well as the burning of the
Jaffna Public Library in 1981 that contained over 90,000 volumes of rare Tamil
manuscripts10. “For the Tamils it was the beginning of a systematic cultural genocide
which has continued to the present with the destruction or occupation by the military of
Tamil schools, colleges, and other academic institutions”11. Political marginalization and
5 K.M. De Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi:
Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 5-6.
6 Sumantra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India, and the Tamil Eelam Movement (New
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 47.
7 Ananda Wickremeratne, Buddhism and Ethnicity in Sri Lanka: A Historical Analysis (Kandy:
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995), p. xxxi.
8 Jack D. Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic
Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 120.
9 Wickremeratne, Buddhism and Ethnicity in Sri Lanka, xxxi.
10 Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty, 73.
11 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), p. 160.
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targeted violence began to shift the nature of Sri Lanka’s domestic struggle with the
formation of increasingly violent Tamil nationalist insurgency.
The civil war between Sri Lankan government forces and Tamil separatists gained
momentum in 198312. Known as Black July, the ambush of 13 government soldiers
outside the northern city of Jaffna resulted in a wave of anti-Tamil violence that spread
across the island ‘shaking the moral foundations’ of Sri Lankan civil society13. Tamils
were openly targeted in the streets, ripped from cars and their homes by Sinhalese mobs
and security forces across the island as well as the capital Colombo. Not only did these
actions fully expose ethno-national fissures within Sri Lankan society, but marked the
turn towards overt militarism and guerrilla insurgency.
Emerging as the principle opposition group through the 1980-90s, the LTTE used a mix
of traditional military and terrorist tactics, which enabled its troops to hide amongst the
population and launch devastating attacks. Suicide bombings were widespread and
consistent, against targets including military bases, government buildings, public busses,
train stations, and airports. Contrary to the perception that Islamic fundamentalists used
the first suicide terror tactics, Robert Pape highlights that it was in fact the LTTE with
their contingent known as the Black Tigers that first began the practice of ‘tactical suicide
bombings’ as early as 1987 against a wide range of targets for political gains14. Between
the first attack in 1987 and 2009, the Tiger’s launched 273 suicide attacks – not including
12 Mahinda Deegalle, ‘Sinhala Ethno-nationalism and Militarization in Sri Lanka’ in Vladimir Tikhonov
and Torkel Brekke (eds.), Violent Buddhism: Militarism and Buddhism in Modern Asia (New York:
Routledge, 2012), p. 24.
13 Daniel W. Kent, ‘Onward Buddhist Soldiers: Preaching to the Sri Lankan Army’ in Michael K. Jerryson
and Mark Juergensmeyer (eds.), Buddhist Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 160.
14 Robert A. Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, American Political Science Review 97(3)
(2003), 4.
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the reported waves launched against SLA positions in the final months15. Among the
most note-worthy include an attack on Colombo’s International Airport in 2001, and the
1996 bombing of Colombo’s Central Bank which killed ninety-one and injured almost
1,50016. Political assassinations were also widespread, including several leaders at the
international level - Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan
President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.
By early 2001, the LTTE claimed nearly a third of the territory of Sri Lanka -
establishing a near military parity with government forces – building up a large army,
navy, merchant fleet and were the first insurgency to have a nominal air force with
Czech-made light aircraft17. With an administrative capital in Kilinochchi, border guards,
customs officials, offices in London and Paris, and international NGO’s, the LTTE began
building institutions mirroring that of a de facto state:
The Tigers built a parallel system of government that included courts of law,
municipal administration, a police force, a customs service, a tax and legislative
code, a banking system, and a television and radio network. They sought
recognition for their homeland, and took heart from the internationally backed
independence movement for Timor Leste and Kosovo18.
These military and political gains were leveraged for greater autonomy under a
Norwegian-backed Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) beginning in 2001. A group of Western
powers known as the Tokyo Donor Group pegged $4.5 billion in development aid to
15 Gordon Weiss, The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. (London:
Vintage Books, 2011), p. 77.
16 Francis Harrison, F. (2012) Still Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka’s Hidden War. London:
Portobello Book, 2012), p. xx.
17 Kristian Stokke, ‘Building the Tamil Eelam state: emerging state institutions and forms of governance in
LTTE-controlled areas in Sri Lanka’, Third World Quarterly 27(6) (2006), 1022.
18 Weiss, The Cage, 8.
111
positive advancement of the peace process19. While initially successful in promoting
cooperation, fractures began to emerge in late-2003 after a prolonged period of
negotiations failed to bring what the LTTE viewed as substantive change. While the Sri
Lankan government viewed the CFA and negotiations as a means to transform the LTTE
into a more political organization – disarming, demobilizing, and returning to the
government’s fold – the Tigers were never committed to a federal solution and desired
more substantive autonomy20. The LTTE largely left negotiations in 2003-2004 – with
the government functionally following suit, while not formally abrogating the peace
process until January 200821.
However, a number of internal and international developments set the stage for the
government’s pursuit of a military victory. The 2004 defection of the LTTE’s Eastern
Commander with six thousand cadre contributed to the loss of roughly 50 percent the
LTTE’s territorial resource base, a large portion of its standing military, and widespread
intelligence losses22. Furthermore, in 2005, an LTTE-ordered boycott in the north and
east contributed to the relatively narrow national electoral victory of Mahinda
Rajapaksa23. A rural politician from the country’s southern coast, Rajapaksa was
supported by a political base of hardline Sinhalese nationalists and Buddhist clergy,
building a quasi-autocratic regime through expanded executive powers and close political
appointments. “Rajapaksa’s centralization of power, erosion of the judiciary’s
independence, and lethal harassment of media personnel who are not pro-government,
19 Amita Shastri, ‘Ending Ethnic Civil war: The Peace Process in Sri Lanka’, Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics 47(1) (2009), 86.
20 Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Walton, ‘The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in
the Sri Lankan peace process’. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3(3) (2009), p. 319.
21 Shastri, ‘Ending Ethnic Civil War’, 95.
22 René M. Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, ‘A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network
Resilience’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31(1) (2012), 49.
23 M.D. Nalapat, ‘Defeating Terrorism – Why the Tamil Tigers lost Eelam – And How Sri Lanka Won the
War’, The Sentry, 28 March 2011, accessed 18 October 2014, http://www.jinsa.org/publications/global-
briefing/defeating-terrorism-why-tamil-tigers-lost-eelamand-how-sri-lanka-won-wa.
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transformed Sri Lanka’s particular style of democracy into what is, effectively, a move
towards elected tyranny”24. Beginning expansive military investment, Colombo increased
its defense expenditure and cross-border military ties focusing on elite training and the
acquisition of new military technology that dominated the national budget25. Using an
ultra-nationalist narrative, the Rajapaksa government branded opponents as well as
critical journalists ‘terrorists’ with widespread detention, disappearance, torture, and
sexual assault paralleled a violent decline of civil liberties and freedom of the press in the
government’s aims to defeat the LTTE26. In July 2006, the Tigers closed the sluice gates
to a reservoir in the Eastern Province that provided irrigation water to thousands of
farmers in government-held areas. Launching air and ground attacks in response, the
entire Eastern Province was back in government control by mid-2007 with wider conflict
imminent27.
Final Stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War
The Sri Lankan Government officially began their final campaign against Tamil
separatists in January 2008, when some 50,000 elite members of the Sri Lankan army
began a methodical offensive, reducing the area of Tiger control in the North-East of the
island from seven thousand square miles to some thirty square miles by the end of 200828.
Surrounded in a shrinking corner with the Sri Lankan air force overhead and naval forces
offshore, the LTTE retreated deeper into the northern Vanni region – drawing more than
24 Niland, Inhumanity and Humanitarian Action, 8.
25 Panel of Experts, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’, 31
March 2011, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf, p. 43.
26 International Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression Mission, ‘Media Under Fire: Press Freedom
Lockdown in Sri Lanka’, December 2008, http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_sri_Lanka.pdf.
27 Weiss, The Cage, 94.
28 Richard D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York:
Random House, 2010), p. 203.
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360,000 civilians in tow29. Denying access to international media, INGO staff, or
international UN workers into the conflict zone, the government unilaterally announced
the formation three consecutive government-demarcated No-Fire Zones (NFZs) - widely
broadcasted safe-areas for civilians to seek refuge30. On 20 January, the Sri Lankan
government announced the creation of a first NFZ31. Driving further into the conflict
zone, and while claiming to carry out a ‘humanitarian rescue operation’, the Sri Lankan
Army used high-caliber weaponry and widespread shelling against civilian and
humanitarian positions including within NFZs32. As the UN Panel of Experts would later
conclude:
From as early as 6 February 2009, the SLA continuously shelled within the area
that became the second NFZ, from all directions, including land, sea and air. It is
estimated that there were between 300,000 and 330,000 civilians in that small
area. The SLA assault employed aerial bombardments, long-range artillery,
howitzers and MBRLs [Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers] as well as small mortars,
RPGs [Rocket Propelled Grenades] and small arms fire33.
Withholding water, food, and particularly medical aid from entering the conflict zone, the
Sri Lankan government brought untold suffering while continuing to pound LTTE as well
as humanitarian positions in an effort to claim further territory. Gordon Weiss, a UN
Spokesmen in Sri Lanka at the time, highlighted: “Hospitals and medical points were
struck so often during these months, and with such repeated accuracy, that Tamil
29 Panel of Experts, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability’, 28.
30 Ibid.
31 Associated Press, ‘Military declares civilian safety zone in rebel area’, The Guardian, 21 January 2009,
accessed 2 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/22/sri-lanka-military.
32 Jon Lee Anderson, ‘Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s brutal victory over its Tamil insurgents’, The New
Yorker, 17 January 2011, accessed 6 October 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/
death-of-the-tiger.
33 Panel of Experts, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability’, Para. 100.
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government doctors busy stemming the loss of life asked the ICRC to conceal the
coordinates of the make-shift medical tents from the government”34. For their part, the
LTTE were implicated in holding the population captive, at times through the use of
force – placing artillery, soldiers and, supplies near civilian positions as human shields,
while forcibly-recruiting the Tamil population, including children as young as twelve to
fight on the front lines35. “Civilians trapped in the fighting faced a double peril: if they
fled, they risked being killed by the LTTE; if they stayed, they were in danger of
succumbing to the government’s bombardment”36. Caught between and within belligerent
forces, civilians were killed as a result of actions from both sides, yielding an estimated
1,000 casualties per day in the final month37. Unrestricted warfare was left un-answered
and even facilitated the regime’s defeat of the LTTE. Regaining territorial control of the
entire Sri Lankan landmass, the government declared victory on 19 May after Velupillai
Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, was found dead on the beach of the Vanni38.
Funneled those that did escape from the conflict zone into government-ran internally
displaced population (IDP) camps functioned as a means of limiting international access
to the population and vetting those that escaped of LTTE members – with the camps well
documented for torture, sexual abuse, and widespread disappearances.
International Response
34 Weiss, The Cage, 183
35 U.S. Department of State, ‘Report to Congress on Incidents During the Recent Conflict in Sri Lanka’, 41.
36 Alex J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds (New York:
Routledge, 2011), p. 60.
37 Louis Charbonneau, ‘World “may never know” how many died in civil war’, Die Welt, 30 May 2009,
accessed 6 January 2015, http://www.welt.de/english-news/article3831743/World-may-never-know-how-
many-died-in-civil-war.html.
38 Matthew Weaver and Gethin Chamberlain, ‘Sri Lanka declares end to war with Tamil Tigers’, The
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The case of Sri Lanka marks a seminal moment for its lack of international protection
measures. In the face of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, “Member States did not hold
a single formal meeting on Sri Lanka, whether at the Security Council, the Human Rights
Council or the General Assembly”39. The UN bodies responsible for collective security
and the legality of the international use of force illustrated a forceful support against
formal consideration by key members – even permeating through to many Western
powers widely supportive of international civilian protection. Sir John Holmes, the UN
Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs later articulated,
There was a bit of a diplomatic dance around all this, with everybody knowing
that the end of this was going to be an inevitable military victory for the
government and the inevitable defeat of the LTTE, and it was a question of
waiting for that to happen, hoping it happened as quickly as possible and that it
happened with as few civilian casualties as possible... That may sound a bit
cynical, but that was the reality I was observing40
As Sri Lanka’s conflict fully kicked off with large-scale civilian deaths in January 2009,
Israel’s month long siege of Gaza was coming to a close with roughly 1,000 total deaths.
With Sri Lanka slower to evolve and spiking after three decades of near-steady conflict, it
took several months for international diplomats to recognize the nature of atrocities.
“From late 2008, a small group of non-permanent members of the Security Council had
become deeply concerned by events and by early February 2009 wished the Security
Council to formally consider the situation”41. When more reliable UN statistics emerged
39 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on the UN’s Actions in
Sri Lanka’, November 2012, accessed 10 May 2015, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_
Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf. Para. 33.
40 Callum Macrae, ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’, The Huffington Post, 12 March 2012, accessed 18 June
2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/callum-macrae/sri-lankas-killing-fields_b_1339127.html.
41 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel’, 24-25.
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in February 2009, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon began a personal fight for
protection among member states42. However, a lack of consensus from members of the
UNSC resulted in the establishment of ‘informal interactive dialogue’ sessions as the
primary medium for spreading information relating to atrocities and the UNSC’s
responsibilities43. The briefings involved dialogue with the Under-Secretary General on
Humanitarian Affairs and the Secretary General’s Chef de Cabinet following diplomatic
visits to Colombo in Spring 2009. Although several delegations and Western leaders
from the US, UK, Mexico, France, and Canada among others at the UN made calls for
greater civilian protection in the final several months, it was evidently clear within UN
bodies that there was not enough political backing for a resolution that would support any
form of interference.
The recognized lack of consensus in the General Assembly and active stance against
formal discussion at the Security Council led several delegations to turn towards Geneva
– requesting a Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Advocating
for greater information and humanitarian access to the conflict zone, a European and US-
backed draft resolution sought a formal investigation of alleged human rights violations44.
However, even with reliable reports of atrocities in the thousands and over 100,000
civilians trapped, it took over a month to garner the required 16 signatures to hold the
Special Session – which didn’t occur until after the war had ended. Furthermore, the
initial Western-backed draft resolution was set aside and replaced by one openly
sympathetic to the regime and affirming nonintervention. “The 47-members body
concluded the session with China joined by India, Russia, and others in passing a
resolution authored by Sri Lanka (29 to 12, with 6 abstentions) that characterized the civil
42 Weiss, The Cage, 140.
43 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel’, 24-25.
44 Nilanthi Samaranayake, ‘Are Sri Lanka's relations with China deepening? An analysis of economic,
military, and diplomatic data’, Asian Security 7(2) (2011), 136.
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war as a ‘domestic matter that doesn’t warrant outside interference’”45. Directly outlining
the salience of nonintervention as a norm, Sri Lankan sovereignty was argued as a
normative shield to international actors even in their pursuit of greater information
surrounding the nature of intra-state atrocities.
Limitations to Access and Institutional Failures
Reliable reports of mass atrocities were restricted due to lack of access, while
institutional failures led to limited initial clarity surrounding mass atrocities that could
have been interpreted under R2P towards more coercive protection measures. In
September 2008, the UN had made the decision to withdraw its international presence
from the north after the Sri Lankan government issued an official statement that ‘it could
no longer guarantee the safety of staff’ inside Tiger-controlled territory46. In actions later
described as scare tactics, the main UN compound in the northern LTTE capital of
Kilinochchi had been repeatedly targeted by air strikes in the lead up to government’s
ground campaign through the summer of 200847. UN national staff members were forced
to remain by the LTTE, while some Tamil medical staff, and NGO staff remained with
limited access. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Caritas
staff maintained some international presence48. While weekly aid convoys for the World
Food Program (WFP) were negotiated from October 2008 through January 2009,
international UN access was entirely cutoff by February 2009.
45 Ibid.
46 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel’, 24-25. Para. 49.
47 Ibid., 48-50.
48 Norah Niland, John Holmes, and Miriam Bradley, ‘Policy Debate - Humanitarian Protection in the Midst
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Even with decreased access, information began to emerge in the final months pointing to
a high level of civilian casualties caught amongst belligerent forces49. In late January
2009, the final WFP convoy allowed in the conflict zone became trapped with
international staff documenting conditions with photographic evidence for nearly two
weeks. A New York Times article highlighted: “Both sides are egregiously flouting
humanitarian norms and principles, and as a result civilians are dying”50. As more severe
reports started coming in from the Vanni, the UN established a Crisis Operations Group
(COG) starting in February 2009 – collecting casualty data and other statistics in large
part by telephone in Colombo that had to be triangulated - verified by three independent
sources including a national UN employee. As the Internal Review Panel later found,
When the UN began to collate information through the COG, reports pointed to
the large majority of civilian killings as being the result of Government shelling
and aerial bombardment, with a smaller proportion of killings resulting from the
LTTE actions. UN staff in Colombo and UNHQ had no doubt that Government
attacks were killing many civilians – as demonstrated by internal correspondence
and meeting minutes51
Not including casualty figures from the final week, the UN estimated 7,721 civilians
killed and 18,479 injured from August 2008 to 13 May 200952. These statistics would be
later underlined as both highly contentious and overly conservative with Frances
Harrison, a BBC correspondent in Sri Lanka at the time, highlighting: “The death toll
49 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sri Lanka: Stop Shelling “No Fire Zone”: UN Security Council action needed to
avert humanitarian catastrophe’, 9 April 2009, accessed 2 August 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009
/04/09/sri-lanka-stop-shelling-no-fire-zone.
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could be 55,000 if the population figure for January 2009, given by a senior Tamil civil
servant, is used. A Tamil Catholic bishop did the sums using the government’s own
population data for late 2009 and found 146,679 people unaccounted for” 53. Médecins
Sans Frontières staff working in hospitals and aid clinics located just south of the conflict
zone documented ‘waves of civilians’ and thousands of amputees in late March, with
150,000 it estimated were still in the conflict zone54. The LTTE had an incentive to
inflate the numbers for increased aid and international condemnation, while the
government had the opposite motivations to reduce international condemnation or the
potential of foreign interference. Credible population numbers largely relied on NGO
estimates and loose calculations created with population growth projections based on the
last official census in 1981 – years before the mass outflow of the 1983 riots and steady
stream in the war immediately following.
While international actors lacked consistent access or verifiable population statistics, the
conservative estimates outlining thousands of confirmed atrocities didn’t reach
international media, member states, or were even discredited – limiting international
momentum towards greater protection measures. After the COG began collecting detailed
casualty data, the evidence was left off reports and presentation slides to embassy staff,
press, and NGOs within Sri Lanka that could have spread the information globally55.
While frustrating diplomatic staff and even UN officials working in Colombo,
challenging the regime was known to bring even less access for aid staff - particularly
within the IDP-camps. ‘Trading advocacy for access’ then served to benefit the regime
53 Harrison, Still Counting the Dead, 27.
54 Médecins Sans Frontières (2009). ‘Situation in rainy Sri Lanka deteriorates’, 27 March 2009, accessed 10
October 2015, http://www.msf.org.uk/article/situation-rainy-sri-lanka-deteriorates.
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120
and hurt the potential for protection measures56. This combination of limited access and
minimal reporting meant that the only international organization with a protection
mandate reduced information to press or member states – even discrediting details that
did emerge in exchange for greater access. In early March 2009, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, expressed alarm: “The current levels of
civilian casualties are truly shocking, and there are legitimate fears that the loss of life
may reach catastrophic levels”57. Using conservative estimates, she cited civilian deaths
and population numbers for the Vanni collected by the COG. However, UN staff in Sri
Lanka continued to limit international exposure to collected information - and weirdly,
discredit their own numbers in the face of Sri Lankan government indictments.
Immediately following Pillay’s statements, the of UN in Sri Lanka issued a statement on
its website discounting the accuracy: “these figures were drawn from an internal working
document which is based on information that cannot be fully, reliably, and independently
assessed…”58. Institutional failures to spread accurate statistics and portray the nature of
atrocities existed at the highest levels, including the UNSC within the ‘informal
interactive dialogue’ sessions. Even as greater information from the COG became
available to UN officials – the extent of government responsibility or breaches of
international law were not communicated to member delegations. Within the UNSC,
“prepared briefings made some references to international human rights and humanitarian
law and political concerns but these were largely focused on the humanitarian situation.
Briefings did not emphasize the responsibilities of the Government”59. As some
representatives later commented, this lack of communication regarding responsibility of
56 David Keen, ‘Compromise or capitulation? Report on WFP and the Humanitarian Crisis in Sri Lanka’ in
World Food Programme, Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies (Rome: United
Nations World Food Programme, 2009), p. 53.
57 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Serious violations of international
law committed in Sri Lanka conflict: UN human rights chief’, 13 March 2009, accessed 2 September 2015,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9499&.
58 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel’, 74.
59 Ibid., 81.
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the government and international humanitarian law meant that the Security Council was
limited in its knowledge of legal responsibility on the part of the regime that could have
driven formal consideration for greater action.
The ICRC was perhaps the only internationally credible agency with knowledge of
international human rights law with consistent involvement throughout the conflict.
Harking back to their knowledge of Nazi concentration camps and non-disclosure during
WWII, the ICRC remains an apolitical and distinctly neutral actor in cases of
humanitarian crises. “In the face of inevitable brutality, and with the guarantee that they
will remain silent about what they see, protagonists generally respect the neutral role of
the ICRC, as well as their physical presence in the conflict theater”60. While ICRC staff
exemplified selfless bravery in several cases to reduce human suffering, for those looking
for greater protection measures in Sri Lanka, ‘neutrality as a form of moral bankruptcy’
perhaps rang true61. The ICRC was able to evacuate 14,000 wounded civilians and their
families with small aid ships docked in shallow water off the coast through early May –
but only those channeled through an LTTE ‘pass system’ with voyages approved by the
government62. What is often not mentioned, is that while the ICRC avoided any type of
plea for intervention, several press statements were released - particularly in cases of
egregious violations of the Geneva Conventions paired with direct threats to its own staff
operating in the conflict zone – providing insights as to what conditions were like on the
ground. The ICRC released several press releases regarding consecutive deaths of
international staff members, as well as details regarding hospital shelling, restriction of
aid access, and shelling of an ICRC ship evacuating wounded in the final days of
60 Weiss, The Cage, 136.
61 David P. Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 100.
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conflict63. In the final moments of conflict, the ICRC’s international director of
operations, Pierre Krähenbühl, released a press statement: “our staff are witnessing an
unimaginable humanitarian catastrophe… No humanitarian organization can help them in
the current circumstances. People are left to their own devices”64. However, the very
nature of the ICRC meant that perhaps the only humanitarian actor with consistent
access, reliable data, and knowledge of internal law surrounding war crimes could not
provide more formal evidence.
Terrorist Organization and Regime Stability
While the Sri Lankan government’s poor human rights record was used as justification
for trade restrictions from Western actors, the LTTE’s continued terrorist attacks post-
9/11 and designation as a terrorist organization made condemnation of government
actions increasingly problematic with a shifting political climate under the Global War on
Terror (GWOT). Highlighting how wider international context can influence the
application or influence of specific norm, the GWOT and expansive Western forces
fighting across the Middle East shaped the international response to Sri Lanka’s civil war.
As early as 17 September 2001, Sri Lanka’s then-President, Chandrika Kumaratunga,
spoke out regarding disparities in reactions to terrorism between the West and developing
countries – urging western powers ‘to change their double standards’ and support a more
global-focused fight against terrorist organizations. Having lost her own right eye in a
1999 terrorist attack, she commented: “When countries like Sri Lanka fought against
terrorists, developed nations worried only about human rights of terrorist
63 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Sri Lanka: staff member killed in the conflict area’, News
Release No. 48/09, 5 March 2011, accessed 8 January 2015, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/docum
ents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/sri-lanka-news-050309.htm; See also, 09/103 and 34/09 among others.
64 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Sri Lanka: humanitarian assistance can no longer reach
civilians’, News Release No. 09/103, 14 May 2015, accessed 8 January 2015, https://www.icrc.org/e
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organizations”65. As a long-established and founding member of the Non-Aligned
Movement, Sri Lanka used its position to highlight disparities in international rhetoric
and build support for its domestic anti-terror struggle.
When details of civilian casualties were published, the Sri Lankan regime vehemently
denied allegations – constructing a narrative that it was carrying out ‘the world’s largest
humanitarian-rescue operation’, denying its use of heavy weaponry, while also
purposefully underestimating the number of civilians trapped in the battle space66. The
Sri Lankan government was seen as “anxious to deflect calls for a ceasefire and avoid a
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) military intervention that, he argued, would likely result
in civilian casualties”67. During a 2 March BBC Hardtalk interview, the Sri Lankan
minister for human rights, Mahinda Samarasinge, repeated the regime’s narrative that the
army was engaged in a ‘humanitarian operation’ and was not using heavy weaponry in
operations which, contrary to reports, were actually resulting in ‘zero civilian deaths’68.
“Again and again throughout the following months, it denied using heavy or
indiscriminate weapons and tactics, or that civilians were dying as a result… if civilians
were dying at all, it was because the Tamil Tigers were shelling and shooting their own
people”69. Creating consecutive NFZs, several periods of semi-observed ceasefires for
ICRC evacuations from the coast, and allowing some humanitarian to trickle into the
conflict zone provided the regime an aura of limited credibility. In an interview on 29
April to CNN-India, Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa commented:
65 Agence France-Press, ‘Sri Lanka wants end to “double standards” in fighting terrorism’, 17 September
2001, accessed 7 October 2014, http://www.infolanka.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/004404.html.
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It’s proceeding like a ceasefire only. Yes, our soldiers are moving forward. So
when you view all this, it looks like a real war. But we are not using our heavy
weapons… Whatever we did, the government, we had a plan. Clear this area,
defeat terrorism in this country, then give them a political solution70.
Outlining his desire to capture the Tiger leadership alive and allow trials including in
India for the assassination of its prime minister, the Sri Lankan president confirmed the
government’s continued care to limit Tamil deaths and rescue Sri Lankan civilians.
“Colombo thus disingenuously engaged in endless discussion of access to humanitarian
aid in order to ‘demonstrate good intentions’, enabling it to distract the relief system
while simultaneously presenting its military campaign as a ‘humanitarian hostage rescue’
exercise”71. Recurrently framing the conflict as a liberation struggle against terrorism,
every speech delivered by President Rajapaksa between the beginning of 2008 and May
2009 contained mention of the battle against the terrorist threat72. Through this effort to
publicize the status of the LTTE as a terrorist group, the government highlighted the link
between the LTTE and the GWOT on an international level.
Pegging the LTTE as a terrorist organization rather than the legitimate representative of
the Tamil population served as a means to delegitimize the group at the international
stage, propelling international support and embedding the Sri Lankan military campaign
within the wider political context of the GWOT. This made it harder for Western states to
challenge the Sri Lankan Army, while insulating the regime from foreign interference.
The then-US Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Robert Blake, later commented: “The Sri
70 The Hindu, ‘Freeing the civilians held hostage is my duty: Rajapaksa’, 29 April 2009, accessed 10
January 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/freeing-the-civilians-held-as-hostages-is-
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Lankans, not without reason, argued that the LTTE was really never interested in peace
and that they had always used ceasefires as a way to regroup and rearm themselves, so
they essentially refused any efforts to resume the peace process”73. By 2006, over 30
countries including Canada, Australia, the US, and European Union classified the LTTE
as a terrorist organization74. Continued suicide bombings, political assassinations, and
attacks against ‘soft’ civilian targets, increasingly turned Western powers against the
LTTE and in support of Colombo75. “Whereas in the 1980s the Tamil cause attracted
considerable support from the liberal, ‘like-minded’ community of governments, analysts
and pundits, relationships and reputations had become severely compromised by the
consistency of reports regarding the use of child soldiers and suicide bombers”76. While
Western powers still restricted military aid to the regime due to Sri Lanka’s poor human
rights record, the post 9-11 political environment drove support for the regime politically
and well as substantively in terms of limited military and intelligence gains while also
leading Tamil diaspora populations and Tamil NGO’s abroad to be treated with increased
suspicion77.
During the final months of conflict, members of the Tamil diaspora population made
rallying-cries in Western capitals including Ottawa, Washington D.C., London, and Paris.
The ‘very vocal’ Tamil diaspora population in London at the time totaled over 300,00078.
France’s Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, along with David Miliband both travelled
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to Colombo in a French military plane to deliver a mobile field hospital. “Both men
sought and received assurances from the president that the Sri Lankans were not using
heavy weaponry. Their choice was to accuse him of lying, or accept his word. They
unloaded the French field hospital and departed the island”79. Although Western states
faced varied degrees of domestic pressure to protect Tamil diaspora populations, the
LTTE’s own detailed history of human rights atrocities and state building through
conflict were invoked in the international political climate for having destabilizing the
state and greater region80. Canadian officials illustrated this dynamic clearly. On 15 April
2009, in response to demonstrators around Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Minister Jason
Kenney outlined, “The Tamil Tigers are responsible for suicide bombings and the deaths
of thousands of civilians… We have done everything that these protesters are asking
Canada to do – namely call for a ceasefire”81. This highlights the apparent reluctance of
the international community to act against a government fighting a terrorist group,
despite the civilian casualties incurred.
Through suicide bombings, forced recruitment of children, widespread acts of
brutality and intimidation against the population is claimed to protect – in the
final months of conflict, the LTTE’s own use of ‘human shields’ was used a
justification of government abuses of civilian rights82.
While the US dealt with the issue of Guantanamo Bay, the Abu-Ghraib prison scandal,
and two international conflicts to fight terrorism, it became increasingly hard and
79 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sri Lanka: trapped and under fire’, 15 April 2009, accessed 10 January 2015,
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contradictory to politically challenge foreign powers such as Sri Lanka, Russia, Israel,
and China, among others that used the opportunity to consolidate their own positions
against ‘terrorists’83. With Western powers were stretched thin by the 2008 economic
collapse and nearly a decade of war in the Middle East, the GWOT functioned to hinder
political resolve for protection measures that might benefit a known terrorist organization
abroad. Many of the international actors that turned against the LTTE under the GWOT
remain some of the most active ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in asserting R2P and are among the
few countries with the military capacity to project force globally. However, military sales
and political support at the UN also reflected a transition in political alliances in the lead-
up to the government’s military campaign.
Greater Regional Involvement: Material and Normative Considerations
With limited economic or strategic interests in Sri Lanka, the US and several other
Western powers supported peace negotiations through the CFA from roughly 2001-04.
But as the peace process failed, Western powers were seen to distance themselves from
the regime due to their poor human rights record, and the LTTE due to their linkages to
global terrorist networks84. With the disintegration of the peace process, the government
faced a parallel process of condemnation with continued reports of illegal detentions,
torture, sexual assaults, and violent restrictions on press freedoms. Reports from
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and International
Crisis Group, paralleled a steady flow of international UN officials highlighting
continued government human rights abuses85. While maintaining limited anti-terror
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intelligence, by 2007 the United States and various other Western states cited government
human rights abuses as rationale for wide-ranging restrictions. US AID alone declined
over 75 percent between 2004 and 200986. Almost all UK and US aid halted by 2008,
with much of the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan embracing similar
positions87. However, such distance led to a transition in diplomatic ties from West to
East. ‘Take aid from China and take pass on human rights’ marked a transition to new
partnerships with Sri Lanka’s Foreign Secretary, Palitha Kohona, stating bluntly in 2008:
“The new donors are neighbors; they are rich; and they conduct themselves differently.
‘Asian’s don’t go around teaching each other how to behave’”88. China, Pakistan, Iran,
and to a large extent India, picked up the residual slack – aligning aid and political
backing with the regime’s desire for a military victory. As Goodhand and Korf highlight,
The Rajapaksa government essentially redefined the ‘ethnic question’ as an
internal security problem with the LTTE becoming the overarching threat and
enemy to the Sri Lankan polity and society… To this end, Rajapaksa consciously
diluted the influence of Western international actors by strengthening alliances
with regional players such as India, China, and Pakistan, who were less attached
to an interventionist, liberal model of peacebuilding89.
This transition in aid and political partnerships highlights the shifting political context
regionally and internationally as the regime began its pursuit of a military option to
86 Lunstead, ‘Superpowers and small conflict’, 64.
87 Tom Nicholson, ‘Slovak ministries defend Sri Lankan arms deal’, The Slovak Spectator, 25 May 2009,
accessed 16 January 2015, http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/35369/2/slovak_ministries_defend_sri_
lanka_arms_deal.html. [Accessed 16 Jan 2015]; Lunstead, ‘Superpowers and small conflict’, 71.
88 Somini Sengupta, ‘Take Aid from China and Take Pass on Human Rights’, The New York Times, 9
March 2008, accessed 10 January 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/weekinreview/09sengupta.
html?_r=0.
89 Jonathan Goodhand and Benedikt Korf, ‘Caught in the peace trap?’ in Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan
Spencer and Benedikt Korf (eds.), Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the peace trap?
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011), p. 2.
129
ending its civil war. These actors providing the military aid necessary to carry out the
final stages of the civil war, and political overhead to ensure the regime had the necessary
political space without foreign interference. Pakistan provided arms sales, political
support, and even direct military involvement – allegedly launching its own air sorties
against LTTE bases in August 2008 with Pakistani planes and pilots operating from
Colombo90. In the final year of conflict, Pakistan supplied Sri Lanka’s main 22 Al-Khalid
battle tanks, and other advanced arms and ammunition with sales totaling over $190
million including an emergency delivery of 60mm, 81mm, 120mm, 130mm mortars, and
hand grenades that were in short supply during the final months91. Throughout the lead-
up to the final stages of civil war, India also maintained intelligence and military ties with
the regime, as well as close economic ties through development projects92. With
linguistic, religious, and cultural ties to the trapped population in its own region of
Tamilnadu, India justified its past involvement in the 1980s through human rights
protections for the Tamil population. Often referred to as India’s Vietnam, the Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF 1987-1990) ultimately failed with Indian forces alienating
themselves from both the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan government - resulting
in the death of 1,155 Indian soldiers, nearly 3,000 wounded at the cost of $1.25 billion
and the post-conflict assassination of its Prime Minister93. As it became clear that the
LTTE would not negotiate a peaceful solution for a federal structure or greater internal
political rights within the Sri Lankan state, Indian support shifted entirely to the Sri
Lankan government. Indian policymakers and analysts have emphasized that the
transformation in Indian policy did not reflect changes in end game, but strategy with the
view that “whatever solution is found has to be within the framework of constitutional
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arraignments which preserves Sri Lanka’s territorial unity and integrity, a logic which
India applies to its own violent separatist movements in different parts of the country”94.
This shift can also be described in terms of India’s regionally dominant position and
necessity to align aid with Colombo in order to retain economic and diplomatic linkages.
With China and Pakistan increasing their investments, India was faced with either losing
its bilateral partnership with the Sri Lankan government set on a military victory, or back
a known terrorist organization that had ties to its own population in the south.
While Indian and Pakistani military support and assistance in Sri Lanka marks a historic
pattern of regional relationships in trade and military cooperation, from 2007 onward “the
huge economic investments made by China and Iran in particular have marked a
significant departure from Sri Lanka’s previous reliance on the more traditional donors of
Japan, the West, and multilateral international lending institutions”95. In March 2007, Sri
Lanka and China signed an agreement that China would fund 85 percent of a deep-water
port project at Hambantota on the island’s southern coast including a fuel bunkering
facility, power plant, oil refinery, and airport96. After signaling these development
agreements, in April 2007 China provided a secret $37.5 million worth of sophisticated
weaponry and ammunition97. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), by 2007 China became Sri Lanka’s largest military supplier - over 80
percent of total supplies and $1 billion in military sales of ammunition, aircraft and other
advanced weaponry systems98. “Military assistance, including six F-7 fighter jets free of
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charge, was crucial in ending the military stalemate with the Tamil rebels in favor of the
Sri Lankan government”99. Building a trade and political partnership, Iran also provided a
$1.5 billion soft-loan package to Sri Lanka, delivering oil as well as beginning several
development projects including an oil refinery and hydropower project in 2008100.
Various scholars and defense reports have emphasized China’s involvement in South
Asia as a means of hard-power alignment – an exertion of regional dominance and
subversion of India’s authority101. Through this lens, China is “continuously making
inroads into every country neighboring India… sufficiently for China to be the dominant
player in Asia in the next century”102. However, a more realistic assessment highlights
China’s regional trade partnerships and port access along its major strategic trade routes
as a means of solidifying its greater-regional security and economic interests. A well-
cited security report from Booz Allen Hamilton (2004), labeled this Chinese expansion
its ‘String of Peals’ or ‘encirclement strategy’ in South Asia - “defensive and offensive
positioning to protect China’s energy interests but also to serve its broader security
objectives”103. The rise of the Beijing Consensus and focus on investment in countries
such as Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka may serve as a means of building partnerships
stretching along strategic trade routes for oil and other resources from Africa and the
Middle East across to the South China Sea. China has its own fears of internal separatist
conflicts in Tibet and in the far western region of Muslim Xinjiang. But China’s greater
strategic interests likely lie in its ability to supply raw materials to sustain economic
growth. Through this lens, China has more to gain through Sri Lankan stability and close
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diplomatic linkages – widely averse to R2P and interventions that fail to address root
causes perpetuating regime instability.
Unlike other humanitarian crises in the Middle East, Africa, or Europe, Sri Lanka
highlights a lack of regional organizational involvement. In terms of security constructs,
the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Bangladesh never formally
addressed the crisis in the final stages of war against the LTTE. “Chronic tension,
occasional conflict, and perennial absence of trust between India and Pakistan and
periodic hiccups in relations with other neighbors have contributed to uneven progress on
multilateral bodies like SAARC”104. The population and power disparity of India
dominating the regional order, as well as cross-border ethno-national linkages India
shares with each of its neighbor’s underlines perennial tensions and perception of cross-
border meddling105. “Haunted by old mindsets and prejudices, South Asian power elites
who come from various backgrounds (military, dominant ethnicity, and so on) have not
been able to free themselves from religious, ethnic, regional and separatist trends”106.
Pervasive regional insecurities and cross-border ethnic disputes have served to
consolidate and continually highlight the powerful internalization of the norm of
nonintervention in South Asia as a regional order107. The final months were particularly
critical through Indian, Pakistani, and even the Maldives’ support for nonintervention108.
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While India has been ‘traditionally suspicious of Western interference in its
neighborhood’, it would have been a likely candidate for intervention as well as
canvassing international support for protection measures109. While having to play a
subdued role due to upcoming elections and large Tamil population in the state of
Tamilnadu, had the final stages of conflict sparked violent protests in India, or led to
waves of refugees – such as the over 100,000 that poured into India after the 1983 riots –
India might have been forced into greater calls for protection. According to the Calcutta
based Telegraph, India’s National Security Advisor, M.K. Naryanan’s ‘main concern’
was “a possible fall out on the Lok Sabha [India’s lower parliament] elections as the
result of an evacuation without explicit approval of the LTTE and any consequent
spilling of Tamil blood”110. In parallel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued that Indian
spectatorship in any rescue attempt would damage its reputation as a regional power,
while any intervention would also serve in undermining Colombo’s strategic aims for
peace111. Nonintervention was contested as the necessary policy decision to maintain
positive relations with an important regional partner, while not getting stuck in another
protracted peacekeeping operation that it framed as something that was not desired by the
Sri Lankan government, and could potentially lead to a continued conflict through Tamil
deaths and survival of the LTTE. Widely conservative surrounding foreign interference,
India has been openly averse to R2P’s third pillar in the past, with a pluralist conception
of international order driving its normative position aligned with nonintervention112.
What made India’s support for a military solution all the more incompatible for
humanitarian intervention rests on its regional power and ties to Western states. Most
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crucially, recognition of India’s regional sphere of influence and past involvement within
Sri Lanka made it a widely ‘deferred to actor’ on the part of Western powers such as the
United States and UK113.
Apathy in the UN Security Council and Opposition amongst Major Powers
No South Asian state was in the Security Council at the time, but aligned with norm
localization and nonintervention with East Asia, all Asian members on the Council at the
time including Japan, Vietnam, and China, only agreed to discuss the situation informally
if the Sri Lankan delegation did not object and were reluctant to issue any official
statement even into late April114. As the principle South Asian regional actor and
‘deferred to’ actor for appraising the nature of atrocities and potential for coercive
measures in response to government atrocities, India’s stance did play a major role within
UN bodies through close diplomatic communication. As the final months of conflict
yielded increased atrocities, several Indian politicians including its Minister of Foreign
Affairs made calls to limit civilian deaths115. However, reports lacked consequence and
India continued its silence at the UN116. India’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pranab
Mukherjee, ‘stressed’ to Western powers in diplomatic cables: “military victories offer a
political opportunity to restore life to normalcy in the Northern Province and throughout
Sri Lanka, after twenty-three years of conflict. The President has assured me that this was
his intent”117.
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After the first informal interactive dialogue session in the UNSC in February 2009, the
UK’s Ambassador to the UN, Sir John Sawers, commented to the press: “The United
Kingdom was in favor of receiving a briefing on Sri Lankan humanitarian aspect, but the
UK has a clear position that Sri Lanka is not on the formal agenda of the Security
Council and it is not that kind of situation”118. America’s Ambassador to the UN, Susan
Rice, did comment in March in that “the United States feels strongly about Sri Lanka and
we support a provision of it to the Council – a full and updated information on the
humanitarian situation”119. However, leaked cables from the US Ambassador to Sri
Lanka at the time, indicate that even while the government’s denial of heavy shelling and
civilian deaths was discounted as inaccurate, calling the situation a genocide or deserving
of similar classification was pushed back as “an overstatement” meaning that such deaths
were not determined of sufficient threshold or character deserving of R2P type
classification120. Western powers may have been concerned surrounding the civilian
atrocities, but did not have detailed knowledge of the nature of atrocities until the final
several months, with the LTTE’s designation as a terrorist organization limiting any
arguments for intervention that would only support the aims and ongoing existence of the
LTTE. When greater pressure was exerted in late April and May to push for greater
international transparency surrounding the nature of atrocities for potential protection
measures, the Sri Lankan government pushed for a decisive victory with political
overhead.
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In terms of the norm of nonintervention, the fact that it was upheld so firmly provides a
level of insight regarding how it informed the behavior of international actors. While
Russia has it’s own terrorist insurgencies in the Northern Caucuses, it has remained
overtly conservative in its views of humanitarian intervention and seemingly skeptical of
any R2P promotion in Sri Lanka. While holding no real strategic or economic interests in
Sri Lanka, Russia’s UN Ambassador at the time, Vitaly Churkin, maintained: “This is an
internal situation against a terrorist group which the Government is trying to handle
through military and political means”121. Russia’s continued stance of nonintervention in
cases of intra-state conflict meant that as the rotating chair of the UN Security Council in
May 2009 it was placed in a position that it could continue to keep Sri Lanka off the
formal agenda. The first Official Statement from the UNSC did not emerge until 13 May
with estimated tens of thousands already dead and only days left in the conflict. While
expressing deep concern for government shelling and necessity for greater humanitarian
assistance, the UNSC statement affirmed: “Members of the Council strongly condemn
the LTTE for its act of terrorism over many years, and for its continued use of human
shields and acknowledge the legitimate right to the Government of Sri Lanka to combat
terrorism”122. Similarly, as conflict mounted towards the final weeks in May 2009, China
provided explicit political cover for the Sri Lankan government, actively subverting
allegations of human rights violations, and keeping the topic away from formal bodies at
the UN and discourse that could have led to any kind of substantive resolution. A
spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry at a press briefing in Beijing on April
2009 expressed China’s backing of the Sri Lankan government “to safeguard their
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and to maintain national stability to
121 Gamage, ‘U.N. Ambassadors unanimous LTTE laying down arms’.
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economic development”123. Taking a strict stance with the Sri Lankan government and
mirroring its ongoing economic investments, the Chinese delegation pushed against any
international momentum towards intervention.
Too Little, Too Late: The Responsibility to Protect
In terms of the content or applied meaning of R2P in the case of Sri Lanka, the 2001
ICISS report did seemingly little to articulate the exact procedural obligations of the UN
international actors in terms of the responsibility to protect. A consensus-based definition
and strategic period of norm contestation affirming a more clear and arguably legitimate
understanding of the norm of R2P in 2005 within the SOD – later unanimously endorsed
by the UNGA and UNSC. However, the SOD placed continued development of R2P
within the hands of the UNGA, with several powers citing this fact as R2P was invoked
post-2005, contributing to a seemingly limited invocation of the norm’s precepts.
Expansive understandings of the norm seemed to be echoed in international politics as
well as scholarship. However, the UN Secretary General’s report in 2009 on
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ then served as a means to further clarify and
build consensus surrounding what the norm procedurally and substantively entailed124.
With Sri Lanka’s crisis occurring before the 2009 debate and UN Secretary-General’s
report, the articulated meaning of R2P could be argued as less-diffuse than the post-2009
context, with Sri Lanka and the Secretary General’s report serving as periods of
contestation which shaped greater recognition of the norm and clarity surrounding its
meaning aligned with the SOD. As Alex Bellamy outlines through 2015, Sri Lanka is the
“only case in which R2P language was used by actors other than NGOs but where there
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was a clear failure to act”125. In April and May 2009, the Global Centre for R2P penned
two open letters to the UNSC, imploring them to take the necessary action to protect the
civilians of Sri Lanka, affirming paragraph 138 and 139 of the SOD. The letters
emphasized the responsibility of the Security Council to act in with “‘timely and decisive
measures’ to prevent or halt mass atrocities” and take a more assertive stance against
atrocities from both sides126. Further NGO calls for action included the International
Crisis Group, the Global Action to Prevent War, Minority Rights Group and MEDACT
under the worsening situation127.
Institutionally, the UN’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng,
called in April and May for both sides to respect humanitarian law, addressing both the
LTTE and government in his statement128. While Deng began tracking the crisis closely
by March 2009, he allegedly limited any pressure or further steps to promote more
coercive protection measures due to his knowledge that the US and India both supported
the government’s campaign even with a level of civilian casualties in the cross fire129. It
was not until April that several non-permanent members of the Security Council
including Mexico and Costa Rica placed more pressure on the UN for the atrocities to be
formally addressed. Critically, R2P was invoked, including Mexico’s Permanent
Representative to the UNSC, Claude Heller, telling reporters at the beginning of April:
“in the case of Sri Lanka there is concern of the responsibility to protect the
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population”130. India’s Minster of Foreign Affairs released a press release on 23 April
articulating India’s bottom line and articulation interaction between R2P and
nonintervention: “the Sri Lankan government has a responsibility to protect its own
citizens and the LTTE must stop its barbaric attempt to hold civilians hostage” however,
“there is no military solution to this ongoing humanitarian crisis, and all concerned
should recognize this fact”131. While India has since 2009 echoed support for R2P in
principle, it remained highly skeptical surrounding the projection of force under the third
pillar, with Sri Lanka an example of feared meddling within its own sphere of interests,
in which foreign intervention was seen as likely to contribute to further instability and
survival of the LTTE – further protracting conflict and human rights abuses long term.
Civilian protection was emphasized as an important pursuit, but not one that promoted a
normative advancement for intervention against a recognized government fighting for
internal order. However, while nonintervention remained firmly held as a regional norm
and by a number of important international actors, the extent of political bargaining
meant that Sri Lanka’s crisis in many ways highlights a shift in acceptance of R2P.
As Damien Kingsbury concluded, the failure to invoke R2P’s precepts were attached to
international division surrounding R2P’s legitimacy, LTTE’s wide proscription as a
terrorist organization, acknowledgement that economic sanctions would be too late and
intervention would likely cause greater harm with limited chance of success, and lack of
endorsement at the UNSC, which was “blocked by China and actively opposed by
Russia”132. These factors paint a holistic picture of the international dimension, which
was largely compounded by limited international access and UN institutional failures that
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limited the spread of information and traded ‘advocacy for access’ on the ground. While
the United States, United Kingdom, India, and perhaps other international or greater-
regional actors had the means to exert greater pressure including military intervention,
the regime was somehow seen as justified enough to carry out the final stages of conflict.
As Madeline Albright and Richard Williamson highlight “the case of Sri Lanka
exemplifies a challenge for implementing R2P when sovereign governments confront an
internal threat from a group that is designated as a terrorist organization”133. The LTTE’s
close association with terrorism meant that a means versus ends argument could be
constructed by the regime and within wider international rhetoric surrounding the Global
War on Terror (GWOT). An Economist article launched at the conflict’s height, perhaps
highlighted the central argument for nonintervention with its title: ‘Dark Victory: But the
imminent end of war offers an historic chance to make peace’134. Framing the conflict as
a domestic struggle against a violent insurgency, the Sri Lankan regime “depicted human
rights as a tool of Western hegemony, discredited by double standards, and a threat to
national sovereignty”135. These factors in part magnified the norm of nonintervention or
enabled actors to invoke it pragmatically with the regime seen as justified in its internal
pursuit of stability regardless of civilian atrocities. Thus, while R2P was addressed
through a level of global discourse, the Sri Lankan regime’s articulation of its first pillar
authority to maintain sole control of the crisis paralleled the international context of the
GWOT, helping to solidify a case of nonintervention that would later be highlighted as a
failure of international responsibility.
Conclusion
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The final campaign has been highlighted regionally and internationally by references to
the Sri Lankan Option or Rajapaksa Model – which functionally turns the hearts and
minds counter-insurgency strategy on its head. The Indian Defense Review outlined:
“Terrorism has to be wiped out militarily and cannot be tackled politically. That’s the
basic premise of the Rajapaksa Model”136. The Sri Lankan Army’s Director of
Operations and leading General of the 58th Division that spearheaded many of the final
operations in 2009, was appointed as Sri Lanka’s Deputy Permanent Representative to
the UN in 2010 and was even nominated by Asian states to sit on the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Advisory Group on Peacekeeping Operations137. Far from being
condemned, “hawkish generals and politicians from Colombia to Israel seem to be using
Sri Lanka’s experience to justify harsher anti-terror operations”138. Instead of creating
incentives for the population to transform against the insurgency from the top down, the
Sri Lankan government effectively decapitated the leadership of the LTTE and pacified
the Tamil population through overwhelming force.
International apathy towards civilian atrocities in the final months mirrored articulations
from actors such as China, Russia, and India that such domestic behaviors did not
normatively warrant intervention. These positions were strengthened by international
context of the GWOT, material interests of regional powers, and failures inside the UN
that prevented the scope of atrocities becoming widely recognized until the final several
weeks. While the nature of the domestic conflict within the wider international context of
the GWOT and pragmatic interests of regional powers could be argued as principle
136 V.K. Shashikumar, ‘Lessons from Sri Lanka’s War’, Indian Defense Review 24(3) (2009), accessed 12
January 2014, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/lessons-from-the-war-in-sri-lanka/.
137 Charles Haviland, ‘UN role for Sri Lanka ex-army General Shavendra Silva’. BBC News, 27 January
2012, accessed 10 January 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16763509.
138 The Economist, ‘“The Sri Lanka Option”: Friends Like These’, 20 May 2010, accessed 10 January 2015,
http://www.economist.com/node/16167758.
142
driving factors for inaction, norm localization of nonintervention regionally and amongst
a number of key international powers illustrated its substantive persistence. Invocations
of nonintervention emphasized the long-term necessity for regimes to maintain a
monopoly of force and secure their populations - affirming the state’s sovereign right to
pursue domestic stability even when a high level of civilian deaths are recognized.
Through this lens, the norm of nonintervention contributed to apprehension to even
address potential protection measures let alone the threat of force to limit atrocities with
R2P barely echoed and civilian protection measures never formally addressed. However,
relative to R2P, Sri Lanka marked a potential turning point in the acceptability of the
level of inaction globally in response to similar crises.
Where misapplications of the norm of R2P have been outlined through expansive
interpretations to include environmental catastrophe or ‘disingenuous and geopolitically-
driven’ disproportionate use of force139, Sri Lanka reflected a misapplied lapse in
protection. This reflected not only limited knowledge of what the norm of R2P’s
precept’s proscribed to particular actors, but it’s limited salience relative to the norm of
nonintervention surrounding mass atrocities, which seems to match the sentiment of the
time. As the UN Internal Review Panel later assessment:
The concept of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was raised occasionally during the
final stages of the conflict, but to no useful result. Differing perceptions among
Member States and the Secretariat of the concept’s meaning and use had become
so contentious as to nullify its potential value. Indeed, making reference to the
Responsibility to Protect was seen to weaken rather than strengthen UN action140
139 Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Misrepresenting R2P and advancing norms: An alternative
spiral?’, International Studies Perspectives 11(4) (2010), 354-374.
140 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel’, 26.
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Only after the conflict ended did a large amount of information about the nature of the
atrocities become available, and therefore the response across the globe has been
considerable and deemed widely as an illegitimate exertion of sovereign power.
In May 2010, President Rajapaksa launched a domestic Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission to investigate ‘the matters that may have taken place’ during
the last seven years of the war141. Under continued reports of mass atrocity crimes
committed in early 2009, the Secretary-General commissioned a Panel of Experts to
report on the accountability of the war in Sri Lanka in 2011, which challenged the
partiality of the Sri Lankan Commission and condemned both the LTTE and government
of Sri Lanka for their actions during the conflict142. The Panel of Experts also called for a
review of the actions of the UN during and after the conflict, leading to the commission
in November 2012 of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel, which concluded,
“the events in Sri Lanka mark a grave failure of the UN to adequately respond to early
warnings and to the evolving situation during the final stages of the conflict and its
aftermath, to the detriment of hundreds of thousands of civilians and in contradiction with
the principles and responsibilities of the UN”143. Although Sri Lanka highlights the
failure of the international community to take any substantive action to protect the
civilians of a state causing the atrocities, the response of the international community
during the aftermath shows in part the illegitimacy of nonintervention or at the very least
greater efforts to address the crisis within formal institutions with greater levels of
accountability for the protection of their civilians. As Alex Bellamy highlights, “while it
is important to highlight Sri Lanka as a glaring sin of omission and to redouble efforts to
ensure that this is not repeated, the failure to protect there was not a typical case of
double standards at work. What is more, far from being complicit in the failure, R2P
141 Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka, ‘National Plan of Action to Implement the Recommendations of
the LLRC’, 26 July 2012, accessed 10 August 2015, http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affair
s/ca201207/20120726national_plan_action.htm.
142 Panel of Experts, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability’, 34.
143 Internal Review Panel, ‘Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel’.
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served as one of the foremost vehicles of critique”144. Institutionally, the failure of Sri
Lanka contributed towards a number of initiatives including the establishment of Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC) principles that seek to ensure ‘The Centrality of
Projection in Humanitarian Action’, and UN ‘Rights Up Front’ action plan emphasizing
the importance of civilian protection to address conflicting incentives such as the
advocacy vs. access’ dichotomy between UN institutions within countries’145. This has
contributed to the creation of a ‘convening mechanism’ to bring the UN Under Secretary
Generals together during crisis situations and a UN-wide ‘contact group’ on R2P146.
Since the end of the conflict, the international community shifted from welcoming peace,
to reviewing and condemning the actions of both the LTTE and Sri Lankan government,
and increasing pressure for accountability for those responsible. This shift is best
highlighted when examining the stance of the UNHRC from the end of the war. On 26
May 2009, just after the end of the conflict, the UN Human Rights Council held a Special
Session on Sri Lanka, in which they passed a resolution that “welcomes the continued
commitment of Sri Lanka to the promotion and protection of all human rights”147. This
resolution is a far cry from the more recent action of the Human Rights Council with
respect to Sri Lanka. In March 2014, the Human Rights Council of the UN declared that
an investigation into the claims that the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE
committed war crimes during the conflict148. The report is, at the time of writing, yet to
be published having been postponed from March 2015 to September 2015 after
144 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense, 145.
145 Niland, Inhumanity and Humanitarian Action, 2.
146 Edward C. Luck, ‘From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ in Jared
Genser and Irwin Cotler (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in
our Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 85-108; Panel of Experts, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability’, 34.
147 UN Human Rights Council (2009) ‘Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human
rights’, 11th Special Session, A/HRC/S-11/2, 26-27 May 2009, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC
/GEN/G09/144/09/PDF/G0914409.pdf?OpenElement.
148 UN News Centre, ‘UN rights council approves inquiry into alleged abuses in Sri Lanka war’, 27 March
2014, accessed 8 August 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47447#.VcYaJIe4mPk.
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Rajapaksa’s government was replaced after the national elections in January 2015, and
the new government appears willing to be increase transparency and work with the
international community to aid investigations149. The shift highlights the powerful
transition of the international community during the aftermath of the conflict with Sri
Lanka as a case study shaping the normative context away from inaction as an acceptable
international response.
149 Ankit Panda, ‘With UN war crimes report delay, Sri Lanka must deliver on post-war accountability’,
The Diplomat, 18 February 2015, accessed 8 August 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/with-un-war-
crimes-report-delay-sri-lanka-must-deliver-on-post-war-accountability/.
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Chapter 4: Libya’s Jamahiriya
Following Sri Lanka, few anticipated the swift and decisive response that would emerge
two years later in Libya during the Arab Spring. On 19 March 2011, the United States,
France, and United Kingdom began strikes in Libya as part of a coalition that would
include nearly twenty states imposing a no-fly zone, arms embargo, and civilian
protection mandate under Operation Unified Protector. In the weeks leading up to the
intervention, the UN Security Council passed consecutive Resolutions 1970 and 1973,
invoking R2P and mandating the entire spectrum of coercive instruments against the
regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi including ‘all necessary measures’ to protect the
civilian population. While calling a ceasefire moments after the UN’s authorization of
force, loyalist forces barreled through the desert reclaiming rebel areas, with an
anticipated bloodbath in the city of Benghazi. Outlining the events and actors
surrounding Libya’s humanitarian crisis and international response, this chapter first
examines the background surrounding the Arab Spring and Libya’s humanitarian crisis.
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Second, it addresses international response through regional organizational involvement,
the UN, and projection of military force for civilian protection from March to October
2011. Third, this chapter examines the implementation of R2P and how nonintervention
continued to inform the choices of actors in the face of mass atrocity crimes. While the
case illustrates an unprecedented example of R2P’s Third Pillar, I argue that the Libyan
case illustrates a rare confluence of factors, which enabled a decisive response and
softened the normative salience of nonintervention.
Background: The Arab Spring and Libya
In early 2011, a wave of revolutionary movements engulfed the Arab world. Beginning in
Tunisia, violent and non-violent protests spread throughout Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and
Syria with more minor protests across Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Morocco,
and Iraq. Prior to the revolutions, many countries maintained a high level of economic
growth, with authoritarian regimes ruling under relative stability. Bellow the surface,
decades of despotic leadership led to widespread resentment surrounding the stinted
political process and squandered national resources1. Whereas the autocrats of Tunisia
and Egypt were forced down with a level of restraint and the military working alongside
the transitional governments, the Libyan regime quickly declared war on the revolution –
exposing tribal and regional cleavages that have plagued the country for decades2. While
later reports would confirm protesters as the first to turn violent with security forces
responding with widespread brutality, the revolution received a nearly unprecedented
level of international attention3.
1 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the
Making of a New Era (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
2 Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya’, Foreign Affairs 90(3) (2011), 2-7.
3 Alan J. Kuperman, ‘A model humanitarian intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya campaign’
International Security, 38(1) (2013), 105-136.
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Libyan protesters took to the streets in the eastern city of Benghazi on 15 February and
within hours demonstrations erupted across the country, resonating regional chants for
popular rule. The protests quickly turned violent with amateur video released of
government forces and foreign mercenaries attacking protesters with knives, guns, and
cleavers – literally hacking their way through demonstrations4. On 18 February, soldiers
opened fire on a funeral procession of several killed demonstrators – sparking what one
witness called a ‘volcano’ of dissent with rebels burning police stations, army barracks,
and looting government arsenals5. Further reports emerged of aircraft bombings, artillery,
and rocket fire within civilian areas with protesters jumping from bridges to avoid
government forces6. A French doctor operating in eastern part of the country alleged
2,000 deaths in the area between 17 and 20 February7. Residents of the capital Tripoli
reported on 21 February, “Warplanes and helicopters are indiscriminately bombing one
area after another. There are many, many, dead. Our people are dying. It is the policy of
scorched earth”8. Internationally, the Libyan state faced a mass exodus of defecting
ambassadors, its UN mission, several domestic leaders, and air force pilots landing with
their planes in Malta following orders to target civilians. Libya’s deputy permanent
minister to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi, called for the regime to step down in New York
asserting, “We are sure what is going on now in Libya is crimes against humanity and
4 Richard Spencer, ‘Libya: civil war breaks out as Gaddafi mounts rearguard fight’, The Telegraph, 23
February 2011, accessed 15 May 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian
ocean/libya/8344034/Libya-civil-war-breaks-out-as-Gaddafi-mounts-rearguard-fight.html.
5 Ethan Chorin, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (New York: Public Affairs,
2012), p. 194.
6 Nick Meo, ‘Libyan protests: 140 “massacred” as Gaddafi sends in snipers to crush dissent’, The
Telegraph, 20 February 2011, accessed 29 May 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnew
s/africaandindianocean/libya/8335934/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-
dissent.html.
7 BBC World News, ‘Libya protests: Gaddafi embattled by opposition gains’, 24 February 2011, accessed
16 January 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-africa-12564104.
8 Richard Spencer, ‘Libya: Muammar Gaddafi’s fires on his own people’ The Telegraph, 21 Feb 2011,
accessed 27 January 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/
8339347/Libya-Muammar-Gaddafi-fires-on-his-own-people.html.
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crimes of war”9. Foreign workers and diplomatic staff quickly evacuated the country,
while a media, humanitarian aid, and domestic communications blackout was imposed by
the regime.
As NATO surveillance and intelligence assets flew overhead, Qaddafi’s security forces
barrelled through the desert with continued reports of human rights atrocities. From 5-15
March, government forces reclaimed the Western part of the country and solidified their
position in the capital of Tripoli. In the east, a National Transitional Council (NTC)
emerged as a rival authority, announcing its formation in late February and on 5 March
issuing a declaration as the ‘only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and
Libyan state’. Believing that Western troops’ involvement in Afghanistan and decade
long war in Iraq would limit political resolve for the use of force, the Qaddafi went on the
offensive, determined to finish the rebellion with a decisive blow10. While the rebel
militias and NTC quickly rose in recognition and international support, their subsequent
military losses and poor organization placed rebel-held cities at risk. By 18 March,
loyalist forces pushed through the city of Misrata, Ajdabigya, and closed within one
hundred miles of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. In a chilling address, Colonel
Qaddafi issued a now infamous threat – vowing to cleanse the city house by house
‘without mercy or pity’11.
The International Response
9 Colin Moynihan, ‘Libya’s U.N. diplomats break with Qaddafi’, The New York Times, 21 February 2011,
accessed 14 May 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html.
10 Alison Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 226.
11 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, ‘Qaddafi warns of assault on Benghazi as U.N. vote nears’,
The New York Times, 17 March 2011, accessed 27 February 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/
world/africa/18libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>; Ian Black, ‘Qaddafi threatens retaliation in
Mediterranean as UN passes resolution’, The Guardian, 18 March 2011, accessed 28 May 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/gaddafi-retaliation-mediterranean-libya-no-fly-zone.
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International focus on the Arab Spring and violence in Libya brought a wave of media
attention and institutional focus with ‘human rights up front’, with both regional and
international condemnation from initial violence in late February laying the groundwork
for subsequent protection measures. On 22 February, the Security Council issued a press
release deploring the civilian deaths and regime responsibility, with the UN’s High
Commissioner on Human Rights, Navi Pillay, further criticizing the attacks and asserting
that ongoing strikes against civilians may amount to crimes against humanity12. The
UN’s Under Secretary Generals on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P issued a joint-
statement reiterating the government’s 2005 commitment to protect the population from
egregious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law13. Regionally,
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and
League of Arab States (LAS), all issued statements of condemnation. On 23 February, the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) issued a communiqué on the
situation in Libya condemning the indiscriminate and excessive use of force against
demonstrators in response to the ‘legitimate’ “aspiration of the people of Libya for
democracy, political reform, justice and socio-economic development”14. Several days
later, the UN Human Rights Council convened for a Special Session, calling for an
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya.
12 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Pillay calls for international inquiry into
Libyan violence and justice for Victims’, 22 February 2011, accessed 30 May 2015,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10743&LangID=E.
13 UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, ‘UN Secretary-General Special
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect,
Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya’, 22 February 2011, accessed 30 May 2015, http://www.un.org/en/
preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20Libya,%2022%20
February%202011.pdf.
14 African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council’, PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI), 23 February 2011, accessed 9 October 2015,
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PSC%20Communique%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Libya.
pdf; Paul D. Williams, ‘Briefing The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’, Global Responsibility to
Protect 3 (2011), 251.
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On 26 February, the UNSC debated the situation in Libya and unanimously adopted
Resolution 1970 – condemning systematic violation of human rights against peaceful
demonstrators and recalling the Libyan authorities’ “responsibility to protect its
population”15. Highlighting the earlier statements of regional organizations, the Security
Council called for an immediate end to hostilities, invoking its Chapter VII powers with
an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze for a number of Libyan authorities, and
referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court. The resolution also called for
a progress review in 120 days surrounding the implementation of coercive measures. In
response to the uniquely robust and swift measures, the Libyan regime responded in early
March with a statement that the UNSC’s actions were premature, requesting a suspension
of sanctions until conditions could be confirmed16. However, conditions within Libya
remained violent and targeted against revolutionary forces and civilian protesters.
With ongoing conflict on the ground in early March, regional and international actors
solidified their stance. The European Union implemented further sanctions calling for an
end to hostilities and regime change17. France’s Nicholas Sarkozy and UK’s David
Cameron were particularly active in promoting recognition of the NTC and working to
move intelligence and naval assets into the region in early March. The African Union
embraced a more conservative approach. Issuing a further communiqué on 10 March, the
AU established an ad-hoc High Level Committee composed of five heads of state
including Mauritania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, South Africa,
Uganda, as well as the Chairperson of the commission to engage with (i) the immediate
cessation of all hostilities, (ii) the cooperation of the competent Libyan authorities to
15 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1970’, UN SCOR 66th Sess., 6491st Mtg., UN Doc.
S/RES/1970, 26 February 2011.
16 Williams, ‘Briefing The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’, 252.
17 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on the Southern




facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, (iii) the
protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya, and (iv)
the adoption and implementation of political reforms necessary for the elimination of the
cause of the current crisis’18. The ad-hoc committee was charged with working to
facilitate dialogue between domestic authorities and wider regional and international
organization towards domestic reforms at the root of the crisis. Calling for international
protection measures under the weight of continued atrocities, the GCC on 7 March
requested the Security Council to ‘take all necessary measures to protect civilians,
including enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya’ with the OIC echoing their call for a
no-fly zone the following day, while expressly ruling out foreign ground operations19.
Crucially, on 12 March, the LAS also issued a further resolution calling on the Security
Council to,
Assume its responsibilities with regard to the situation in Libya, including taking
the necessary measures to impose a no-fly zone; the establishment of safe areas,
especially in places that have been struck by aircraft; and measures to ensure the
protection of the Libyan people and foreign citizens20.
The Arab League’s resolution emphasized that the regime had lost all legitimacy while
seeking international support to ‘cooperate and communicate’ with the NTC towards
18 African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security




19 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the
responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 87(4) (2011), 841.
20 Council of the Arab League, ‘The outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at the




humanitarian aid and protection measures21. With continued calls for action and
recognition of the limited timeframe with Qaddafi forces nearing eastern rebel cities,
France and the UK drafted a resolution with a more expansive protection mandate.
Initially skeptical surrounding the projection of further coercive measures, the United
States made a last minute decision to back the no-fly zone, coordinating with European
and Middle Eastern powers to build international support. In the Security Council on 17
March, a Lebanon, France, UK, and US-backed draft for Resolution 1973 passed under a
vote of ten in favor and five abstentions (India, China, Germany, Russia, and Brazil).
Widely supported to end violence on the ground and lead to a negotiated ceasefire, the
resolution deplored the failure of Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 while
recalling both African and Middle Eastern regional organization statements.
Strengthening the travel ban, arms embargo, and targeted sanctions, the resolution
demanded an immediate ceasefire and end to human rights violations. Again invoking its
Chapter VII powers, the Security Council authorized a no-fly zone and ‘all necessary
measures’ for member states “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attacking the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”22. The resolution
also established a panel of experts to examine and analyze mandated actions and their
impact.
With the regime failing to heed calls for a ceasefire, the international community braced
for an anticipated massacre. On 19 March, France hosted a crisis summit in Paris with
diplomats from the US, EU, and Arab World. Hours later, naval and air force assets from
coalition countries made the initial strikes against Qaddafi’s integrated air defense
system, air force bases, command and control centers, and ground forces moving toward
21 Williams, ‘Briefing The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’, 254.
22 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1970’.
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Benghazi. The United States at first coordinated operations from naval assets in the
Mediterranean and AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany – reducing forces and
transferring command to NATO in late March. A coalition of roughly twenty countries
ultimately contributed towards the air and sea mission including non-NATO members
Qatar, Jordan, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates. Within the first several days, the
city of Benghazi was protected, with the no-fly zone and arms embargo firmly in place
and Qaddafi’s air force and air defense system shattered.
While coalition strikes were noted for their decisiveness and ‘clinical accuracy’, loyalist
forces and their entrenchment in the west showed greater resilience than expected. The
NTC would not accept any political result that kept Qaddafi in power, and the regime
would not negotiate with a rebel movement that they ‘believed (not without some basis in
fact) to be inspired by radical Islam’23. Even with government defections in some its most
prestigious brigades, loyalist forces were able to hold off rebel fighters and even mount
assaults despite the coalition bombings. In cases where NATO forces failed to provide air
cover such as Misrata in mid-April, the rebel’s complained that the airstrikes were erratic
and inconsistent, forced to retreat under the government attacks24. The revolutionary’s
poorly organized and trained factions of militia were pushed into a deadlock. Fearing a
protracted conflict reminiscent of Iraq or Afghanistan, coalition actors became
increasingly convinced that under government resistance, the only means to ultimately
secure the resolution’s mandate was to directly target the regime25. The question then
became how far the resolution’s mandate could be interpreted to directly target the
23 Christopher S. Chivvis, ‘Libya and the future of liberal intervention’, Survival 54(6) (2012), 76.
24 Rod Nordland, ‘Many Libyan rebels blaming NATO, flee city in the east’, The New York Times, 18 April
2011, accessed 5 March 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/world/africa/18libya.html; C.J. Chivers
and David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Libyan rebels complain of deadly delays under NATO’s command’, The New
York Times, 4 April 2011, accessed 5 March 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05li
bya.html.
25 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, ‘Statement on Libya: Following the Working lunch of NATO
Ministers of Defence with non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector’, Press Release (2011)
071, 8 June 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_75177.htm.
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regime and its infrastructure26. While calls for the regime’s removal echoed from many
states even before the intervention, the mandated enforcement measures were stretched
beyond the resolution progressively through the conflict – what Jennifer Welsh
accurately frames as NATO’s ‘creep towards partiality’27.
Ultimately with foreign intelligence, funding, arming, and air support, rebel factions
made decisive progress on the ground throughout the summer, taking Tripoli in August
2011. The UNSC passed Resolution 2009 on 16 September, lifting the asset freeze for
several corporations, the arms embargo, flight ban for commercial aircraft, and
establishing a mandate for a UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The mission was
designed to help restore public order, security and build legal capacity for political
institutions through the National Transitional Council. By October 2011, rebel forces
held almost all of Libyan territory, removing the last pockets of resistance including
Qaddafi’s hometown of Sirte. During the final stages of conflict, French aircraft attacked
a lone convoy exiting the town. Rebel forces closed in on those escaping on foot –
ultimately finding Col. Qaddafi wounded in a drainage pipe. Thrown around a group of
rebels, the leader was tortured, shot, and ultimately put on display to the public in a
refrigerated meat locker28.
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect
The ongoing attacks of government-aligned forces against civilians were recognized as
illegitimate assertions of sovereign power – driving international condemnation and
26 Spencer Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, The Melbourne Journal of
International Law 13 (2012), 66.
27 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Civilian protection in Libya: Putting coercion and controversy back into RtoP’,
Ethics & International Affairs 25(3) (2011), 259.
28 Andrew Malone, ‘A gruesome tourist attraction: Hundreds (including young children) queue to gawp at
Gaddafi’s body’, The Daily Mail, 24 October 2011, accessed 30 May 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2052248/Gaddafi-dead-pictures-Hundreds-queue-gawp-body-meat-locker.html.
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coercive sanction that ultimately included the use of military force. But as Aiden Hehir
outlines, “The mere fact that R2P exists and that the P5 sanctioned action against Libya
does not mean there is a causal relationship between the two”29. However, there is
evidence throughout the crisis to suggest that R2P was used as a framework to address
mass atrocity crimes as well as to drive international support through its permeation of
international discourse. This dynamic can be seen in the focus of global actors to define
the crimes within the lenses of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ as well as
direct invocations or statements of global leaders surrounding the Libyan and
international ‘responsibility to protect’ the population.
Statements surrounding R2P, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were repeatedly
echoed by the UN’s Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility
to Protect, the UN Secretary-General, and Commissioner on Human Rights. On 22
February, the Security Council’s first press release called on the regime ‘to meet its
responsibility to protect its population and to act with restraint, to respect human rights
and international humanitarian law, and to allow immediate access for international
human rights monitor and humanitarian agencies’30. Several calls of regional
organizations for action were also caste in terms of responsibilities to protect. The Gulf
Cooperation Council asserted on 7 March, ‘We call on the international community,
especially the UN Security Council, to face their responsibilities…’ framed in terms of
human rights protections in an intra-state crisis31. Furthermore, the League of Arab States
statement on 12 March explicitly called on the Security Council to ‘assume its
responsibilities with regard to the situation in Libya’ which included an interpreted
29 Aidan Hehir, ‘The permanence of inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to
Protect’, International Security 38(1) (2013), 137-159.
30 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Libya’, Press Release SC/10180-AFR/2120,
22 February 2011, accessed 29 May 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm.
31Agence France-Press, ‘AFP Report: Statement by the GCC Concerning Libya, 7 March 2011’, 7 March
2011, accessed 9 October 2015, http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabsprin
g/libya/Libya_13_AFP_Report.pdf.
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necessity to establish a no-fly zone and safe-area for the population. Resolution 1970 and
1973 recalled ‘the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect its population’ and then the
‘responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population’32. During
deliberations surrounding Resolution 1970, the French Ambassador outlined, “The text,
unanimously adopted today, recalls the responsibility of each State to protect its own
population and of the international community to intervene when States fail in their
duty”33. For Resolution 1973, the Colombian Ambassador outlined that the Libyan
government “through its actions and statements, has shown that it is not up to the
international responsibility of protecting its populations”34. Through this lens, legitimacy
of the Libyan state and its sovereign rights were then argued as contingent, with the
authority of the UNSC affirmed and extended to address human rights abuses in an intra-
state conflict.
Canadian officials at the beginning of the crisis and within its House of Commons in
March, June, and September widely framed their response in terms of a responsibility to
react when governments egregiously target their own populations. As Canada’s Foreign
Secretary John Baird outlined, “We have a responsibility to act when we can, when our
objectives are right, when our objectives are clear, to protect and to assist those who
share the values”35. Although the norm was arguably ‘misused’ through parliamentary
interpretation implying that it could be used for the promotion of democracy, the
intervention was met with overwhelming consensus in voting and debates with
32 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1970’ and UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1973’, 6498th Mtg., UN
Doc.S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011.
33UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6491th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6491, 26 February 2011, p. 4.
34 Timothy Dunne and Jess Gifkins, ‘Libya and the state of intervention’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs 65(5) (2011), 521; UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 6498th Mtg., UN Doc.
S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011.
35 Kim Richard Nossal, ‘The Use – and Misuse – of R2P: The Case of Canada’ in Aidan Hehir and Robert
Murray (eds.), Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 116-117.
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widespread sentiment that the intervention was of R2P character36. Similarly, R2P was
invoked throughout UK parliamentary debate. On 21 March in a six hour long
deliberation, opposition leader Edward Miliband outlined:
Debate is often conducted about rights to intervene, but this debate is not about
rights but responsibilities. The decade-long debate about the ‘responsibility to
protect’ speaks precisely to this question. As the House will know, the
responsibility to protect was adopted in 2005 at the world summit and was
endorsed by the United National General Assembly and the United Nations
Security Council, and it should help frame our debate today…37.
The argued ‘meaning-in-use’ of R2P’s application illustrated a variance of interpretations
across Western actors involved in the intervention as well as within broader global
articulations of what the protection mandate entailed. The UK’s principle legal advisor
for the government, Attorney General Dominic Grieve, provided an assessment outlined
in parliamentary debate that an intervention could be accomplished legally in the most
severe cases without a UN mandate in cases of imminent or ongoing mass atrocity
crimes38. In parallel, French leaders publically stressed the importance of UNSC
authorization; however, in private, French President Sarkozy allegedly told NTC
delegates in France before the UNSC vote that without authorization, France and the UK
would go forward with a mandate from the EU, LAS, and AU39. This serves as an
important point to illustrate that R2P was invoked, interpreted, and employed by actors
36 Ibid., pp. 110-129.
37 UK Houses of Parliament, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973’, House of Commons
Debate Column 700, 21 March 2011, accessed 12 June 2015, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/debtext/110321-0001.htm#1103219000001.
38 Patrick Wintour and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Is Muammar Gaddafi a target? PM and military split over war
aims’, The Guardian, 22 March 2011, accessed 31 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
mar/21/muammar-gaddafi-david-cameron-libya.
39 Steven Erlanger, ‘By his own reckoning, one man made Libya a French cause’, The New York Times, 2
April 2011, accessed 1 June 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 04/02/world/africa/02levy.html?_r=0.
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with a variance of given meanings to address their appraisals of the purpose of the
intervention and how the protection mandate ‘should’ be applied. What the Libyan case
also illustrates around R2P are how institutional mechanisms have developed to build
awareness of mass atrocities and the promotion of protection measures as both indication
of normative change and a means of building greater international support. Although the
UN has only recently begun to develop more explicit mechanisms ‘to bring an atrocity
prevention and human protection lens to bear in policymaking’, the Libya cases does
provide some evidence that the ‘establishment of modern early-warning, assessment and
convening capacities can have a positive effect on policy planning and
decisionmaking’40. R2P in Libya then functioned as a means to frame and build political
and legal consensus for coercive measures that included intervention. As Alex Bellamy
and Paul Williams outline, “those Council members that remained skeptical about the use
of force abstained because they believed that they could not legitimatize inaction in the
face of mass atrocities”41. However, while R2P played a defining normative role, it ‘was
still contested by some members of the Security Council as an appropriate rationale for
military action’42. Much of the contentious encircled R2P’s relationship with regime
change – potentially unseating the recognized authorities as an action of international
humanitarianism – with the norm of nonintervention and more pragmatic application of
the intervention norm articulated through R2P propelling arguments against military
action.
The Influence of Nonintervention
40 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The exception and the norm’, Ethics and
International Affairs 25(3) (2011), 264.
41 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The new politics of protection? Cöte d’Ivoire, Libya and the
responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 87(4) (2011), 844.
42 Welsh, ‘Civilian protection in Libya’, p.255.
160
While war crimes and crimes against humanity were widely articulated as the basis for
any coercive measures, the decision to authorize and project military force within
domestic, regional, and international political spheres still illustrated the normative
influence of nonintervention informing the foreign policy decisions of international actors
relative to R2P. As evidence, Resolution 1970 remained relatively uncontroversial among
members of the UNSC even with coercive economic and diplomatic instruments
including the ICC referral. However, Brazil, India, Germany, and others were seen to
affirm that these measures were only a coercive means to limit further violence and bring
a ceasefire for political transition. Russia’s UN Ambassador affirmed:
A settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In
fact, that is the purpose of the resolution adopted by the Council, which imposes
targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures with regard to those guilty of
violence against he civilian population. However, it does not enjoin sanctions,
even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which could make the
situation worse43.
Through Qaddafi’s continued ‘intransigence’ through early March, member states and
other regional actors became increasingly convinced that the regime would not end
violence under the coercive measures put in place through Resolution 197044. However,
even with the acknowledgement of 1,000 to 10,000 estimated deaths and anticipated
loyalist strike on Benghazi, the consensus underwriting any further coercive projection
measures was minimal and highly contested. On 8 March, within the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation issued their statement in support of the no-fly zone and the provision
of humanitarian aid, but crucially emphasized the ‘imperative’ of ‘non-interference in the
43 UN Security Council, UN Doc S/PV.6491, p. 4.
44 Bellamy and Williams, ‘The new politics of protection?’, 840.
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internal affairs stressing the principled and firm position of the OIC against any form of
military intervention in Libya’45. Similarly, the African Union refused to send a delegate
to the Paris crisis summit. Their communiqué on 10 March, expressed its concern for the
humanitarian situation and urged authorities to move towards greater reform, but
affirmed ‘its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form’46.
Individual diplomats echoed these points. Sam Kutesa, Uganda’s Foreign Minister
outlined, “We do not want foreign interference. We think that there should be an African
solution to this”47. Furthermore, Youssef bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Oman’s foreign
minister who announced the League of Arab States call for a no-fly zone, reiterated on 12
March, “If the Arab League does not take responsibility to prevent a downward spiral,
that could lead to internal fighting or unwanted foreign intervention”48. This underlined a
very limited regional consensus for even the Arab League’s call for action.
The negotiations surrounding Resolution 1973 provided a particularly relevant lens to
address international opinions surrounding global responsibility for human rights
protections and intervention not only because of the unprecedented speed of response, but
the composition of the UNSC with all five BRICS powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa). Membership reflected not only the vast majority of the global
population, but most major economic powers including in the EU with Germany also
present. An abstention for veto powers is a means of allowing the Security Council to
proceed without direct endorsement while, for non-permanent members, abstentions are
45 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, ‘Final Communiqué Issued by the Emergency Meeting to the
Committee of Permanent Representatives to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on the Alarming
Developments in Libyan Jamahiriya’, 8 March 2011, accessed 5 June 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/
libya/final-communique-issued-emergency-meeting-committee-permanent-representatives.
46 African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security
Council’, para. 6.
47 Sudan Tribune, ‘AU’s opposition to military intervention in Libya ignored by UNSC, Obama’, 19 March
2011, accessed 2 June 2011, http://www.sudantribune.com/ spip.php?article38332.
48 Al Jazeera, ‘Arab states seek Libya no-fly zone’, 12 March 2011, accessed 6 June 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131218852687848.html.
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as Bruce Jones highlights, “simply non-positive votes, legally equivalent to ‘no’ votes”49.
In the case of Libya, Russia and China’s abstentions marked a significant decision in
overcoming both countries enduring un-ease surrounding R2P with both countries
approving resolution 1970 and abstaining from 1973 – allowing the implementation of
coercive civilian protection measures in response to actions taken by the regime.
However, their abstentions were still underwritten by arguments questioning the
legitimacy of intervention and lack of operational criteria – more fully outlined by several
non-permanent members.
Affirming a strict application of nonintervention as a norm, the Chinese Ambassador
asserted, ‘China is always against the use of force in international relations’50. However,
the delegation embraced a seemingly pragmatic stance, with China’s Ambassador, then
acting-president, outlining: “China has serious difficulties with parts of the resolution.
Meanwhile, China attached great important to the relevant position by the 22-member
Arab League… In view of this, and the special circumstances surrounding the situation in
Libya, China abstained”51. Thus, China’s conservative approach to R2P and intervention
was pitted against a critical regional backing from the Arab League and perhaps decision
to not be the only veto power against a resolution halting impending massacre. Similarly,
Russia emphasized that due to the severity of the situation, Libya required an immediate
ceasefire in which Russia would abstain in order to address. However, the Russian
Ambassador Vitally Churkin warned that operational specificity was lacking in
Resolution 1973, and could ultimately been accomplished through peaceful settlement
that Russia had proposed in an earlier draft resolution. Illustrating the influence of
individual statesmen in relation to specific norms and cases, the Libyan case in Russia
was framed as a major point of contention and fissure point in the relationship between
49 Bruce D. Jones, ‘Libya and the responsibilities of power’, Survival 53(3) (2011), 54.
50 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6498, p. 10.
51 Ibid.
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then Prime-Minister Vladimir Putin and then-President Dmitri Medvedev. President
Medvedev in 2011 was noted for close interaction with US President Obama. Following
Russia’s abstention on 21 March, President Medvedev asserted, “Russia did not use its
veto power for the simple reason that I do not consider the resolution in question
wrong…. This was a conscious decision on our part. Such were the instructions I gave
the Foreign Ministry, and they were carried out”52. While Russian policy has been
explicitly conservative in terms of R2P, the Libyan case signaled that in particular cases,
Medvedev would not shield the regime in the UNSC.
The intervention was particularly challenged in the UNSC in terms of lacking operational
criteria and potentially destabilizing outcome. Specificity surrounding operational
targeting criteria, time scope, and other requirements from various members were seen as
lacking in the resolution, with its ultimate humanitarian aim potentially damaged through
any projection of force. Russia’s Ambassador highlighted, “Questions raised by Russia
and other members of the Council remained unanswered. Those questions were concrete
and legitimate and touched on how the no fly zone could be enforced, what the rules of
engagement would be, and what limits on the use of force there would be”53. Several
non-permanent members echoed concerns – with their abstentions interpreted as an
openly critical response to the resolution’s mandate.
India and Brazil’s abstentions in particular expressed concern surrounding the
aggravation any military force projection could bring through a no-fly zone as well as the
lack of operational specificity surrounding the measures outlined. Brazil’s ambassador
emphasized, “We are not convinced that the use of force as provided for in operative
52 Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Statement by Dmitry Medvedev on the situation in Libya’, Presidential Executive
Office of Russia, 21 March 2011, accessed 27 July 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/10701,
(my emphasis).
53 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6498, p. 8.
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paragraph 4 of the present resolution will lead to the realization or our common objective
– the immediate end of violence and protection of civilians”. Furthermore, “We must take
the greatest care to ensure that our actions douse the flames of conflict instead of stoking
them”54. While Brazil within the Organization of American States has not been averse to
democracy or human rights promotion, this case illustrated a particularly critical
reflection of force to achieve the resolution’s mandate. These concerns were even more
unfavorably addressed by India. Manjeev Singh Puri, India’s ambassador, emphasized
that the UN had appointed a Special Envoy on the situation in Libya, whose report had
not been seen, while the African Union’s High Level Panel was taking further efforts to
resolve the crisis through peaceful means that might be negatively impacted through an
immediate UNSC response. ‘We must stress the importance of political efforts’ arguing
that the both the resolution’s mandate and potential impact had not been adequately
addressed. “We must ensure that the measures will mitigate and not exacerbate an already
difficult situation for the people of Libya. Clarity in the resolution on any spillover
effects of these measures would have been very important”55. Thus, favoring a political
rather than military response under lack of clarity of the enforcement measures and their
projected impact, India chose to not support the resolution. It was not that sovereignty
provided a normative barrier to intervention, but that the projection of force would not
alleviate the civilian suffering or required greater clarity surrounding its mandated scope.
A particularly contentious abstention came from Germany, a prominent member of
NATO. With a new UN Ambassador Peter Wittig, several critics of the abstention echoed
that Germany must have had a lapse in judgment or didn’t understand ‘how the council
54 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Approves “No-Fly Zone” over Libya, Authorising “All
Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions’, Meetings Coverage
SC/10200, 17 March 2011, accessed 5 June 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.
55 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6498, p. 5.
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worked’56. The abstention was cited by several as a blunder for German policy and its
pursuit of a permanent Security Council seat. However, the vote was later affirmed as a
calculated decision, vocally insisting the necessity for multilateral action that would be
best achieved through non-military means. Germany’s UN Ambassador outlined:
We have very carefully considered the option of using military force – its
implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-
scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be
ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict
that would affect the wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation
on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be
achieved. Germany therefore decided not to support a military option, as foreseen
particularly in paragraphs 4 and 8 of the resolution. Furthermore, Germany will
not contribute to such a military effort with its own forces57.
Various reasons have been given for the abstention linked to Germany’s historic aversion
to projecting force following the two world wars, Eurozone crisis waging in 2011, and
domestic political elections with popular sentiment against military action. However,
Germany’s involvement in Kosovo in 1999 with NATO’s Operation Allied Force and
later Afghanistan through ISAF’s campaign showed a new side of Germany’s activism in
foreign affairs in which 2011 illustrated a further seminal moment. Rather than signaling
acquiescence or acceptance with Resolution 1973, Germany separated itself from
traditional allies and vocally raised a number of concerns against intervention. As Alister
Miskimmon highlights, “These considerations focused on the risk of Germany forces
56 Richard Rousseau, ‘Why Germany abstained on UN Resolution 1973 on Libya’, Foreign Policy Journal,
22 June 2011, accessed 15 January 2015, http://www.foreign policyjournal.com/2011/06/22/why-germany-
abstained-on-un-resolution-1973-on-libya/.
57 UNSC, Security Council, S/PV.6498, p. 5.
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becoming embroiled in extended conflict and Germany political assertions in German
domestic politics that the crisis could be resolved through diplomatic and economic
tools”58. Providing additional force contributions to Afghanistan to aid NATO’s pivot
towards Libya, Germany remained critical of intervention in Libya.
These disputes over intervention also spread throughout global civil society between
those in favor of a no-fly zone such as the Global Centre on the Responsibility to Protect
and those opposed which included the International Crisis Group (ICG)59. Emphasizing
that ongoing widespread and systemic ‘crimes against humanity’ placed the crisis firmly
within R2P’s purview, the Global Centre on R2P highlighted that the League of Arab
State’s call for action through the ‘responsibility’ of the UNSC as directly linked to the
2005 commitment, with a no-fly zone serving as a viable means to ensure that the regime
would not use its air force against the population60. In contrast as Louise Arbour, then-
President of the ICG in an open letter to the Security Council on 16 May, emphasized
that the situation had evolved into a full scale civil war, in which: “The most urgent goal
now must be to end the violence and halt further loss of life, while paving the way
towards a political transition, objectives that require a different response. Imposing a no-
flight zone, which many have been advocating, would, in and of itself, achieve neither of
these”61. What this argued was that the nature of conflict and atrocities made the
imposition of a no-fly zone inappropriate and at worst case unhelpful in moving towards
a stabilized political climate. Outside foreign intervention and statebuilding, the
preferable option forwarded by Arbour involved a ‘vigorous political effort’ towards a
ceasefire and transition in government that could be accepted as legitimate by the
58 Alister Miskimmon, ‘German foreign policy and the Libya crisis’, German Politics 21(4) (2012), 396.
59 Williams, ‘Briefing The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’, 254.
60 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Libya: Time for a decision’, 14 March 2011, accessed
31 May 2015, http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/libya_time_for_decision_14_march_2011.pdf.
61 Louise Arbour, ‘Open Letter to the UN Security Council on the Situation in Libya’, International Crisis
Group, 16 March 2011, accessed 31 May 2015, http://www. crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-
releases/2011/open-letter-unsc-libya.aspx
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population. Leading international relations and legal scholars echoed these arguments -
stressing the potential dangerous repercussions of intervention62.
A Rare Confluence of Factors
Even within states pushing for intervention, consensus was highly limited with emphasis
placed on regional support, an authorized mandate, and interestingly, the limited strategic
value of Libya that provided policymakers room to maneuver without risking major
national interests or sparking wider international conflict63. The decisive and timely
response in Libya was widely heralded for its clinical accuracy in halting the bloodbath in
Benghazi and Qaddafi’s forces cleansing further rebel cities. As the revolution in Libya
evolved, the clear potential for mass atrocities and negative spillover-effects of continued
instability meant that nonintervention was argued as an illegitimate international
response. Throughout the crisis, protection measures were contested through
justifications and behaviour centred on egregious violations of human rights and
worsening situation on the ground – necessitating progressively severe measures to halt
violence against unarmed protesters and ultimately an imminent mass slaughter64. The
threat of imminent atrocities was exceptionally clear, not only due to the range of reports
closely following the crisis, but the direct statements of the Libyan regime. Reminiscent
of the Hutu Radio broadcasts in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, Qaddafi threatened
the purification of Libyan ‘cockroaches’ that would be hunted down with ‘rivers of
62 Michael Walzer, ‘The case against our attack on Libya’, New Republic, 20 March 2011, accessed 15 June
2015, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-libya; Richard Falk,
Falk, ‘Libya: Will we ever learn? Kicking the intervention habit’, Voltaire Network, 11 March 2011,
accessed 14 June 2015, http://www.voltairenet.org/ article168826.html.
63 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘New Terrains: Sovereignty and Alternative Conceptions of Power’ in Martha
Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 339.
64 Jason W. Davidson, ‘France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: An integrated analysis’, Cambridge
Review of International Affairs 26(2) (2013), 310-329.
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blood’65. By directly threatening and carrying out violence with an estimated 1,000 to
10,000 killed prior to resolution 1973, the regime presented itself as manifestly culpable
with international actors successfully arguing that intervention was required to halt an
imminent and clear threat of mass atrocity crimes66.
The humanitarian crisis had developed within weeks to an articulated threat to wider
regional and international stability through ‘migration, economic interests, and terrorism
logics’ pegged to egregious violations of international humanitarian and human rights
norms67. Although even the most ardent supporters for coercive action such as France and
the UK were initially cautious, by mid-March, both embraced a radically proactive stance
in support of intervention against loyalist forces poised to strike Benghazi68. British
Prime Minister David Cameron outlined that coercive actions were pegged to
‘demonstrable need, regional support, and a clear legal basis’, which in the case of Libya
was underwritten by an immediate threat: “Forces have attacked peaceful protesters, and
are now preparing for a violent assault on a city of a million people that has a history
dating back 2,500 years”69. The time frame provided an important factor. To the Security
Council on 17 March, France’s Foreign Minister Alain Juppé asserted, “every day, every
hour that passes tightens the vice of the forces of repression on the liberty-loving civilian
population, notably the population of Benghazi”70. Outlining the threat of the regime
inflicting punishment door to door with deaths of ‘over a thousand people in a single
65 Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, 60; Kareem Fahim and David D.
Kirkpatrick, ‘Qaddafi’s grip on the capital tightens as revolt grows’, The New York Times, 22 February
2011, accessed 27 May 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23libya.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
66 James Pattison, ‘The ethics of humanitarian intervention in Libya’, Ethics and International Affairs 25(3)
(2011), 272.
67Davidson, ‘France, Britain and the intervention in Libya’.
68Ibid.
69 UK Government, ‘Prime Minister statement on the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya’, 18 March
2011, accessed 5 June 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/ news/prime-minister-statement-on-the-un-
security-council-resolution-on-libya.
70UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6498.
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day’, US President Barack Obama argued, “If we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city
the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the
regional and stained the conscious of the world. It was not in our national interest to let
that happen”71. The principal Western leaders involved in the intervention emphasized
the protection of civilians as the key causal factor in ultimate intervention and its work to
build international consensus surrounding the vote for Resolution 197372. Having
imposed coercive diplomatic and economic measures without substantive impact, the
immanency and clarity of the threat was seen to weaken arguments for a more gradual or
diplomatic approach proposed by actors such as Russia and the AU73.
Throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Western world, Qaddafi’s long history of
foreign adventurism and support of terrorist movements meant that the Libyan regime
was ‘uniquely reviled, and uniquely disposable’ with few strategic partnerships abroad74.
Libya’s defecting foreign Ambassadors and UN Mission also calling for intervention
along with the NTC further isolated the regime while giving further credibility to Libyan
calls for protection measures. Libya’s relatively weak military, air defense network, and
geographic position in North African with its small population concentrated along with
coastline meant that foreign carriers and bases in Europe could carry out air strikes within
relatively easy reach – an often under-emphasized operational advantage. Regional calls
for action, speed of the humanitarian crisis within wider Arab Spring context, NATO’s
involvement which allowed for a diffused command structure, strategic bargaining
71 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Libya’, 28 March 2011, accessed 5 June 2015, https://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya.
72 Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘Libya’s pathway to peace’, The New York Times,
14 April 2011, accessed 9 June 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-
edlibya15.html?_r=0].
73Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele, ‘The (D)evolution of a Norm: R2P, the Bosnia Generation and
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya’ in Aiden Hehir and Robert Murray (eds.), Libya: The Responsibility to
Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 152.
74 Philip Gourevitch, ‘The Arab Winter’, The New Yorker, 28 December 2011, accessed 25 June 2015,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-arab-winter.
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surrounding international authorization, and the alignment of state interests with human
rights protections meant that the crisis presented a ‘perfect storm’ for actors to implement
R2P75. As American President Barack Obama asserted:
In this particular country – Libya – at this particular moment, we were faced with
the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that
violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join
us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people
themselves. We also had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks
without putting American troops on the ground76.
While several critics noted the strategic importance of Libya along the Mediterranean
with large oil reserves, the justifications for force projection and actions of those
intervening did not as Stephen Krasner outlines, fit a ‘neat realist narrative’77. Several
states spent over a billion USD on the operation, while NATO powers carrying out the
protection mandate by April ran low on munitions highlighting extensive material costs78.
Many of the powers projecting force including the US and UK had little ‘confidence in,
or much knowledge about, the nature of the Libyan opposition’, furthermore, “Nothing
that happens in Libya will change the international balance of power”79. Illustrating an
unusual confluence of factors, the protection of civilians was emphasized by global actors
as the principle element driving coercive sanction in the face of nonintervention – even if
75 Timothy Dunne and Jess Gifkins, ‘Libya & R2P: Norm consolidation or perfect storm?’, The Interpreter,
14 April 2011, accessed 31 May 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/04/14/ Libya-R2P-Norm-
consolidation-or-perfect-storm.aspx?COLLCC=1925744585&.
76 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Libya’.
77 Krasner, ‘New Terrains’, pp. 339.
78 Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, ‘NATO runs short on some munitions in Libya’, The Washington Post,
15 April 2011, accessed 15 June 2015, http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-
munitions-in-libya/2011/04/15/AF3O7ElD_story.html.
79 Krasner, ‘New Terrains’, pp. 339.
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the ultimate result would yield unknown or potentially negative political and economic
costs for individual states intervening80.
Political Will and Nonintervention
Affirmation of the norm of nonintervention should be caveated to the extent that limited
discourse argued that the Libyan regime had a right to carry out such atrocities free from
international sanction – illustrating R2P’s salience as a means of restructuring the terms
of international debate. Furthermore, shallow support for intervention may have also
reflected the pragmatic interests of states to avoid material costs of protracted military
investment or other contextual alliance or regional dynamics specific to Libya. However,
arguments still encircled the extent to which the international community may respond –
particularly the use of military force, and even how those forces could be potentially
projected. Through this lens, the norm of nonintervention served as a normative factor
embraced by China and other major powers underwritten by arguments that while non-
direct military actions such as sanctions, embargoes or perhaps no-fly zones may be
acceptable in those most extreme cases, the projection of force against domestic actors
should not be carried out as a general rule, particularly against a standing regime faced
with domestic insurrection.
While widely affirmed as a success for the norm of R2P and its implementation in world
politics, the consensus underwriting intervention remained limited with the norm of
nonintervention playing a substantive role. This dynamic was partially illustrated by the
lack of contributions from powers with unique capabilities to intervene as well as NATO
alliance interests at stake. Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy all have ground
attack capabilities including munitions and technology for suppression of enemy air
80 Bellamy and Williams, ‘The new politics of protection?’, 844.
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defense (SEAD)81. Yet even as some of the few international powers able to take these
roles paired with a UN mandate, Germany and Poland both principally opposed the
humanitarian intervention, while Italy and the Netherlands critically limited their roles or
relegating their forces to air policing82. Ultimately, only 14 of the 28 NATO states
contributed any resources, while only six European countries (Britain, France, Belgium,
Italy, Norway and Denmark) contributed to the strike mission83. The United States made
large initial contributions and sustained roughly 70 percent of the air refueling and the
majority of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), however the United
States distanced itself from direct combat roles following initial weeks84. Few Middle
Eastern powers provided military resources and none initially carried out the strike
mission. Neither neighboring Egypt nor Tunisia made military contributions, while those
most vocal – Qatar and the UAE – represent roughly one percent of the Arab world85.
These elements illustrated the weak regional interests in intervention, and generally
limited international consensus underwriting the projection of force.
The initial draft resolution for 1973 was openly opposed by various NATO allies and
‘regarded with considerable caution by the United States’86. The US decision to intervene
was widely framed by White House officials as a last-minute decision in which President
Obama decided to push for intervention to halt imminent atrocities, but with the ability to
relinquish command to NATO and keep the intervention highly air-oriented in order to
hinder an international perception of US meddling in a further Middle Eastern state after
ten years of regime change and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert
81Christian F. Anrig, ‘Allied air power over Libya: A preliminary assessment’, Air & Space Power Journal
25(4), 92.
82 Ibid., 93.
83 Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Towards a “post-American” alliance? NATO burden-sharing after
Libya’, International Affairs 88(2) (2012), 322.
84 Anrig, ‘Allied air power over Libya’, 92.
85 Walzer, ‘The case against our attack on Libya’.
86 Bellamy and Williams, ‘The new politics of protection?’, 840.
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Gates and National Security Advisor Jacob Heibrunn among others challenged the
efficacy of any intervention, economic costs, and potential for military overstretch, and
lack of national interests in Libya87. Yet, intervention was also critically promoted by a
number of close advisors including Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, UN Ambassador
Susan Rice, and National Security Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights,
Samantha Power, ‘arguing for limited military action in Libya against the
noninterventionist inclinations’88. In the UK and France, both actors affirmed the
necessity to intervene based on the implications of Libya descending into further chaos
with economic, immigration, and terror implications. However, the projection of force
was still argued as an unnecessary exertion initially in France, and throughout the UK’s
parliamentary debate. Conservative MP Bob Stewart, a former army officer and UN
Commander in Bosnia commented, “What can we do to help? We cannot invade, we
cannot assassinate – it is up to the Libyans to decide what to do… We cannot do it.
Nobody knows the end game – we all realize that”. The skeletons of Iraq and Afghanistan
were also evidently clear, with Labour MP Yasmin Qureshi:
We in this country and this House do not really understand the Middle East and
North Africa. We are meddling in things that we should not meddle in, because
there are so many uncertainties. In the past 10 to 12 years, America, ourselves and
others have spent trillions of dollars on being involved in conflict in the Middle
87 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘How to Lose a Revolution’ in The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges and
Opportunities in Light of the Libyan Intervention, e-International Relations, November 2011, http://www.e-
ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P.pdf, p.15-17.
88 Ramesh Thakur, ‘R2P, Libya and International Politics as the Struggle for Competing Normative
Architectures’, in The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges and Opportunities in Light of the Libyan
Intervention, e-International Relations, November 2011, http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P.pdf,
p.12-14.
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East, and what have we left? We have not resolved any of the situation involved
or made countries any better than when we went into them89.
These arguments highlight the tentative nature of international consensus for any
projection of coercive force within Libya. A degree of international and regional support
was also seen as a prerequisite for both France, and particularly the UK’s involvement90.
While the UN authorization and regional support played critical roles in providing a legal
basis and domestic support for action in several Western states, both rested on nominal
political foundations. Without UN approval, the intervention most assuredly would not
have occurred91. Yet, the regional support for intervention was highly Arab-centred rather
than embraced by African elites with a history of support for such humanitarian roles
through the Constitutive Act of the AU. This is in part attributed to the investments of
Libya in sub-Saharan Africa, with South African officials publically commenting that it
‘doubted whether the AU panel would be impartial’92.
Members of the OIC, GCC, and Arab League, promoted the no-fly zone with statements
supporting coercive measures as a means to force a ceasefire towards political
reconciliation, ensuring the regime’s air force couldn’t operate in specific areas – while
all regional actors generally or specifically denounced foreign ground forces that would
be seen an ‘illegitimate occupation force’93. Under the vocal support of Lebanon
representing the Arab League in the UNSC, delegates highlighted that Western powers
succeeded in shaping discourse to reflect a moral imperative for intervention – a no-fly
89 UK Houses of Parliament, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973’, House of Commons
Debate Column 700, 21 March 2011, accessed 12 June 2015,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/debtext/110321-
0001.htm#1103219000001.
90 Davidson, ‘France, Britain and the intervention in Libya’, 316-317.
91 Aidan Hehir and Anthony Lang, ‘The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the International
Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect’, Criminal Law Forum 26(1) (2015), 166.
92 Sudan Tribune, ‘AU’s opposition to military intervention in Libya ignored by UNSC, Obama’.
93 Council of the League of Arab States, Res. No. 7360, 12 March 2011, para. 1.
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zone and military mandate to ensure that no Srebrenica situation re-emerged under a
more limited mandate that precluded forces from military targeting those on the ground
threatening the civilian population94. Any level of consensus undergirding the
intervention arguably was placed on the conception that a no-fly zone would be
minimally destructive of regime force directly in the civil war, and more based on a
coercive means to bring about a ceasefire and political transition. At both domestic as
well as international levels, this dynamic illustrated a lack of operational requirement
knowledge of what a no-fly zone substantively entailed – including arguments
surrounding the utility of a strict no-fly zone that precluded the targeting of ground forces
that were carrying out atrocities – particularly as the intervention evolved towards regime
change.
While Qaddafi’s air force had been pivotal in supplying loyalist troops and maintaining
regime bases, the greatest threat to civilians by mid-March remained ground forces –
which left unchecked, could continue to attack civilian positions and rebel forces. Very
early in the drafting process following the request of the Arab League, the US mission
was uncomfortable with a no-fly zone mandate due to its inability to shape the situation
on the ground. When the Obama Administration did signal its ultimate support, greater
consensus was built around the resolution through a compromise introduced by Lebanon
which outlined ‘no foreign occupation’ on the ground, which helped quell Russia’s
argument against the resolution and the United States concern that it needed a more
expansive mandate allowing for the removal of air defenses and targeting ground forces
which threatened civilian areas95. Coalition countries supporting intervention widely
recognized that loyalist ground forces targeting civilians would need to be militarily
challenged – requiring more than aerial denial. Within the US domestically, defense
94 Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention
in Libya’, European Journal of International Relations 20(4) (2014), 901.
95Ibid.
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secretary Robert Gates outlined, “there’s a lot of frankly, loose talk about some of these
military options, and lets just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on
Libya to destroy the air defenses. That’s the way you do a no-fly zone”96. Further
discussed in UK’s parliament, sentiment was seen to revolve around a ‘romantic notion
of a no-fly zone’, which as several members of parliament noted, really serves as a
‘euphemism for war’ requiring denial of air defenses that place coalition aircraft as risk
while actual protection of the population would ultimately require striking loyalist targets
on the ground including tanks, artillery, and personnel carriers threatening civilian
locations. Within Resolution 1973, the expansive statement of ‘all necessary measures’
including the protection of ‘civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ was accepted
in part due to the Ambassador of Bosnian and Herzegovina’s statement in the UNSC, “I
know what the airstrikes can do, I was there, but eventually it did not bring peace”97.
However, while several Western powers seemed to interpret the Arab League’s call as a
desire for the coercive projection of force, evidence from the time suggests the no-fly
zone was largely interpreted regionally as a coercive means to bring about a ceasefire
rather than targeting regime forces or directly contributing to the civil war. Aligned with
the norm of nonintervention, once the intervention began, diverging conceptions of what
the civilian protection measures entailed through the no-fly zone showed their fissures,
with the seeming support for military measures from the Arab League and other regional
and international actors quickly dissipating.
Although the Arab League and other regional actors played a major role in securing
Resolution 1973, their support was ultimately tentative and emphasized that the role of
the no-fly zone was to bring about a political solution. Within hours of the first coalition
airstrikes, the President of the Arab League Amr Moussa called for a ‘genuine ceasefire’
96 Elise Labott, ‘U.S. mulling military options in Libya’, CNN, 3 March 2011, accessed 28 January 2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/03/02/libya.military.options/ index.html?_s=PM:U.S..
97 Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, ‘Power in practice’, 901.
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that including coalition forces. “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of
imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the
bombardment of more civilians… You can’t have a decisive ending. Now is the time to
do whatever we can to reach a political solution”98. As the African Union would vocally
challenge in the month following initial strikes: “there is a growing acknowledgement
with the international community, including prominent civilian and military officials
from key countries of the coalition contributing to the NATO operation in Libya, that
there is no military solution to the current crisis in Libya”99. Furthermore, both Chinese
and Russian leaders felt ‘duped’ that the force projection was proving expansive and
ultimately contributing towards the civil war and regime change. Chinese President Hu
Jintao met with French President Nichoals Sarkozy days after the first strikes, asserting,
“Dialogue and other peaceful means are the ultimate solutions to problems… If military
action brings disaster to civilians and causes humanitarian crisis, then it runs counter to
the purpose the UN resolution”100. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin outlined,
NATO “violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing
the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too”101. This element emphasizes
the limited regional and wider international support for intervention, which quickly
became apparent following initial strikes.
Conclusion: Libya’s Legacy
98 Ian Traynor, ‘Arab League chief admits second thoughts about Libya air strikes’, The Guardian, 21
March 2011, accessed 31 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2011/jun/21/arab-league-chief-
libya-air-strikes.
99 African Union Peace and Security Council, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the
Activities of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on the Situation in Libya’, PSC/PR/2(CCLXXV), 26
April 2011, accessed 27 May 2015, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ 275reportonlibyaeng.pdf.
100 Wang Yan, ‘Chinese President meets French counterpart, saying force is no solution to the Libyan issue’,
Xinhua, 30 March 2011, accessed 10 June 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
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What makes Libya an exceptional case in relation to R2P was the speed of international
response, decisiveness of institutional calls for action including the Arab League and
UNSC mandate for ‘all necessary measures’, but also as the only case of military force
projection authorized without regime consent. Politically and ethically meaningful,
international aversion to human rights atrocities led to a level of consensus in support of
forcible military projection for humanitarian purposes in the face of nonintervention.
While the Libyan intervention has been framed as a self-interested pursuit of states to
remove a uniquely reviled autocrat, patron of international terror, and petroleum source
right across the Mediterranean, the decision to intervene reflected a wide body of
normative and material factors. At the time intervention was initiated, intelligence was
widely framed as pointing towards impending mass atrocities. While we will never know
what the ultimate impact would have been, several Western state actors made the
decision to intervene under a unique set of circumstances, which facilitated protection
measures. Both the speed of international responses, robustness of the authorized
measures, and authorization without the target state consent does mark an important
precedent for R2P as a norm. In stark contrast to Sri Lanka, the international community
placed ‘human rights up front’ with widespread activism. When a level of consensus for
international civilian protection existed in response to anticipated mass atrocity crimes,
the international community responded with substantive military investments. Under a
UNSC authorized mandate based on the strategic bargaining of key actors, Libya
illustrated what Thomas Weiss frames as a ‘high water mark’ for the support of R2P102.
The direct invocation of R2P within consecutive UNSC resolutions and regional
institutional calls underwrote an international perception that inaction would have yielded
further civilian deaths and mass atrocities in the city of Benghazi.
102 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘After Syria, Whither R2P?’, in Robert W. Murray and Alasdair McKay (eds.), In the
Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria, and Humanitarianism in Crisis (Bristol, UK: E-International Relations, 2014),
p. 34-37.
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This chapter highlights that while the intervention’s legitimacy and justifications were
pegged to Security Council authorization and the protection of civilians from widespread
atrocities, the norm of nonintervention still played a role in the aversion of China and
Russia, but also the principled assertions of non-permanent member states that
interventionary practice under R2P does not exist as an accepted standard of behavior
yielding humanitarian outcomes. Thus, while a rare confluence of factors underwrote
intervention, “the implementation of the sharp, military end of Pillar Three of R2P in
Libya in 2011 shows that the global consensus on R2P is tenuous and fragile rather than
robust and resilient”103. The international context following the Sri Lankan crisis, greater
discussion of R2P globally, and with Western powers ending their decade long wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the immediacy and clarity of the threat posed by the regime
illustrated a rare confluence of operational and international political factors. While
France, the UK, and US bore the brunt of force projection, the transition toward
impartiality with special operations support, military advisors, funding, and armaments
streaming to the rebels from international actors, the support for intervention evaporated.
Although the projection of force is inherently non-neutral in its impact to those targeted,
the coalition intervention proved decisive and turned the tide domestically from a waning
revolution, to stalemate, and ultimately coalition-sponsored air, ground, and intelligence
war against the Qaddafi regime. The UNSC authorization was predicated on short-term
gains through the immediacy of mass atrocities in Benghazi and regional support for a
seemingly un-authoritarian no-fly zone for area denial. While the military force
projection was widely framed as a “successful application of R2P because the military
campaign succeeded in protecting Libyan citizens… Even the most ardent international
advocates of R2P had acknowledged that the mandate was stretched to breaking point
103 Thakur, ‘R2P, Libya and International Politics as the Struggle for Competing Normative Architectures’.
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and maybe beyond it”104. Although the removal of Qaddafi’s air force, air defense
network, and those ground forces nearing Benghazi could have been argued as legitimate
targets to limit the potential for mass atrocity crimes, the transition in NATO’s aims
towards deposing the regime ultimately backfired for R2P through its rhetorical and
political attachment to the intervention105. Arguably tied to regime-change and its
relationship to R2P, the Libyan case highlighted arguments for nonintervention as a firm
standard of behavior due to the long-term and potentially detrimental repercussions of
humanitarian intervention against standing regimes faced with domestic insurrection.
Following Libya’s revolution, the NTC moved towards its outlined plan of institution
building within a constitutional government based around secular democracy – a
seemingly successful result and stark contrast to Qaddafi’s four decades of rule. Holding
elections in July 2012, government power successfully transferred to a General National
Congress in August. However, in the wake of democratic reforms, there has been an
inability to consolidate greater security – perpetuating domestic turmoil and wider
regional insecurity. By 2014, two rival governments have appeared with the
internationally recognized regime based in eastern city of Tokruk, and a rival government
based in Tripoli under a loose coalition of largely Islamist militant groups known as
‘Libya Dawn’106. Taking advantage of the power vacuum left from the intervention and
weak political institutions left in Qaddafi’s wake, the country exists in a state of anarchy,
with tribal militia and jihadist groups gaining a substantive foothold. As Brazil’s
President Dilma Rouseff argued in the UNSC:
104 Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, 70.
105 Gareth Evans, ‘Interview: The R2P Balance Sheet After Libya’. in The Responsibility to Protect:
Challenges and Opportunities in Light of the Libyan Intervention, e-International Relations, November
2011, http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P.pdf, p.34-42.
106Ruth Sherlock, ‘Libya slipping toward all-out civil war after peace talks delayed in Morocco’, The




Attention must be paid to the fact that the world today suffers the painful
consequences of intervention that have aggravated existing conflict, allowed
terrorism to penetrate into places where it previously did not exist, given rise to
new cycles of violence and increased the vulnerability of civilian populations107.
Criticism has focused on the failure of NATO and other international actors to effectively
secure the country and aid in the process of reconstruction and statebuilding. However,
the lessons learned from this intervention may not be that similar cases require more
expansive post-conflict statebuilding, but rather that the intervention’s aim and
repercussions should have been more heavily scrutinized. As one study outlined, based
on the Libyan crisis’ progression and trajectory prior to intervention, had intervention not
occurred, the poorly organized and trained rebels would have lasted an estimated six
weeks and 1,100 of the population would have been killed108. In contrast, the coalition
intervention ultimately contributed to thirty-six weeks of bombing, with foreign funding,
military advisors, and weapons from Sudan and Qatar among others leading to decisive
victory with the regime’s weapons and fighters trickling throughout the region – inciting
both domestic instability and violence in neighboring countries.
Immediately following rebel victory, militia groups carried out widespread reprisal
killings, torture, and detainment of suspected Qaddafi loyalists109. Targeted violence
particularly against the population from Sub-Saharan Africa believed to be ‘mercenaries’
107 UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, 66th Sess., UN Doc.
A/66/551-S/2011/701, 11 November 2011, para. 10.
108Kuperman, ‘A model humanitarian intervention?’.
109 Kareem Fahim, ‘Accused of fighting for Qaddafi, A Libyan town’s residence face reprisals’, The New




reached such extensive levels that within months of declared victory, Human Rights
Watch asserted that abuses “appear to be so widespread and systematic that they may
amount to crimes against humanity”110. Furthermore, Malian ethnic Tuareg fighters left
Libya with newly acquired weapons, launching a rebellion in northern Mali that
contributed to a further French intervention. The power vacuum in Libya has led to a
fractured territorial division with Islamist groups claiming large areas of territory.
Perhaps most alarming, despite a Western-led ‘buyback’ program of particular advanced
weaponry, much of Libya’s stockpiles remain unaccounted for – including as many as
15,000 man-portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs), which can shoot down civilian
airliners and military aircraft111. While some have been recovered in neighboring Egypt
and Niger, radical Islamic groups such as Boko Haram and fighters in Syria and Iraq
reportedly now hold many of these weapons112.
While widely framed as successful due to its relative humanitarian ‘purity of motive’ and
humanitarian impact in saving those in Benghazi from imminent slaughter and the wider
Libyan population from further crimes against humanity, stability has still not come to
Libya. Although this may be framed as something that will impact the way intervention is
carried out, Libya as a negative case study for regime stability may serve to negatively
impact the legitimacy of R2P’s third pillar in future cases of de facto civil war situations
similar to Libya in which the regime does not give consent. This dynamic illustrates the
ongoing contestation of the efficacy and impact of humanitarian intervention particularly
in cases of de facto regime change - challenging R2P’s substantive meaning and utility
110 Human Rights Watch, ‘Libya: Wake-up call to Misrata’s leaders: Torture, killings may amount to
crimes against humanity’, 8 April 2012, accessed 5 June 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/04/08/libya-wake-call-misrata-s-leaders.
111 Rod Nordland and C. J. Chivers, ‘Heat-seeking missiles are missing from Libyan arms stockpile’, The
New York Times, 8 September 2011, accessed 16 January 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/world/africa/08missile.html?pagewanted =all.




not only in terms of what behaviors under Pillar III may be acceptable or viable, but
questions as to what constitutes ‘manifest failure’ of existing political communities to
protect their populations. “Humanitarian emergencies in Syria and elsewhere have
prompted new calls for humanitarian intervention, but the controversies of the Libya
mission continue to loom large in such discussions”113. Nonintervention as a norm has
thus been recurrently contested and in the case of Libya, emphasized as an important
counter-point to those arguing for intervention’s humanitarian impact through R2P in
further humanitarian crises.
113 Roland Paris, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect” and the structural problems of preventive humanitarian
intervention’, International Peacekeeping 21(5) (2014), 570.
184
Chapter 5: The Syrian Arab Republic
At the time of writing, an estimated 220-250,000 have died in four years of Syrian
conflict with half the population of twenty million either internally displaced or foreign
refugees spilling into neighboring countries1. The regime’s lethal targeting of the civilian
population, far from repressing the widespread uprising, has fueled the conflict and
exposed sectarian cleavages – creating the vacuum from which jihadist and Islamic
extremists have hijacked the civil war and regionalized the crisis. The UN Human Rights
Council-mandated Independent Commission of Inquiry has published ongoing reports
since 2011, concluding that the Syrian government has ‘manifestly failed to protect the
population from mass atrocities’ with government forces as a matter of state policy
carrying out ‘widespread attacks on the civilian population, committing murder, torture,
1 Somini Sengupta, ‘U.N. finds its voice on Syria’s “Transition”’, The New York Times, 17 August 2015,
accessed 18 August 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/ world/middleeast/un-finds-its-voice-on-
syrias-transition.html?ref=world&_r=1.
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rape and enforced disappearances as crimes against humanity’2. While all sides have been
responsible for human rights atrocities, the government’s culpability has been
disproportionate and recurrently documented through siege tactics, the use of artillery,
barrel bombs, rockets, and alleged chemical weapons against civilian populations
paralleling the obstruction of food, water, and medical aid3.
Similar to the subsequent cases of Sri Lanka and Libya, Syria has been widely framed as
a test case for the Responsibility to Protect – exposing the operational and normative
fissures surrounding the projection of force for humanitarian purposes. With
internationally recognized atrocities, calls for coercive measures under R2P have been
echoed throughout the crisis, which include no-fly zones, area denial or safe havens, as
well as forcible intervention to protect the population. However, the Syrian case
illustrates again the normative persistence of nonintervention and even its resurgence
within world politics through the backlash of Libya4. This chapter first charts the
domestic progression of the crisis and civil war surrounding internal actors and the nature
of atrocities. The chapter then shifts to outline international responses and UN
institutional measures – exposing international and regional cleavages surrounding the
Syrian crisis relative to R2P and the norm of nonintervention. What this analysis
highlights is the interplay between the complex set of ‘proxy and alliance interests’ and
diverging normative visions of global order, manifesting in a strong position against the
projection of force for humanitarian purposes due to not only the backlash from the
Libyan intervention, but principled rationale affirming that intervention would be a
misapplication of civilian protection in Syria. From this perspective, not only can actors
2 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report on the work of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation in the
Syrian Arab Republic’, UN GAOR, 27thSess., A/HRC/28/69, 5 February 2015.
3 Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl, ‘The Syrian Uprising and Bashar al-Asad’s First Decade in Power’
in Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl (eds.), Syria from Reform to Revolt, Volume 1 (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 2015), p. 305.
4 Justin Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum’, International Affairs
89(5) (2013), 1265-1283.
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be seen to not intervene due to alignment with the norm of nonintervention, but also the
calculated analysis of what intervention would accomplish and politically or materially
cost. Thus, while R2P has been embraced as an important lens by a wide body of
international actors, a complex set of geopolitical interests mirror articulations that
humanitarian intervention in Syria would not bring stability long-term and could
potentially lead to further suffering.
Historical Background and the Progression of Conflict
Syria’s Assad regime came to power in 1970 through a period of economic and political
turmoil with the current President Bashar Al-Assad’s father, Hafez, building a wide base
of political support through educational reforms and infrastructure modernization. On the
fault lines of Kurdish nationalism, Israeli-Arab peace, and Lebanese stability, the regime
has been able to build a nominally secular and nationalist Syrian identity with a political
elite dominated by the Alawite minority – a Shia offshoot of Islam. To better understand
the internal political dynamics, it is important to identify the sectarian divisions with
roughly 65 percent Sunni Arab, 13 percent Alawite, 10 percent Kurdish, nine percent
Christian, and three percent Druze5. Constitutionally a Socialist Popular Democratic
Republic, Syria has existed as an authoritarian state for more than four decades with past
elections having yielded 99 percent ‘yes-no’ referenda in favor of the Assad
government6. In 2000, the death of Hafez led to the rise of his son Bashar – a soft spoken
and western-educated ophthalmologist. Having carried out a decade of social and
economic restructuring since taking power, by 2011 Bashar Al-Assad was seen by many
5 Christopher Phillips, ‘Sectarianism and conflict in Syria’, Third World Quarterly 36(2) (2015), p. 357.
6 Raymond Hinnebusch and David W. Lesch, ‘Syrian Arab Republic’ in David E. Long, Bernard Reich and
Mark Gasiorowski (eds.), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Boulder:
Westview Press, 2011), p. 279.
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domestically and internationally as a liberal-minded reformer, with Syria likely to avoid
the fate of Egypt or Tunisia’s regime7.
While relatively latent in its development, Syria’s revolution ultimately mirrored regional
uprisings within the Arab Spring. Beginning in smaller and medium-sized cities across
Syria’s ‘periphery’, Syria’s youth bulge and high unemployment rate helped fuel an
uprising propelled by disenfranchised youths with little vested in the status quo - seeking
greater involvement in their system of government8. The southern city of Dar’a was one
of the first to spark in March with protests surrounding the release of political prisoners –
with government violence drawing wider protests across the country including the cities
of Homs, Hama, and the capital Damascus by early April 20119. Protesters initially
advocated more local social and political reforms surrounding issues such as poverty,
freedom of speech restrictions, and democracy promotion rather than calling for Assad’s
removal. Closely watching regional developments with the collapse of Egypt’s and
Tunisia’s presidents, and NATO intervention underway in Libya, Assad embraced an
overtly martial solution of violent repression met with nominal political reforms likely
influenced by regime hardliners that were present for Hafez’s response to the uprising in
Hama in the early 1980s which killed between ten and forty thousand civilians.
Calculated as a decisive means to end the demonstrations and deny the opposition any
territorial base that would provide an opening for foreign intervention, loyalist forces
pursued a punitive strategy of repression and area denial, with the military, intelligence
forces, and pro-regime shabbiha militia (Arabic ‘ghosts’) moving into agitating cities10.
7 David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), pp.
38-54.
8 Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl, ‘The Syrian Uprising and Bashar al-Asad’s First Decade in Power’,
p. 285.
9 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic’, UN GAOR, 17th Special Sess., A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 23 November 2011, p. 8.
10 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: From “authoritarian upgrading” to revolution?’, International Affairs 88(1)
(2012), 109.
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In parallel, the regime announced the formation of a new government cabinet, repeal of a
state of emergency law that had been in effect since 1963, release of political prisoners,
and later the creation of a new constitution11. Widely labeled as ‘too little too late’, the
months following initial protests yielded desertions from government forces largely along
sectarian lines and compounded already existent reliance on minority Alawite and
Christian dominated security forces12. Conflict ultimately permeated across the state, with
bands of armed revolutionaries striking regime forces, military compounds and claiming
population centers with continued regime violence against civilians perpetuating
sectarian cleavages morphing from a call for greater popular governance and legal
reforms on the periphery into a fractured civil war.
Opposition forces emerged through localized operations and command, in many cases
organically to defend their own homes and cities. A number of rebel militias led by Sunni
Syrian army defectors formed a loose coalition of armed groups in July 2011 under the
Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, their inability to gain foreign military aid or form a
nationally cohesive strategy has hindered military advancement towards a territorial
foothold, with continued domestic insecurity fracturing their ranks and providing an
opening for more religious extremists and foreign jihadists13. The group Jabhat Al-Nusra
as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda was established early in 2012 with foreign arms and funding –
claiming territorial gains from the regime through a mixture of suicide terror and
conventional tactics14. Since 2013, Kurdish groups concentrated along the northern
11 Bassem Mroue, ‘Syria forms new cabinet; President releases hundreds of detainees’, The Huffington Post,
11 April 2011, accessed 29 June 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/14/syria-new-
government_n_849266.html.
12 Nicholas Blanford, ‘Repeal of hated emergency law is “too little, too late”’, The Times, 22 April 2011,
accessed 29 June 2015, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/ world/middleeast/article2995371.ece.
13 Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘The dynamics of Syria’s civil war’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2014), accessed 7 July 2015, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ perspectives/PE115.html, p. 8.
14 Ruth Sherlock, ‘Inside Jabhat al Nusra – The most extreme wing of Syria’s struggle’, The Telegraph, 2




borders with Iraq and Turkey have also been active including members of the People’s
Protection Units (YPG), holding semi-autonomous areas and drawing regional support
from neighboring Kurdish populations including the Peshmerga from Iraq. In April 2013,
the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creating of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS or the Islamic State) which has been widely
successful, gaining territory in the power vacuum of Syria and in the Sunni-dominated
west of Iraq. By 2014, ISIS had shown a more brutal dimension of the Syrian conflict
while also expanding influence across North Africa, Nigeria, and even Western states.
Adhering to strict Islamist ideology and Sharia Law in the pursuit of an Islamic
Caliphate, ISIS has carried out its own atrocities including mass executions, enslavement,
sexual abuses, and torture. However, its ideological position has gained widespread
following with tens of thousands of foreign Muslims emigrating to join the movement
paralleled by jihadists, religious extremists, and financial flows. The group’s successes
have claimed wide swaths of territory across both Iraq and Syria - establishing de-facto
control and subverting post-colonial territorial constructs – with the stated aim of
dismantling the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which established many of the modern Middle
Eastern Borders during the First World War15. While the various opposition groups have
all fought against the Syrian regime, rebel in-fighting has been widely documented since
2013, with ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra, Kurdish forces, and the ‘kaleidoscope’ of other rebel
groups fighting amongst themselves16.
The complexity of Syrian rebel groups and their inability to form a unified front against
the regime has meant that they have lacked the cohesion and means necessary to
challenge the regime as a credible rival authority that could bring stability. With
international support, and largely filled with Syrian exiles of the Muslim Brotherhood, a
15 Graeme Wood, ‘What ISIS really wants’, The Atlantic, March 2015, accessed 27 April 2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
16 Jenkins, ‘The dynamics of Syria’s civil war’, p. 8.
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Syrian National Council announced its establishment in Istanbul in August 2011 loosely
based on the National Transition Council (NTC) in Libya. However, with the inability to
shape the conflict domestically through gained military aid or wider international
political recognition, the Council was incorporated into a further umbrella organization of
opposition groups including the FSA to form the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in 2012. Gaining a substantial level of international
diplomatic recognition as the ‘legitimate representative of the Syrian people’, the Syrian
National Coalition has struggled to consolidate a singular command or voice amongst
disparate and heterogeneous armed groups within the country17. As David Lesch
highlights, the Syrian opposition is “divided inside and outside the country, and each
opposition group has vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the eyes of others that have
prevented any single group from gaining legitimacy and general acceptance necessary to
offer a viable alternative to the regime”18. Disparate in ideology and authority, opposition
authorities have proven unwilling or unable to negotiate a solution in which Assad retains
power. Conversely, the regime’s targeting of unarmed protesters and counter-insurgency
strategy has resulted in mass atrocities, which have degraded the regime’s legitimacy
perhaps irreparably. However, as Stephen Starr and others have documented, despite
Western and Gulf-State media reports to the contrary, the Assad regime continues to
retain a substantial basis of territorial control and popular support amongst diverse
sectarian populations particularly in the most populated regions in the West19. Not
without basis, Assad has repeatedly claimed that the regime’s collapse would lead to a
Syrian failed state with continued fighting amongst opposition militias and extremists,
perpetuating further atrocities against minority Alawites and Christians.
17 Stefan A. G. Talmon, ‘Recognition of opposition groups as the legitimate representative of a people’,
Chinese Journal of International Law (2013), 219-253.
18 Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad, pp. 172-173.
19 Stephen Starr, Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising (London: Hurst Publishing, 2012).
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At the center of the ongoing conflict has been a largely unheralded humanitarian crisis,
with the civilian population bearing the impact of the violence from all sides. By June
2013, an estimated 100,000 of the population had been killed, doubling by August 2014
to 191,000 with tens of thousands of non-combatant deaths20. Both the regime’s siege
tactics and use of indiscriminant weaponry, and conversely brutal tactics of anti-regime
forces have led to the displacement of nearly half the population of roughly 22 million,
with over an estimated four million pouring into neighboring countries as refugees21.
However, while non-government aligned factions such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the
FSA have brutally targeting regime-supporters, loyalist areas, and committed massacres
of their own, the Syrian government has claimed a disproportionate responsibility for
both perpetuating the conflict through violence against initial protests, and continued
state policies resulting in mass civilian atrocities22. Government aligned forces have
pursued a trademark strategy widely referred to as tansheef al bakhar meaning ‘draining
of the sea to kill the fish’ through its impact in driving out the civilian population to kill
insurgents23. This consistent practice involves the siege of population centers – cutting
off humanitarian and media access, medical aid, food, and often water and electricity then
bombardment of areas with heavy artillery, rocket fire, and aircraft attacks including the
use of barrel bombs with the active targeting of medical facilities and personnel24. A
number of chemical weapons attacks have also been recorded, including the 21 August
2013 strike in Ghouta killing an estimated 1,400 civilians widely attributed to the
20 See: Megan Price, Adnita Gohdes and Patrick Ball, ‘Updated statistical analysis of documentation of
killings in Syrian Arab Republic’, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, August 2014, accessed 18 July
2015, https://hrdag.org/wp-content/ uploads/2014/08/HRDAG-SY-UpdatedReportAug2014.pdf.
21 Sam Jones and Kareem Shaheen, ‘Syrian refugees: Four million people forced to flee as crisis deepens’,
The Guardian, 9 July 2015, accessed 22 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/jul/09/syria-refugees-4-million-people-flee-crisis-deepens.
22 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report on the work of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation in the
Syrian Arab Republic’, 20.
23 Ibid,, 4.
24 Annie Sparrow, ‘Syria’s assault on doctors’, The New York Review, 3 November 2013, accessed 8 July
2015, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/nov/03/syria-assault-doctors/.
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regime25. As Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl highlight, “When one level of violence
failed to stop the uprising, the regime’s steady escalation – to tanks, fighter planes,
missiles, barrel bombs, and finally chemical weapons – showed that it was ready to
overstep all red lines”26. While the regime’s counter-insurgency strategy has served a
practical purpose of area denial with limited troop contributions or door-to-door tactics
that would result in much heavier casualties to already depleted loyalist forces, it has
resulted in the leveling of many Syrian cities, refugee crisis, and the decimation of state
infrastructure with immeasurable civilian suffering.
International and Institutional Responses
A wide number of international, regional, and global actors have echoed their
condemnation of the regime’s targeting of unarmed civilians and counterinsurgency
tactics throughout the crisis. These calls have paralleled diplomatic measures, economic
sanctions, and a host of UN institutional resolutions designed to shape the regime’s
behavior surrounding civilian atrocities27. The Security Council first addressed the
worsening crisis in late April 2011, with the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe briefing that credible sources within Syria were “consistently
reporting the use of artillery fire against unarmed civilians; door-to-door arrest
campaigns; the shooting of medical personnel who attempt to aid the wounded; raids
against hospitals, clinics and mosques and the purposeful destruction of medical supplies
and arrest of medical personnel”28. With continued violence against unarmed protesters,
25 Joby Warrick, ‘More than 1,400 killed in Syrian chemical weapons attack, U.S. says’, The Washington
Post, 30 August 2013, accessed 4 August 2015, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-
85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html.
26 Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl, ‘The Syrian Uprising and Bashar al-Asad’s First Decade in Power’,
285-305.
27 See Table 1: UNSC Resolutions/Drafts on Syria, p. 199.
28 UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6524th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6524, 27 April 2011, p. 2.
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EU member states, the US, and other Western powers placed economic and other smart
sanctions on Syrian regime by May 2011, while the UN Secretary General and Joint
Special Advisors on R2P and the Prevention of Genocide began what would become
consistent statements recalling the Syrian government’s 2005 obligations to protect its
population29. The UNHRC followed with a number of Special Sessions, initiating an
Independent International Commission of Inquiry (CoI) beginning in August 2011.
Following seven months of violence, the first draft UNSC resolution was debated on 4
October 2011. Introduced by France, Germany, Portugal and the UK, the draft resolution
strongly condemned ‘the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the
use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities’, demanding an immediate end to
all violence and intention to review the resolution’s implementation in 30 days to
determine the potential need for Article 41 measures relating to coercive non-military
sanctions30. Although relatively un-contentious in substance and with every member of
the Security Council echoing their concern and recognition of civilian atrocities, the draft
resolution was vetoed by China and Russia with the abstentions of Lebanon, Brazil,
South Africa, and India31.
As the civilian death toll mounted and refugee flows began in large numbers into Turkey,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt in particular, the domestic crisis became increasingly
fractured and regionalized. In a major shift, the GCC and Arab League transitioned from
what many saw as marked passivity to suspending Syrian membership on 16 November
2011 with the threat of economic and diplomatic sanctions under the implementation of a
Plan of Action – demanding a end to all violence, release of political prisoners,
withdrawal of Syrian armed forces from civilian areas, freedom of peaceful
29 Ibid., 8.
30 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2011/612, 4 October 2011.
31 UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6627, 4 October 2011, p. 4.
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demonstration, and unhindered access to the League of Arab States observer mission32.
Soon after marked the first published report from the independent international
Commission of Inquiry, concluding that the Syrian government was responsible for the
commission of crimes against humanity33. Despite condemnation and sanctions from
many global powers, the regime continued its repression through early 2012, driving
increasing civilian atrocities and militarized opposition groups.
Drawing from the Arab League’s Plan of Action, a second draft resolution was negotiated
in the Security Council on 4 February 2012. Introduced by Morocco and supported by a
number of Middle Eastern powers, the resolution condemned the regime’s attacks against
civilians, and demanded adherence to the plan of action with full cooperation for the
Commission of Inquiry and delivery of humanitarian aid34. While the evening prior to the
Resolution’s vote, on 3 February, saw perhaps the heaviest civilian casualties to date with
regime bombardment of Homs, the Resolution received thirteen positive votes, failing
with the veto’s caste by Russia and China. The debate in the Council has been
highlighted as one of the most ‘acrimonious debates’ since the Cold War, with France,
the UK, US, and Germany bitterly opposing ‘unmoved’ Russian and Chinese
delegations35. In a largely unheralded motion, the substance of the second vetoed Syrian
draft resolution was taken to the UNGA, with Resolution 66/253 passing with a majority
support of 137 members, 12 against, and 17 abstentions, condemning violence from
32 Jack Shenker and Peter Beaumont, ‘Arab League votes to suspend Syria if it doesn’t end violence against
protesters’, The Guardian, 12 November 2011, accessed 4 July 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-arab-league-bashar-assad.
33 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic’, p. 100, 107.34 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2012/77, 4 February 2012.
35 Spencer Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, The Melbourne Journal of
International Law 13 (2012), 74.
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Syrian authorities and demanding that the government protect its population and ‘put an
end to all human rights violations and attacks against civilians’36.
After a number of failed UNSC draft resolutions, regional actors took further steps in
February 2012, appointing prior UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the first Joint
Special Envoy of the United Nations and League of Arab States to Syria. Charged with
working across parties to assist in the negotiations for an inclusive political settlement,
Annan drew from international input and the Arab League’s plan releasing a Six-Point
Proposal that has continued to serve as the international basis for a transitional authority
and political resolution to the conflict, calling on the Syrian government to:
(1) Work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process;
(2) Stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised
cessation of armed violence in all of its forms by all;
(3) Ensure a timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the
fighting;
(4) Intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons;
(5) Ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and non-
discriminatory visa policy for them;
(6) Respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally
guaranteed37.
Under international pressure, the Syrian government on 25 March 2012 agreed to
implement the Proposal, calling for a ceasefire to begin on 10 April38. In a rare moment
36UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution 66/253’, UN GAOR, 66th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/66/253, 16
February 2012.
37 See: Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, ‘Six-Point Proposal of the
Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States’, 14 April 2012, accessed 6 June
2015, http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/documents/six_point_proposal.pdf.
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of consensus, the UNSC passed successive Resolutions 2042 and 2043 (2012) with the
first on 14 April explicitly backing Annan’s Six-Point Proposal and then 21 April
establishing a UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) of 300 unarmed observers to
monitor compliance39. However, a tit for tat resurfacing of conflict emerged with reports
that neither side was upholding the ceasefire with fragmented rebel compliance
continuing to launch strikes and government-aligned militias massacring over 100
civilians in Houla in late May40. With continued atrocities, the first international peace
conference was held in Switzerland know as ‘Geneva I’ in late June 2012. The
conference’s purpose was to build support surrounding principles and a framework for a
transitional government ‘that could include members of the present government and the
opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent’41.
Although a level of consensus was reached, neither Syrian regime or opposition forces
were present, with Iran and Saudi Arabia as important regional powers also absent. While
the resulting Geneva Communiqué has continued to serve as the basis for Syrian peace
negotiations at the international level, renewed fighting within Syria left UNSMIS
impotent on the ground.
With a revived opposition campaign and continued government atrocities, several
international powers on the UNSC pushed for more coercive measures against the
regime. A third vetoed resolution was introduced by the UK, US, France, Germany, and
Portugal negotiated on 19 July 2012. The Resolution deplored the regime’s use of heavy
38 Ian Black, ‘Syrian ceasefire plan still alive, says Kofi Annan after deadline passes’, The Guardian, 10
April 2012, accessed 4 August 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2012/apr/10/syrian-ceasefire-
plan-alive-annan.
39 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘From Tripoli to Damascus: Lesson learning and the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect’, International Politics 51(1) (2014), 29.
40 Stephanie Nebehay, ‘Most Houla victims killed in summary execution’, Reuters, 29 May 2012, accessed
4 July 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/us-syria-un-rights-idUSBRE84S0DS20120529.
41 Nick Meo, ‘Geneva meeting agrees “transition plan” to Syria unity government’, The Telegraph, 30 June
2012, accessed 15 July 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9367330/
Geneva-meeting-agrees-transition-plan-to-Syria-unity-government.html.
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weaponry including tanks and helicopters, as well as strikes against population centers
contrary to Resolution 2043, threatening measures under Article 41 with the Syrian
authorities having ten days to implement the Six-Point Proposal42. Azerbaijan, India, and
Guatemala were among those supportive of the resolution, while Pakistan and South
Africa abstained, and China and Russia again casting their vetoes.
Lack of international cooperation and unwillingness in the UNSC to mandate more
coercive measures led to Annan’s resignation as the Joint Special Envoy, with Algerian
diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi appointed in September 2012 – pushing for an end to the
conflict and peaceful political transition through a further round of negotiations43.
Through late 2012 and early 2013, violence continued to spiral and draw foreign
extremists with increasing civilian casualties. A major turning point emerged in the
summer of 2013, with reported uses of chemical weapons against civilian population
centers. Following tense negotiations and Russian bargaining, the UNSC unanimously
adopted Resolution 2118 on 27 September 2013, which under threat of further Chapter
VII measures mandated the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal
led by a joint UN-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
initiative from October 2013 to June 2014. However, the regime’s targeting of civilians
through siege tactics and indiscriminant weaponry persisted with further regionalization
of conflict under growing ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra, and extremist faction presence.
Following the use of chemical weapons, and reflective of international concern
surrounding the growing threat of Islamic extremism spreading from the crisis, Brahimi
pushed for further international peace negotiations. With the use of chemical weapons
42 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2012/538, 19 July 2012.
43 Rick Gladstone, ‘Resigning as envoy to Syria, Annan casts wide blame’, The New York Times, 2 August
2012, accessed 9 August 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-
syria-peace-envoy.html.
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and extremist expansion, 2014 marked the bloodiest year to date, with international actors
taking a more active position in Syria. Proposed as a more expansive and inclusive
conference among Syrian and international actors, ‘Geneva II’ took place in January and
February 2014 while failing again to reach any conclusive plan of action. Working
against extremists as well as forcible measures to alleviate domestic humanitarian
conditions, the UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 2139 in February 2014, citing
the rapid deterioration of the situation in Syria and death of over 10,000 children for a
demanded lift of sieges, end to civilian atrocities, and urgent allowance of humanitarian
aid convoys across the country44. Shortly following, a fourth vetoed UNSC draft
resolution emerged in May 2014. Sixty-five member states supported a resolution calling
for the crisis in Syria to be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The draft
condemned ‘widespread violation of human rights and international humanitarian law
committed by the Syrian authorities and pro-government militias, as well as the human
rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by non-State armed
groups’45. While receiving 13 of the 15 UNSC votes, China and Russia again vetoed the
resolution – drawing condemnation from a wide body of states46. However, the most
overtly coercive measures met with UNSC consensus against the regime followed,
“Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the Syrian authorities to protect the population
of Syria”47. Under reports of continued failure to allow the flow of humanitarian aid
across international and internal boundaries controlled by different factions, the UNSC
unanimously adopted two further resolutions 2165 and 2191 (2014), authorizing the
delivery of humanitarian aid without the consent of the government and then extending
its mandate.
44 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2139’, 7118th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/2139, 22 February 2014.
45 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2014/348, 22 May 2014.
46 Ian Black, ‘Russia and China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal court’, The Guardian,
22 May 2014, accessed 25 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-
un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court.
47UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2165’, 7216th Mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/2165, 14 July 2014.
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Although the Assad regime’s targeting of civilians helped precipitate the rise of Islamic
extremists, their arrival has perversely aided the regime’s narrative48. In response to the
rise of ISIS and other extremist factions with regionalization of the crisis, military
intervention has been carried out including air strikes, creation of an ‘ISIS Free Zone’,
and special operations support, training, and arming of opposition forces in in Syria49.
Since 2014, a coalition of partner states including Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, Canada, and Turkey, have all
conducted air strikes against ISIS targets in Syria. Subverting the territorial integrity of
the state boundaries across Iraq and Syria, the atrocities of ISIS and continued territorial
gains have been widely framed as a threat to regional and international security. As
Charles Glass highlights, “the Syrian war has produced an opposition to Assad so
repellent and so antagonistic to Western allies in the region that when the air intervention
came, it arrived in the guise of the regime’s ally in all but name”50. As of mid-2015,
Turkey has taken a more pro-active role fighting ISIS and working with coalition allies to
create a ‘No-ISIS and humanitarian safe-zone’ into Syrian territory both as a front to
target Kurdish militants caste as unfriendly to the Turkish regime and continued Syrian
insecurity. Regional actors including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE have funded and
armed increasingly extremist groups to counter the regime and ISIS, while Western
powers have trained and armed more ‘moderate’ secular forces, which have fought
against the regime and amongst other non-government factions including ISIS and Jabhat
Al-Nusra. However, the moral problem persists that without a political resolution of
48 Gopal Ratnam and John Hudson, ‘Kerry: Assad and ISIS have symbiotic relationship’, Foreign Policy,
17 November 2014, accessed 22 June 2015, http://foreignpolicy. com/2014/11/17/kerry-assad-and-isis-
have-symbiotic-relationship/.
49 Kareem Shaheen and Constanze Letsch, ‘Turkey agrees plan for “Isis-free zone” along Syrian border’,
The Guardian, 27 July 2015, accessed 5 August 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/turkey-isis-free-zone-syrian-border-us.
50 Charles Glass, ‘In the Syria we don’t know’, The New York Review, 6 November 2014, accessed 8 July
2015, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/06/ syria-we-dont-know/.
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disputes either through internal negotiations, or foreign intervention, civilian casualties
will likely continue.
Foreign alliance and proxy interests from the regional and international levels have been
as diverse as the factions fighting within Syria. While thousands of Iranian military
advisors were already in Syria at the beginning of the crisis, by the end of 2013, that
number had jumped to an estimated 10,000 including ‘Quds Force’ special operations
units, commanders, and other ground contingents directly supporting loyalist divisions
along with billions in financial aid and credit51. This aid has been transferred directly, but
also through Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias against oppositional forces with tens of
thousands of Lebanese-Hezbollah soldiers fighting to reclaim government cities along the
Lebanese-Syrian border with forces deployed as far north as Aleppo and embedded with
government units across the country52. More recently, Russia has also provided direct aid
through troops and aircraft fighting alongside regime force within Syria. Playing a pivotal
role since the beginning of the uprising, Russia has “armed Assad, shielded him at the
UN Security Council, agreed to take Syria’s crude oil in exchange for refined oil products
to sustain the country’s military and economy, and provided loans to stave off Syrian
bankruptcy”53. These countries holistically have served as the principle support to the
Assad regime through providing diplomatic cover, arms, and financial means to subsist.
Civilian Protection under the Responsibility to Protect
51 Ruth Sherlock, ‘Iran boosts support to Syria’, The Telegraph, 21 February 2014, accessed 15 July 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10654144/ Iran-boosts-support-to-Syria.html.
52 Julian Borger, ‘Iran and Hezbollah “have built 50,000 strong force to help Syrian regime”’, The
Guardian, 14 March 2013, accessed 28 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/mar/14/iran-
hezbollah-force-syrian-regime.
53 Anna Borshchevskaya, ‘Russia’s many interests in Syria’, The Washington Insititute, 24 January 2013,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-many-interests-in-syria.
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Throughout the crisis, R2P has permeated international discourse and contributed
positively towards actions for civilian protection. International pressure has resulted in a
momentary ceasefire, UN supervision mission, removal and destruction of Syria chemical
weapons arsenal, a number of UN aid appeals to support displaced Syrian populations,
and the forcible cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid. Invoking R2P as a lens and
call for action, global civil society, the UN Secretary General and Joint Special Advisors
on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to Protect helping to fuel UN
institutional resolutions with a steady stream of information surrounding civilian
atrocities. In March 2014, Adama Dieng, the UN’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of
Genocide to the Human Rights Council, asserted that the international community had
already failed in its duty to prevent atrocities in Syria, in which emphasis must now be
placed on the international response54. Following the fourth vetoed UNSC resolution, the
Assistant Secretary General Jan Eliasson asserted:
The Security Council has an inescapable responsibility… For more than three
years, this Council has been unable to agree on measures that could bring an end
to this extraordinarily brutal war…. If members of the Council continue to be
unable to agree on measures that could provide some accountability for the
ongoing crimes, the credibility of this body and the entire Organization will
continue to suffer55.
These statements have articulated clear obligations of the international community to
address the situation. In its most recent report in March 2015, the CoI concluded: “In
54 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Council discusses the
prevention of genocide’, 7 March 2014, accessed 24 July 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14334&LangID=E.
55 UN Secretary-General, ‘Deputy Secretary-General’s remarks, on behalf of the Secretary-General, to the
Security Council on Syria’, 22 May 2014, accessed 5 August 2015, http://www.un.org/sg/dsg/statements/
index.asp?nid=528.
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light of the manifest failure of the Government to protect its population from gross
human rights abuses, the international community, through the United Nations, bears the
responsibility of protecting the Syrian population from such crimes”56. Under R2P, terms
such as ‘manifest failure’ and international assertions that the regime is culpable for
carrying out ‘mass atrocity crimes’ have not been without political and legal significance.
These assertions surrounding the responsibility to protect have been echoed throughout
the crisis, within UN resolutions across institutional organs, regional organizations, and
individual states. UK Parliamentary debates in 2013 saw the explicit invocation of the
‘doctrine of responsibility to protect’ and the obligation it places on international actors
to respond57. Following the imposition of economic sanctions in response to Syrian
atrocities, European Parliamentary President Jerzy Buzek asserted on 15 Sept 2011, ‘We
Europeans must assume our responsibilities to protect civilians’58. Adopted by consensus,
UNSC presidential statements have referred directly to the Syrian regime’s
‘responsibility to protect’59, while more recent UNSC Resolutions 2139 and 2165 (2014)
also adopted by consensus have invoked the R2P norm. The first of which demands ‘that
all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of ethnic,
religious, and confessional communities, and stresses that, in this regard, the primary
responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities’60. This was also
articulated in arguably the most coercive resolution adopted to date, which mandated the
56 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report on the work of the Commission of Inquiry on the situation in the
Syrian Arab Republic’, p. 20.
57 UK Houses of Parliament, ‘House of Commons debate on Syria’, 30 August 2013, accessed 15 July 2015,
http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2013/august/commons-debate-on-syria/.
58European Parliament, ‘Syria’s Assad must go, and Libya’s resources must benefit all Libyans, says
MEPs’, Press Release, 15 September 2011, accessed 25 June 2015,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20110915IPR26710/ html/Syria's-Assad-must-
go-and-Libya's-resources-must-benefit-all-Libyans-say-MEPs.
59 UN Security Council, 7039th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PRST/2013/15, 2 October 2013.
60 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2139’.
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forcible delivery of humanitarian aid in Syria, ‘Reaffirming the primary responsibility of
the Syrian authorities to protect the population’61.






 Calls for cessation of the use of force by the government on civilians, and
compliance with international laws on human rights.
 Allow access to international bodies to deliver humanitarian aid.






 Calls for Syrian government to end violence against civilians and the
violations of human rights.
 Notes that all parties can be held accountable for violence.
 Calls for government to protect its population.
 Supports shift in the country to democratic system.
No. 13-2-0. Veto: Russian
Federation and China
14-Apr-12 S/RES/2042  Establishes a United Nations supervision mission, and send unarmed
personnel to monitor and report on the situation in Syria, focusing on bringing
about the end of all violence.
 Impresses the responsibility of the government to allow the mission to
complete their work.
Yes. In favor: 15.
Abstentions: 0. Vetoes: 0.
21-Apr-12 S/RES/2043  Establishes United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).
 Deployment of 300 unarmed personnel to continue to observe and report the
developments of the cessation of violence previously called upon in line with
the Envoy's six-point proposal.
Yes. In favor: 15.
Abstentions: 0. Vetoes: 0.
19-Jul-12 Draft-
S/2012/538
 Outlines a deteriorating situation in Syria with UNSMIS presence extension
for 45 more days.
 Requires the government of Syria to allow access to the UN Independent
International Commission of Inquiry.
 Reminds those carrying out human rights violations and attacks on UN
personnel of their accountability and responsibility.
No. Veto: China, Russian
Federation. Abstentions:
Pakistan, South Africa.
20-Jul-12 S/RES/2059  Agrees to keep UNSMIS in place for a further 30 days.
 Stipulates that the mandate will only be renewed in future if the violence has
decreased to a level that the UNSMIS can safely carry out their tasks.
Yes. In favor: 15.
27-Sep-13 S/RES/2118  Condemns the Damascus chemical weapons attack on 21st August as a breach
of international law.
 Bans any production or use of chemical weapons in Syria.
 Aids the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in
the destruction of chemical weapons and provide UN personnel in Syria to aid
the OPCW.
 Promotes other Member States who have the ability to also provide resources
and assistance. Instigate an international conference regarding the situation in
Syria.




 Condemns the blocking of humanitarian aid.
 Requires an end to all violence, especially that targeted at civilians.
 Requests that access to humanitarian aid be allowed without resistance.
 Demand that attacks on Homs and other populated areas be stopped.
Yes. In favour: 15.
22-May-14 Draft-
S/2014/348
 Passes on the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court, and press
the Syrian government to work with the ICC.
 Also request non-State parties to cooperate with the ICC.
No. Veto: China, Russian





 Cites the death of 150,000 people as a consequence of the violence in Syria.
 Condemn that Resolution 2139 was ignored, and that humanitarian aid is still
being prevented reaching civilians.
 Allows humanitarian aid agencies to use any route to enable the delivery of
aid to reach civilians, including crossing conflict boundaries.
 Launches a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all equipment and aid
travelling across borders into Syria is legitimate.
Yes. In favour: 15.
Abstentions: 0. Vetoes: 0.
17-Dec-14 S/RES/2191  Renews the access of aid set out in Resolution 2165 to continue for a further
year, until 10 January 2016, to be reviewed after six months.
Yes. In favour: 15.
Abstentions: 0. Vetoes: 0.
61 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2165’.
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While R2P has been framed as having failed with lack of consensus within the UNSC
surrounding more substantive protection measures, the absence of force projection for
civilian protection reflects a wide set of complex factors including regional alliance and
proxy interests met with assertions that intervention would be a misapplication of civilian
protection and would only enflame the domestic crisis. As Luke Glanville highlights,
‘Sometimes norms are trumped by the interests of powerful states. This does not mean
that the norm may not have a powerful impact in other cases’62. Tracing the assertions of
international actors through recurrent UNSC vetoed resolution and calls for civilian
protection illustrate the tension between calls for greater civilian protection and those
supportive of nonintervention.
Syria’s Spider Web – Alliances, Proxies, and Islamists
While any progression towards intervention has been blocked in the UNSC, the argument
could be made that actors could still intervene for humanitarian purposes outside of the
legitimacy provided by a UNSC mandate and justified their actions in terms of principled
violation. However, wide sentiment has emphasized the severity of the humanitarian
situation, but continue to a hold a seeming aversion to military projection in Syria’s civil
war for humanitarian purposes. While this could be caste as a material-drive calculation
or reflective of the backlash of Libya, it has also mirrored articulations that military force
projection would not likely alleviate humanitarian suffering and could potentially make it
worse – allusions to a limited utility of military force to bring about stability within Syria
and as a rule across humanitarian cases.
62 Luke Glanville, ‘Syria Teaches Us Little About Questions of Military Intervention’, in Robert W. Murray
and Alasdair McKay (eds.), In the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria, and Humanitarianism in Crisis (Bristol, UK:
E-International Relations, 2014), p. 45.
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Western actors with the capability to intervene have cited that force projection for
civilian protection could encompass a wide spectrum from area denial, no-fly zone, air
strikes, or full ground invasion. A number of international and regional actors began to
arm rebel groups more expansively from 2012-13 including vetting and training what
they defined as ‘moderate’ Syrian forces63. However, as US President Barack Obama
asserted in mid-2013, any direct military intervention against Assad could yield mission-
creep – with air strikes or limited surgical operations having nominal impact, citing that
“90 percent of the deaths that have taken place haven’t been because of air strikes by the
Syrian Air Force”64. While Assad was widely argued as having lost legitimacy through
continued mass atrocities against his own population, Western actors seemed to place
hope for stability and an end to violence against civilians in the plea for a moderate
secular opposition group. Without a viable political opposition and wide number of
violent armed groups in Syria, any intervention from foreign actors would like not change
the outcome of the civil war. In a 2013 letter to Congress, Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey stated:
Syria today is not about choosing between two sides, but rather about choosing
between one among many sides choosing. It is my belief that the side we choose
must be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their
favor. Today, they are not… It is a deeply rooted, long-term conflict among
multiple factions, and violent struggles for power will continue after Assad’s rule
ends65.
63 Sibylle Scheipers, ‘Auxiliaries at war in the Middle East’, Survival 57(4) (2015), 121-138.
64 Sam Stein, ‘Obama on Syria: Wary of ‘slip-slide’ into commitments’, The Huffington Post, 18 June 2013,
accessed 5 August 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2013/06/17/obama-syria_n_3456243.html.
65 Martin E. Dempsey, (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), ‘Letter to the Honourable Carl Levin’,
Department of Defence, 19 July 2013, accessed 10 July 2015, http://freebeacon.com/wp-
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The US, UK and Germany among other Western actors have limited advanced arms sales
in the fear that they could fuel continued instability or enter extremist’ hands – closely
monitoring munitions to vetted ‘moderate’ opposition militias66. The rise of ISIS has
posed a further challenge to regional and greater international security. With the group in-
part fueled by a decade of Western occupation, Iraq’s call for military support provided
intervening powers with Article 51 basis surrounding collective self-defense, with ISIS’
de-facto territorial control and bases to launch attacks into Iraq used as legal justification
for airstrikes in Syria. Regarding any argued international lack of military resources,
international and regional actors have been more than able and willing to commit troops
to fight ISIS and other factions within and surrounding Syria, but have not been willing to
engage regime forces for explicitly humanitarian purposes, seemingly placing the crux of
any decision to intervene as a matter of political resolve. Interestingly, as Henry
Kissinger outlines, Syria’s decade of support of Hezbollah, Iran, and militias countering
US interests in Iraq are enough to highlight Syria as where ‘humanitarian and strategic
intervention merge’67. This emphasizes Western involvement in Syria as a potential
means to subvert Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah’s interests in Syria, strengthening
Israeli and Iraqi stability while paralleling wider regional interests of many powers such
as the US or UK. However, even with both strategic and humanitarian interests at stake,
Western powers have refrained from intervention for civilian protection.
A high point for potential intervention emerged following the chemical weapons attacks
in 2013. However, even those most outspoken actors for intervention and supportive of
R2P highlighted the necessity for potential strikes to be ‘very limited, very targeted, very
66 Elad Benari, ‘Clinton: Arming Syrian rebels is supporting Al-Qaeda’, Israel National News, 28 February
2012, accessed 4 August 2015, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/
153233#.VcxuCksx9uY.
67 Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Syrian intervention risks upsetting global order’, The Washington Post, 1 June 2012,
accessed 15 June 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/syrian-intervention-risks-upsetting-
global-order/2012/06/01/gJQA9fGr7U_story.html.
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short term’ and explicitly “targeted at the use of chemical weapons rather that one that
sought more broadly to secure the protection of the Syrian population”68. Previously
supportive of intervention under R2P in Libya, then-US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in 2012 outlined, even with ‘immense human suffering’ after a year of atrocities
with civilian casualties in the thousands, ‘sometimes, overturning brutal regime’s takes
time and costs lives. I wish it weren’t so’69. Or as then-Deputy UK Prime Minister Nick
Clegg outlined in 2013, confidence that such action holds regional and international
support with UN approval is critical, without which there must be clear humanitarian
grounds. In Syria, “the UN is divided and we have judged the risk too high that direct
military intervention by us or our allies would lead to another Iraq-style imbroglio.
Above all, it has not been sufficiently clear that intervention would improve the
humanitarian situation”70. This can be framed as a pragmatic application of R2P due to
the nature of domestic crisis, with intervention arguably resulting in regime change and a
costly protracted conflict amongst a fractured and ethnically divided Syrian population
mirroring past experiences in Iraq and particularly Libya. As a US intelligence official
commented, “By the time Syria had progressed into a crisis in which intervention may
have been considered, I think the resulting instability in Libya was seen by many in the
administration as a reason to not get involved’71.
While Russian and Chinese vetoes may in part reflect more conservative adherence to the
norm of nonintervention, the international condemnation towards the Syrian regime,
68 Jonathan Karl, ‘John Kerry Promises “Unbelievably Small’ U.S. Strike Against Syria’, ABC News, 9
September 2013, accessed 5 October 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/john-kerry-
promises-unbelievably-small-u-s-strike-against-syria/. Luke Glanville ‘Syria Teaches Us Little About
Questions of Military Intervention’, in Robert W. Murray and Alasdair McKay (eds.), In the Eleventh Hour:
R2P, Syria, and Humanitarianism in Crisis (Bristol, UK: E-International Relations, 2014), p. 46.
69 Wyatt Andrews, ‘Clinton: Arming Syrian rebels could help al Qaeda’, CBS News, 27 February 2012,
accessed 4 August 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-arming-syrian-rebels-could-help-al-qaeda/.
70 Nick Clegg, ‘If Iraq taught us anything, it’s this…’, The Independent, 17 March 2013, accessed 28
August 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/if-iraq-taught-us-anything-its-this-
8537496.html.
71 Zachary Reinstein, interview by the author, 17 May 2015.
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international activism in terms of non-military protection measures, and number of
proposed UNSC resolutions highlight widespread arguments that state authorities do not
have the right to carry out large scale human rights atrocities free from international
sanction. Thus, the action of non-intervention in the case of Syria also reflects the
pragmatic application of an intervention norm articulated through R2P. In this respect,
R2P has not been weak or without influence, but its third pillar has not been applied due
to a complex set of alliance and proxy interests with international powers unwilling to
project force without wider international consensus and in a case in which intervention
may not have a long-term humanitarian outcome. Addressing the arguments of wider
BRICS powers and those on the UNSC amongst Western circles highlights further
dynamics surrounding the nonintervention norm in Syria.
From the very outset, Syria’s regional and international alliances matched with its
position as the ‘the cornerstone of the Middle East security architecture’ meant that an
expansive set of norms would be at play72. Largely framed in terms of the Shia crescent
stretching from Iran across to Lebanon, Syria has remained Iran’s most enduring regional
ally retaining close economic and military linkages while serving as a conduit for access
to Hezbollah. Similarly, Syria’s decades of military occupation through Lebanon’s civil
war and reconstruction have built close ties, with tens of thousands of Hezbollah’s forces
fighting to reclaim government cities along the Syrian border with forces deployed as far
north as Aleppo and embedded with government units across the country73. Lebanon’s
central position as the only Middle Eastern power and Arab League member on the
Security Council in 2011 played a pivotal role in securing authorization for Resolution
1973 in Libya and in hindering coercive measures against Syria, with its contrasting
response explicitly highlighting the politicization of the UNSC. However, while these
72UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6524, p. 5.
73 Borger, ‘Iran and Hezbollah “have built 50,000 strong force to help Syrian regime”’.
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actors since 2011 have continued to support Assad militarily and financially, Russia and
China have been caste as the primary ‘spoilers’ of further coercive measures with
Western powers seemingly averse to intervene without the legitimacy of a UNSC
mandate74.
Moscow’s aversion to coercive measures against Syria have been widely framed as based
on strategic and material linkages, with the Cold War alliance, economic ties, elite
affinities, and military partnership with Russia’s last Mediterranean naval base at
Tartus75. Through economic and military aid, watering down the wording within repeated
Geneva Communiqués and shielding Syria from recurrent UNSC resolutions, has been
seen as going to extreme efforts - with Moscow cast as ‘manifestly realpolitik-driven’76.
However, as a number of policy analysts and scholars have outlined, these material and
alliance factors alone are insufficient to explain Russia’s diplomatic stance77.
Highlighting diverging influence of individual statesmen, in August 2011, then-Russian
President Medvedev, whom had played a central role in the Russian abstention in
Resolution 1973, echoed that there were limits to his willingness to shield Assad,
emphasizing that the Syrian regime was ‘in for a grim fate’ if a change in government
strategy and reforms weren’t carried out78. While Libya was cited as a moment of
contention between Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, early 2012
marked elections seeing Putin replace Medvedev as President with seeming divergent
views surround forcible intervention for civilian protection. Russia’s position has echoed
74 Bellamy, ‘From Tripoli to Damascus’.
75 Borshchevskaya, ‘Russia’s many interests in Syria’.
76 Gareth Evans, ‘The Consequence of Non-Intervention in Syria: Does the Responsibility to Protect Have a
Future?’ in Robert W. Murray and Alasdair McKay (eds.), In the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria, and
Humanitarianism in Crisis (Bristol, UK: E-International Relations, 2014), p.18-25.
77 Roy Allison, ‘Russia and Syria: Explaining alignment with a regime in crisis’, International Affairs 89(4)
(2013), 795-823; Derek Averre and Lance Davies, ‘Russia, humanitarian intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect: The case of Syria’, International Affairs 91(4) (2015), p. 820; Samuel Charap,
‘Russia, Syria and the doctrine of intervention’, Survival 55(1) (2013), 35-41.
78 Allison, ‘Russia and Syria: Explaining alignment with a regime in crisis’, p. 799.
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a ‘loathing’ of externally applied standards of legitimacy surrounding regime type, with
the conflict in Syria reflecting for Putin a secular versus Islamist hew, with Assad’s
collapse seen as spreading Sunni extremism with very real security implications for
Russia in Central Asia and the North Caucuses79. As Derek Averre and Lance Davies
highlight surrounding Syria, “Moscow argued that both international order and justice
rely on preserving the legal basis of sovereignty and nonintervention”80. Viewing
Western assertions along the ‘Shia-Sunni’ axis to empower regional allies including
Saudi Arabia and Gulf States against Iran have been cited for Russian skepticism of
further Western intentions of regime change81. But as Roy Allison highlights, a broad
range of ideological and structural factors impact Russian position on Syria, which
“underscores the centrality of deeply held principles, not concrete regional interests”82.
As Moscow’s broader ‘foreign policy concept’ published in February 2013 affirms a
pluralist conception of global order while challenging the legitimacy of forcible
intervention outside of UNSC mandate even for humanitarian purposes. Directly
referring the ‘responsibility to protect’, the text asserts:
Some concepts that are being implemented are aimed at overthrowing legitimate
authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting civilian population.
The use of coercive measures and military force bypassing the UN Charter and
the UN Security Council is unable to eliminate profound socioeconomic, ethnic
and other antagonisms that cause conflicts. Such measures only lead to the
79 Charap, ‘Russia, Syria and the doctrine of intervention’, p. 37; Julia Ioffe, ‘In Russia, even Putin’s critics
are OK with his Syria policy’, The New Republic, 23 July 2012, accessed 24 June 2015,
http://www.newrepublic.com/ article/105281/russia-even-putins-critics-are-ok-his-syria-policy.
80 Averre and Davies, ‘Russia, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 824.
81Charap, ‘Russia, Syria and the doctrine of intervention’.
82IIbid., p. 37.
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expansion of the conflict areas, provoke tensions and arms race, aggravates
interstate controversies and incite ethnical and religious strife83.
While Russia has not been opposed to civilian protection or R2P in principle, its very
beginning stance in Syria has reflected a narrative emphasizing Syria as a domestic crisis
that must be addressed through an inclusive internal process without outside interference.
As S. Neil McFarland highlights from a historical perspective, “Russia’s view of order
and justice in international relations remains statist, traditional, and conservative”84.
Asserting that civilian protection is best ensured through regime stability, Russia has
opposed any overtly condemnatory resolution drafts against the Syrian regime. Echoing a
moral equivalence assertion of the atrocities committed and fuelled by opposition
factions, Russian officials have highlighted that atrocities would continue to occur if not
increase under regime collapse, with even worse potential repercussions for regional
security. Directly linked to Libya and its impact in hindering more coercive R2P
measures in Syria, David Lesch highlights,
Russian leaders do not want to see any repeat of this in Syria, and that is why they
have been so sensitive to the specific of the language in proposed UN resolutions
condemning Syria. They – and the Chinese – also do not want to see any UN
resolution that might authorize or lead to military intervention or economic
sanction based on human rights abuse (as has been consistently proposed in the
83 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation’, 12 February 2013, accessed 30 June 2015, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189
ED44257B2E0039B16D.
84 S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘Russian perspectives on order and justice’ in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis
and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), p. 206.
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case of Syria). In this regard, Beijing and Moscow do not want to see precedent
set that might possible be used against them in the future85.
Similarly, China has also served as a principle ‘spoiler’ in the UNSC through four
recurrent vetoes against any progression towards coercive measures under R2P. While
Beijing has been cited as largely following Moscow – unlikely to stand alone as the sole
veto power in the face of human suffering – China has been more than willing to
distinguish itself apart from Russia surrounding issues such as Ukraine and Yemen86.
China’s abstention for Resolution 1973 centered on the importance of regional support,
while other military projections surrounding Cote D’Ivoire and others have been
supported – seemingly resting on regime consent. China’s justifications and statements
surrounding R2P then do not highlight aversion to sovereign responsibility, but reflect a
seemingly firm stance against humanitarian intervention “based on the irreducible core of
the inviolability of national sovereignty”87. Syria has minimal oil reserves and nominal
trade exports or import with China88. As several researchers on Chinese policy
surrounding R2P have noted “both the government and academia are quite conservative
about military intervention”89. The justifications provided by Chinese officials and
Ambassadors in the UN have affirmed this interpretation of R2P whereby the use of force
serves as a last-resort only through approval from the UNSC in response to humanitarian
crisis in which military force would not further incite the instability, which it purports to
alleviate. Focusing on the root causes of instability rather than projection of military force
85 Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad , p. 138.
86 UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 7426th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.7426, 14 April 2015; UN Security Council,
UN SCOR, 7498th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.7498, 29 July 2015.
87 Rana Mitter, ‘An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical
Perspective’ in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Order and Justice in
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 230.
88 Palash Ghosh, ‘What is China’s role in Syria?’, International Business Times, 8 February 2012, accessed
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constitutes international responsibility. The ethical problem remains for the international
community that if there isn’t an outside intervention, mass atrocities will continue90.
Four Vetoed Resolutions and the Libyan Precedent
From the beginning of civilian atrocities in Syria, every member of the Security Council
expressed deep concern for the use of lethal force against protesters – emphasizing the
regime’s responsibility to protect peaceful demonstrators. However, the contention within
the Council by a number or powers was not that draft resolutions were substantively
illegitimate, but that they reflected what Russia’s delegation framed as a ‘philosophy of
confrontation’ aimed at military intervention that would only worsen the potential for a
resolution of crisis and long-term protection of civilians through addressing the root
causes of conflict91. This illustrated the initial Libyan blowback, but also principled
arguments against intervention that would continue to be echoed in the face of R2P
through the remainder of the crisis.
Comparably latent in its development to Libya, as conflict in Syria sparked more fully in
the summer of 2011, NATO’s stretching the boundaries of Resolution 1973 from civilian
protection in Benghazi to the active targeting of government forces seemed to shape
international responses. Hardening positions against more coercive R2P measures, the
Libyan precedent normatively strengthened nonintervention and helped politically
enabled arguments for inaction. As Jennifer Welsh outlines, it is difficult to explain
international positions against protection measures in Syria “without understanding the
impact of the Council’s second resolution with respect to Libya” relating to Resolution
90 Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, p. 91.
91 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6627, p. 4.
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1973’s ultimate application towards regime change92. China, Russia, and IBSA partner
countries (India, Brazil, and South African) in particular through UNSC vetoes and as
‘influential abstainers’ in Syria echoed feelings of being duped through their
authorization of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian areas under threat
in Libya, which was expanded to include active targeting of government forces and
regime change93. Moscow and Beijing had come to believe the intention was to safeguard
civilian lives in Libya, with the liberal interpretation embraced by Western actors to
overthrow Qaddafi seen as a negative case study94. As Jason Ralph and Adrian Gallagher
highlight, “the failure to maintain consensus over Libya made international society’s
challenge in Syria more difficult”95. This was openly apparent through subsequent
negotiations surrounding UNSC draft resolutions and statements of member states
predominantly in the months immediately following operations in Libya96.
The impact of Libya was particularly evident in the first draft resolution in October 2011
based in part on the Council’s composition and continuation of NATO operations in
Libya. While negotiations surrounding the non-coercive draft resolution on Syria took
place seven months after initial reports or civilian atrocities, a number of ambassadors
emphasized the Libyan precedent, fueling skepticism underlying Western intentions.
Directly highlighting Libya, Vitaly Churkin asserted:
Our proposals for wording on the non-acceptability of foreign military
intervention were not taken into account, and, based on the well-known events in
92 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘What a difference a year makes’, Canadian International Council, 5 February 2012,
accessed 25 June 2015, http://opencanada.org/features/syria-un/.
93 Gareth Evans, ‘Responding to Mass Atrocity Crimes: The “Responsibility to Protect” After Libya’,
speech given at Chatham House, London, 6 October 2011,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/177949.
94 Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad , p. 138.
95 Jason Ralph and Adrian Gallagher, ‘Legitimacy faultlines in international society: The responsibility to
protect and prosecute after Libya’, Review of International Studies 41(3) (2015), 570.
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North Africa, that can only put us on our guard… The situation in Syria cannot be
considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience. The
international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security
Council resolution on Libya and the NATO interpretation is a model for the future
actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect97.
Echoing their skepticism surrounding potential underlying motives and disproportionate
condemnation of the regime – seemingly based on a predilection towards aggression and
regime change already echoed across Western states for Assad to step down, the South
African Ambassador further outlined:
With the regard to the draft resolution (S/2011/612) before us, South Africa was
concerned about the sponsors’ intention to impose punitive measures that would
have pre-judged the resolution’s implementation. We believe that these were
designed as a prelude for further actions. We are concerned that this draft
resolution not be part of a hidden agenda aimed at once against instituting regime
change, which has been an objective clearly stated by some. We are thus
concerned about the fact that sponsors of this draft resolution rejected language
that clearly excluded the possibility of military intervention in the resolution of
the Syrian crisis. We maintain that the Security Council should proceed with
caution on Syria lest we exacerbate an already volatile situation98.
The international context which framed norm contestation in Syria influenced how these
norms were interpreted and applied. Nonintervention outlines a rule against military force
projection without regime consent, with international actors not averse to protection
97 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6627, p. 4.
98 Ibid., p.11.
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measures, but rather against the authorization of force that would ultimately target a
recognized regime. These objections to resolutions surrounding civilian protection in
Syria reflected a more firm commitment to nonintervention, asserting that any coercive
measures would create seeming precedence towards the projection of force99. However,
as Alex Bellamy highlights, while the blowback of Libya was evident in initial UNSC
discourse following NATO operations, there is little evidence to suggest the Libyan
precedent played a sustained role to ‘delegitimize RtoP and the associated politics of
protection’100. Outside of the Syrian crisis, the UNSC has been more willing to invoke
R2P in wider context after Libya, with states that have been critical of the Libyan
intervention including Brazil, Pakistan, and India, all supporting following resolutions on
Syria vetoed by Russia and China101. Thus, while the stretched Chapter VII mandate
under NATO and continued instability in Libya may serve as a negative case study, its
impact has been in part of a wide number of factors influencing wider contestation of
nonintervention and assertions than any coercive UNSC resolutions could set precedence
toward further instability.
While several Western powers including the US, France, and the UK pushed for a more
condemnatory response and assertions that those responsible must be held accountable,
Russia, China, and IBSA partner countries (India, Brazil, and South African) maintained
that the crisis was a domestic issue that would only be negatively impacted by foreign
interference102. While South Africa’s abstention from the first draft resolution outlined
skepticism surrounding Western intentions and the Libyan precedent, Indian Ambassador
Hardeep Singh Puri seemingly weighed the regime’s responsibility for civilian protection
99 Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria’, p. 87.
100 Bellamy, ‘From Tripoli to Damascus’, p. 26.
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102 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6524, p. 5.
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with its responsibility to retain order: “While the right of people to protest peacefully is to
be respected, States cannot but take appropriate action when militant groups – heavily
armed – resort to violence against state authority and infrastructure”103. Noting the
complexity of the domestic crisis and importance of Syria in wider regional political
context, the Chinese Ambassador never directly cited the Libyan precedent, from the very
first draft resolution emphasizing:
Whether the Security Council takes further action on the question of Syria should
depend upon whether it would facilitate the easing of tension in Syria, help to
defuse differences through political dialogue and contribute to the maintenance of
peace and stability in the Middle East. Most important, it should depend upon
whether it complies with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of
noninterference in the internal affairs of states – which has a bearing upon the
security and survival of developing countries, in particular small and medium-
sized countries, as well as on world peace and stability104.
Marking a period of transition from humanitarian crisis towards civil war, a number of
regional and international actors embracing a more critical approach to the regime’s
targeting of civilians into 2012. Following the Arab League’s observer mission and then
UNSMIS, periods of consensus surrounding Annan’s Six Point Proposal and ceasefire
were shadowed by a second and third vetoed draft resolution placing diplomatic pressure
on Syrian authorities. While introduced by regional actors and affirming strong
commitment to nonintervention, Russian and Chinese vetoes on the second draft
resolution on 4 February 2012 reflected skepticism surrounding Western intentions and
the one-sided nature of condemnation against multiple sides complicit in violence.
103 UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.6627, p. 6.
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China’s Ambassador asserted, “to put undue emphasis on pressuring the Syrian
Government for a prejudged result of dialog or to impose any solution will not help
resolve the Syrian issue. Instead, that may further complicate the situation”105. While
Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin emphasized, the draft resolution:
“did not take into account our proposed amendments to the draft resolution to the
effect that the Syrian opposition must distance itself from extremist groups that
are committing act of violence, and calling on States and all those with any
relevant opportunity to use their influence to stop those groups committing acts of
violence. Nor has account been taken of our proposals that along with the
withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces from the cities, there should be an end to
attacks by armed groups on State institutions and neighborhoods106.
Following the failure of UNSMIS and a level of international consensus underwriting the
first Geneva Communiqué, the third vetoed resolution on 19 July 2012 was a progressive
step to identifying the continuation of civilian atrocities and necessity for coercive
measures towards forcing actors towards a political settlement or at least shaping the
nature of domestic conflict away from directly targeting civilian population centers.
South Africa and Pakistan’s abstentions emphasized the necessity of a united UNSC
front, and skepticism surrounding an ‘unbalanced approach’ with coercive measures that
threaten the government ‘without realistically allowing any action to be taken against the
opposition’107. Russia’s Ambassador Vitaly Churkin argued that the vote shouldn’t have
occurred at all, asserting “we simply cannot accept a document under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations that would open the way for the pressure of sanctions and
105 UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 6711th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV/6711, 4 February 2012, p. 9.
106 Ibid.
107 UN Security Council, UN SCOR, 6810th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6810, 19 July 2012, p. 6, 12.
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later for external military involvement in Syrian domestic affairs”108. Arguing that the
resolution was biased given the range of opposition forces, terrorist groups, and their
parallel atrocities, Churkin further asserted that “the threats of sanctions were leveled
exclusively at the Government of Syria. That runs counter to the spirit of the Geneva
document and does not reflect the realities in the country today”109. China again echoed
principled moral arguments surrounding the potential externalities of Chapter VII
pressure on the regime as it sought stability - echoed that the draft’s:
“[U]nbalanced content seeks to put pressure on only one party. Experience has
shown that such a practice would not help resolve the Syrian issue, but would
only derail the matter from the political track. It would not only further aggravate
the turmoil, but also cause it to spread to other countries in the region, undermine
regional peace and stability, and ultimately harm the interests of the people of
Syria and other regional countries… sovereign equality and non-interference in
the internal affairs of other countries are the basic norms governing inter-State
relations… We have consistently maintained that the future and fate of Syria
should be independently decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by
outside forces110.
With regional support, the League of Arab States issued a resolution calling for the
international community to take ‘all necessary measures’ but held short of identifying
specific measures under a lack of regional consensus111. The US, UK, and France among
others all echoed intent to launch punitive strikes to either deny the Syrian regime part of
108 Ibid., p. 8.
109 Ibid., p. 9.
110 Ibid., p. 13.
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its chemical capability, or impact its calculus surrounding their use. Violating
international norms surrounding the use of chemical weapons paralleled R2P as a
seemingly egregious example of the regime’s ‘manifest failure’ to protect its
population112. However, in both the US and UK legislative debates, the Iraq precedent
and inability to shape the humanitarian conditions long term in Syria through a limited
military intervention loomed large, signaling mixed political resolve surrounding the
projection of force113. Resolution 2118 (2013) which removed and destroyed Syria’s
chemical weapons stockpiles then served as a reasoned policy – removing Syrian
chemical weapons and their potential to fall into extremist hands if the regime were to
collapse while punitive strikes would have likely had limited impact on the regime’s
calculus surrounding the use of such strategy or removal of the weapons themselves.
Aversion to any precedent towards intervention remained even in terms of the reference
of the situation to the International Criminal Court in May 2014 through the fourth vetoed
resolution by China and Russia with the thirteen other members supportive of a
resolution supported by 64 states. Citing the coercive nature of the reference surrounding
international criminal accountability, Russia again linked the resolution to forcible
intervention, asserting “the draft resolution rejected today reveals an attempt to use the
ICC to further inflame political passions that lay the ultimate groundwork for eventual
outside military intervention”114. While members of the UNSC have not been averse to
civilian protection and R2P as a lens to address the crisis, its potential utility in terms of
the third pillar has been argued as a potentially dangers provocation of instability and
further atrocities.
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Conclusion
With inability to halt continued atrocities in Syria, several scholars have outlined the
erosion or failure of R2P as a norm115. However, the international community has taken
substantive protection measures, in many ways unheralded through the level of dialogue
and continued involvement across UN organs, regional actors, and individual states.
Repeated UNSC vetoes by Russia and China and a number of vocal abstentions by non-
permanent powers have explicitly highlighted principled assertions drawing from moral
argument that intervention would set a dangerous precedent and potentially enflame
rather than alleviate civilian suffering. Even scholars and policymakers in Western
capitals have cited that military projection could aggravate the humanitarian crisis, with
agents seemingly unwilling to countenance intervention for civilian protection without
UNSC mandate. Tracing the recurrent UNSC vetoes throughout the Syrian crisis
highlights international contestation of nonintervention in the face of R2P. This illustrates
objections to forcible intervention through not only the backlash of Libya and negative
political or military costs incurred by potential intervening countries, but also diverging
normative conceptions of how to address Syria in terms of R2P and regime stability.
From this approach, while R2P has played an enormous political and moral role in the
crisis, the norm of nonintervention has served as a salient counterpoint.
Many states in the international community have taken substantive steps towards civilian
protection in Syria through condemnation of the regime, diplomatic recognition of
opposition coalition, humanitarian aid contributions, and promotion of protection
115 See: John Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, ‘R2P after Syria: To save the doctrine, forget regime
change’, Foreign Affairs 26 March 2013, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2013-03-26/r2p-
after-syria; Elliott Abrams, ‘R2P, R.I.P.’ Council on Foreign Relations 8 March 2012, accessed 14 June
2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2012/03/08/r2p-r-i-p.
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measures through UN institutional bodies articulated through R2P. However, the
complex set of alliance and proxy interests have underwritten contestation of R2P and
international aversion to the projection of force for humanitarian purposes. Brent Steele
and Eric Heinze have highlighted that ‘embodying the R2P norm for interventionary
purposes’ may at times be a flawed approach in that the legitimacy of such action would
be mixed with the impact of such action even detrimental116. In cases such as Syria, this
has been argued by states throughout the crisis, challenging any momentum towards
intervention. As Zack Beauchamp argues:
Military intervention in Syria would not only be a misapplication of R2P, but
would radically weaken the doctrine’s role in building both a better Middle East
and a better world. Our responsibility to protect both Syrians and the R2P doctrine
itself demands that we stay out of it117.
Targeting Assad to coercively impact his calculus surrounding civilian atrocities would
weaken the regime’s position relative to extremists and potentially enflame civilian
atrocities, particularly against minority populations if the regime were to fall. This
argument has paralleled a strong normative position of states such as China aligned with
a more firm application of nonintervention globally. Syria highlights that when regimes
target their own civilian populations, they are subject to international scrutiny and
protection measures articulated through R2P. The norm of R2P has then served to
condition international actors and institutions – moving towards greater political pressure
and activism to alleviate civilian suffering in Syria which highlights its salience as an
emerging norm. However, while international debate provides examples of more
116 Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele, ‘The (D)evolution of a Norm: R2P, the Bosnia Generation and
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya’ in Aiden Hehir and Robert Murray (eds.), Libya: The Responsibility to
Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 159.
117 Zack Beauchamp, ‘Syria’s crisis and the future of R2P’, Foreign Policy, 16 March 2012, accessed 15
June 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/16/syrias-crisis-and-the-future-of-r2p/.
223
pragmatic application of the R2P norm, there is still evidence to suggest that
nonintervention has to date retained a high level of salience relative to R2P and been
articulated through the legitimating arguments by member states through UNSC vetoes
and assertions that humanitarian intervention would not bring greater stability to Syria or
a wider international order through normative diffusion of the third pillar.
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Conclusion
Tracing social discourses through recurrent cases of egregious human rights abuses at the
international level provides a lens to address how nonintervention has persisted through
periods of mass atrocities with force projection argued as a practice that would not yield
positive humanitarian outcomes or secure wider international order. Through the norm of
nonintervention’s role in informing the decisions of state and conditioning the behavior
of actors, the decision to not-intervene illustrates more than international apathy to
human rights or the failure of normative structures and ethics to influence state policies.
This concluding chapter takes a wide-angle approach to themes and cases addressed
earlier in this thesis. First, this chapter emphasizes the importance of norms within
international relations and contestation as a foundational framework for further research.
Second, addressing the interaction between the norm of R2P and nonintervention outlines
how the norms construct a normative order and have shaped the boundaries of legitimate
behavior. Third, reviewing the three case studies, each provides an empirical example of
the complex normative and non-normative factors influencing international responses to
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egregious human rights abuses and mass atrocities. The three cases addressed in this
thesis, separately, and holistically, provide insight into how the norm of nonintervention
has continued to persist and inform the decisions of international actors in the face of
R2P.
International Order and a Critical Approach to Norm Contestation
The evolution of a normative architecture provides insight into change at the international
level, and how shifts in international beliefs, values, and practices may influence state
behavior. Agents pursue policies aligned with their subjective understanding of situations
and interests that are not statically defined, but derived from social and historical context.
As a theoretical pursuit, this work has challenged the claimed irrelevance of international
law and normative structures on the decision-making calculations of states within the
discipline of international relations. Rather, norms play a strategic role in constraining
and empowering behavior as resources for international actors, which dynamically shape
the interest and identities of actors. Furthermore, as this thesis has emphasized, there is a
very real connection between state actions and justifications – highlighting the perceived
necessity of states to legitimate their behavior through prevailing norms. Norms then
serve to define the boundaries of debate and normative action, conditioning the behaviors
of states as they evolve and are maintained. Whether Iraq in 2003 or Libya in 2011,
norms can be seen as resources to actors in which agents make reasoned calculations and
justify their actions as a functional means of legitimation – a strategic articulation of
values and beliefs according to intersubjective standards of behavior. It is from the
alignment between behavior and norm, as well as contextual social and historic salience
of individual norms that behavior is appraised and consequences are derived.
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As a framework of exploration in the field of IR, norm contestation plays a central role in
areas of global policy in which outcomes have been deemed illegitimate from
contextually applied norms or within specific cases, within which subjective
interpretations of different actors deviate from each other and articulated intersubjective
standards. However, as Antje Wiener has outlined, there has been a ‘loss of conceptual
precision’ surrounding contestation, as well as its ‘meta-organizing’ utility through
bridging the legality-legitimacy gap1. Norms are not directly causal, nor can their
substance or argued utility be derived outside of their contextual ‘meaning-in-use’2.
Through periods of contestation, actors apply their own understandings of norms in
unique situations as they pursue their relative interests within a political environment.
While external and intersubjective, different actors have at times diverging subjective
appraisals of norm’s meanings as well as understandings of how they should be applied.
Furthermore, the level of salience of various norms including nonintervention vary by
actors and contextual situations amongst various state, regional, and international orders,
in which actors make decisions with agency reflecting interests that include normative
and non-normative considerations. Identifying the various material, alliance, and wider-
normative interests within empirical in-depth approaches then provide greater clarity
surrounding the various complex factors that can be outlined as ‘at play’ in any particular
situation. As periods of ‘strategic social construction’ between subjective appraisals and
intersubjective normative structures3, periods of contestation illuminate norm’s applied
meanings and influence – providing insight into how particular norms inform the
behaviors of international actors. Taken over multiple comparative cases may provide
insight into the boundaries of specific norms and how they are maintained, changed, or
displaced. This approach seems to serve as an under-utilized methodological framework
1 Antje Wiener, A Theory of Contestation (London: Springer, 2014), p. 3.
2 Antje Wiener, ‘Enacting Meaning-In-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations’,
Review of International Studies 35(1) (2009), 175-193.
3 Nicola P. Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, Intervention and Norm Contestation: China’s Stance on Darfur in the
UN Security Council’, Security Dialogue 41(3) (2010), 323-344.
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to address the influence of norms within particular global policy issue areas in which
normative structures conflict.
The contestation of nonintervention in the face of R2P serves as a particularly relevant
lens to address the evolution of norms from a theoretical standpoint, but with practical
implications for the projection of force at the international level. This highlights the
continued salience of nonintervention as an argued means to ensure international order
across recent cases of mass atrocities through limiting the potential for wider
international conflict as well as an argued means to protect the population itself.
Crucially, not all arguments against intervention in cases of large scale human rights
atrocities reflect the salience of nonintervention as a norm. With R2P’s increased
promotion as an emerging norm, state policymakers have argued against intervention for
pragmatic rationale aligned with potential political or material costs. Addressing the
wider normative context and complex factors within specific humanitarian crises then
provides greater insight into how these norms are interpreted and applied – particularly
across sequential cases. This approach highlights how R2P has been increasingly
engrained within the international political lexicon as a framework to address human
rights atrocities. However, the norm of nonintervention has still been invoked as a means
to ensure that political community’s institutions reflect domestic legitimacy, which
humanitarian intervention would fail to secure. R2P’s Third pillar articulation that
nonintervention serves as an illegitimate response in the most severe cases of mass
atrocity crimes pits the normative structures against each other in which actors with
different subjective interpretations of meanings and their contextual application contest
the most legitimate response at the international level as the manifestation of conflicting
interpretations of how to best secure international order. What this lens provides to wider
scholarship is the normative promotion of a non-action, as well as a deeply embedded
norm contested by emerging structures. This outlines how a prohibitive norm as an action
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may still be argued at an international level as an action, illustrating more than
international apathy devoid of carrot and stick material gains or losses. Rather, a
prohibitive norm may be promoted as the legitimate norm under calculated reasoning.
Far from a-political, the practice of nonintervention may have profound consequences
promoted by international actors in an effort to foster their own conceptions of
international order and shape articulations of emerging norms such as R2P. Addressing
the transformation or even erosion of a firmly settled or internalized norm provides
insight into how norms may be unsettled and reduced in salience through history.
Interaction between Non-Intervention and R2P
Drawing from the normative context of the 1990s, mass refugee flows, economic loss,
and the debilitating effects to regional and international infrastructure were cited as
paralleling intra-state humanitarian crises, with conflict and instability permeating
regional boundaries. Civil war, state failure, and large-scale atrocities through state
inability to retain order were increasingly argued as detrimental to wider stability, and
more readily emphasized through globalized media and an expansion of global civil
society. Arguably legitimate interventionary practices and failure to better address
protection measures in Rwanda and Kosovo drove support for norm entrepreneurs to
introduce R2P. The concept’s expansive articulation of a responsibility to prevent, react,
and rebuild served as type of normative catchall – which while contentious, meant that it
could draw from the wider promotion of universal human rights, peacekeeping, and state
building. Through contestation leading to the SOD, a level of consensus supported
arguments that egregious human rights abuses should be identified and prevented, aided
through wider global and international institutions, and halted in those most severe cases
of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity through the
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UNSC.
This conception of international society, which provides the space for normative change,
illuminates how shifts in values and beliefs surrounding international order can shape the
interests and behavior of international actors. Through the norm’s emergence, it has
served as a manifestation of normative context, while providing a permissive
environment for civilian protection globally. Skeptics could argue that international
behavior is detached from any normative development aligned with R2P. From this
perspective, because R2P continues to be contested, it has nominal utility and cannot
substantively shape the behavior of international actors. At most, R2P would serve only
as a means to politically launder self-interested behavior that would occur regardless.
However, following R2P’s introduction as a complex norm or doctrinal framework in
2001, its projection at the international level has been matched with advocacy, gaining a
foothold in international political rhetoric, institutional developments within states,
regional, and international institutions, and been reflective through state voting records in
the UN paralleled with resource contributions – engraining itself within the normative
architecture of international order. Through this progression, R2P has been embedded in
the normative articulations of states and institutional actors including the UN Secretary
General’s report on ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, growing body of UNSC
resolutions, as well as in individual states such as the United States’ 2010 National
Security Strategy4. State actors, regional bodies, and institutions have more recently
began developing strategies and operational planning for civilian protection purposes that
previously didn’t exist. Through more targeted economic sanctions, increased diplomatic
pressure placed on lower systematic atrocities, expanding global civil society activism,
and peacekeeping initiatives informed by R2P, the norm has sufficiently diffused to serve
as normative resource that actors use to legitimate their behavior and promote advocacy
4 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, accessed 18 October 2015,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, p. 48.
230
for the protection of populations5.
Throughout these humanitarian crises, R2P has permeated international discourse, and
made a substantive contribution to civilian protection through its ability to shape debate
as a resource international actors use. In short, R2P has not gone away, but rather
embedded itself within the wider framework of international norms. Ongoing
contestation and implementation of the norm’s precepts have served to better clarify the
norms meaning aligned with the SOD, reflective of a seeming solidarist acceptance that
states have a responsibility to protect their populations from egregious abuses, with the
international community able to legitimately respond in the most severe cases through the
UNSC. Instead of an inviolable rule of international law and practice, states have been
forced to increasingly justify their noninterventions in cases of mass human rights
atrocities. However, these recurrent cases of mass atrocity crimes have highlighted how
support for intervention under R2P has been limited and constrained by the persistence of
nonintervention. As Jennifer Welsh highlights,
Arguably, RtoP was born in an era when assertive liberalism was at its height, and
sovereign equality looked and smelled reactionary. But as the liberal moment
recedes, the distribution of power shifts globally, the principle of sovereign
equality may enjoy a comeback. If so, it could very well dampen the new climate
of expectations around the responsibility to protect6.
Despite R2P’s normative diffusion, the norm of non-intervention has continued to impact
R2P’s emergence and use. While the principle of sovereign equality is distinct from
nonintervention, the salience of nonintervention through recurrent cases of recent mass
5 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘A chronic protection problem: The DPRK and the Responsibility to Protect’,
International Affairs 91(2).
6 Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Implementing the “Responsibility to Protect”: Where Expectations Meet Reality’,
Ethics and International Affairs 24(4) (2010), 425.
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atrocity crimes illustrates the norm’s persistence as an intersubjective standard of
behavior that continues to serve as a normative barrier to interventionary practice for
humanitarian purposes. The ongoing contestation of nonintervention highlights recurrent
arguments that intervention for humanitarian purposes may not actually protect
conceptions of human dignity or wider international order that it purports to address.
“Despite the popularity of good governance rhetoric, traditional sovereignty norms have
displaced remarkable inertia and resistance to change – at least in the sensitive area of
military intervention”7. In order to establish and maintain a level of domestic order may
at times require violence through civil war or to suppress domestic insurrection. Along
ethno-national fissures or revolutionary uprisings, these conflicts may have a hue of
ethnic cleansing or genocide, with the use of human shields and other tactics by non-state
actors resulting in a level of civilian deaths through the government’s plea to re-establish
domestic stability. As Brad Roth highlights, “A regime’s need to establish legitimacy is
rooted not in aspirational norms, but in the practical difficulties of exercising power… a
political system cannot be built without the loyalty of a critical mass of members of the
political community”8. As this thesis has outlined, state governments have jealously
guarded their political autonomy, reflective of continued salience of nonintervention.
Many in the global South, G77, NAM, as well as major powers and permanent members
of the UNSC continue to play a conservative role towards intervention outside of state
consent or self-defense. This contestation is evident through the “desire of sovereign
states not to see diminution of their sovereign authority. The tenacity of the attachment
can be seen to this day in the reluctance that has been evidence in the Security Council”9.
How this norm of nonintervention has been contested provides a lens to address
constraints on the projection of force at the international level.
7 Theresa Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect (New York: Routledge Press, 2013), p.
151.
8 Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
p. 41.
9 Gareth Evans, ‘When is it right to fight?’, Survival 46(3) (2004), 69.
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Following the institutionalization of R2P in the 2005 SOD, many in the global south
articulated the fear of an expansive normative development of interventionary practice
for its potential to yield a hierarchical order – with powerful states more apt to target
those smaller or weaker constructs plagued by ethno-nationalist violence, insurgencies, or
civil war struggling to retain domestic legitimacy. While in contrast, those more powerful
states challenged an conception that placed expansive obligation to intervene in cases
with high human and economic costs to secure global populations. Both of these
arguments have sound moral basis, with political community’s sometimes dissolving into
civil war or other domestic insurrection requiring autonomy to build and sustain political
orders. Externally however, the projection of force for humanitarian purposes must be
addressed with a sufficient level of caution. Interventionary practice involves killing and
also being killed – a costly and morally challenging decision that risks the loss of military
members and resources while imposing a level of civilian hardship through an
unavoidable level of collateral damage. As Eric Heinze and Brent Steele outline, the
generation of populations and policymakers that experienced the failures of inaction in
the 1990s may have built a level of consensus around humanitarian intervention, and lost
site of the moral basis for its legal proscription. Because the legitimacy of norms is also
impact by appraised results, the continuation of policy’s promoting intervention for
humanitarian purposes may have a deteriorating impact on the norm of R2P.
That is, what tends to open up the critical space is a policy action which goes
disastrously wrong, creating a rupture and an opening whereby a norm, and the
generation invoking it, gets delegitimized. This occurs not only because of the
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action’s consequences, but because of the generation’s inability to see any fault in
the worldview which led to the policy action10.
Rather than a lack of military capability or politicized decisions of the UNSC fueling
pragmatic international responses, the interaction between R2P and the norm of
nonintervention serves as an important lens to address ongoing state international
behavior, with increased global activism for human rights protection, diplomatic
pressure, and peacekeeping activism, but limited interventionary practice mirroring R2Ps
invocation. R2P’s third pillar has challenged the boundaries of nonintervention,
promoting expansive areas where force could be more legitimately applied to include
responses to mass cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity authorized by the UNSC – “bending the meaning of ‘international threats to the
peace’ as defined by the Council under Chapter VII”11. However, where R2P has
arguably had limited influence is through its Third pillar in regard to intervention for
humanitarian purposes, highlighting limited consensus at the international level
surrounding the legitimacy of intervention in concrete cases. While a wide body of
international actors have affirmed that populations should be protected from egregious
abuses with support from the international community, the projection of international
force has been argued by a number of critical world powers as a practice that may not
serve to beneficially secure the domestic population, and would be a potentially divisive
practice for international order. Tracing these cases of mass atrocities at the international
level paralleled with invocations of R2P have highlighted the norm of nonintervention’s
continued influence as a resource. States embracing R2P may implement nonintervention
for pragmatic reasons, or come to the rational conclusion that the international projection
10 Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele, ‘The (D)evolution of a Norm: R2P, the Bosnia Generation and
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya’ in Aiden Hehir and Robert Murray (eds.), Libya: The Responsibility to
Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 153.
11 Michael W. Doyle, ‘International ethics and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Studies Review
13(1) (2011), 82.
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of force would not serve to positively impact a humanitarian crisis. However, wider
international context and norm contestation between R2P and nonintervention serves as
an important lens to address the persistence of nonintervention, informing actors of the
utility and consequences of projecting force for humanitarian purposes while outlining
the boundaries of R2P in an evolving international normative order.
A Review of Empirical Cases
Sri Lanka illustrated the salience of nonintervention through its position as the default
norm. Failing to even formally address the crisis within UN bodies, consensus was not
reached until the final weeks in the UNHRC, with the Special Session occurring after the
civil war had ended with a resolution explicitly affirming the norm of nonintervention.
With limited access following the removal of most international NGO and UN staff from
the northern Vanni in late 2008, what constrained institutional access was available
diminished by early 2009 as the government’s campaign and civilian deaths spiked.
Faced with conflicting interests on the ground between protection advocacy and access to
the conflict zone and expanding population within the IDP camps, UN organs in Sri
Lanka withheld information. Institutional failures further limited exposure of information
to international media, member states, or the nature of atrocities with government
culpability under international law not emphasized within UN institutional bodies.
Furthermore, the LTTE’s persistent terrorist tactics under the post-9/11 international
environment limited its political support from foreign powers. This also meant that
diaspora populations that could have played a critical role in rallying support for
protection measures were treated with suspicion for their political and financial backing
of a recognized terrorist organization. Illustrating the influence of liberal human rights
norms and international advocacy for civilian protection, a number of regional and wider
international powers did decrease their nominal trade and military aid with the Sri
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Lankan government following its failed peace process from roughly 2004-2006.
However, this had the effect of driving the government politically towards regional
powers including India, China, and Pakistan – the same actors that politically shielded the
regime’s later actions from formal consideration at the UN. Highlighting the influence of
norm localization at the regional level, regional powers seemed explicitly skeptical of
R2P with nonintervention retaining a deeply internalized role. Furthermore, despite
limited initial knowledge of the scale or nature of atrocities, even Western actors seemed
to limit their condemnation and remain normatively conditioned to nonintervention due
to an articulated unwillingness to take coercive measures against the regime in a de facto
civil war which would have perpetuated the domestic struggle and likely contributed to
the further survival of the LTTE, even under recognized mass atrocities with civilians
caught between belligerent lines. While R2P had emerged with institutional recognition
and was invoked by member states and NGOs, a lack of understanding of what the norm
obligated international institutions and actors to do limited international consensus, with
the norm of nonintervention playing a substantive role in affirming the regime’s authority
to pursue domestic order at the expense of human rights protection for a segment of its
population.
However, the articulated illegitimacy of the Sri Lankan regime’s actions that emerged
months and years following served as an outcry for greater human rights protection and
accountability. The norm of R2P’s influence was then reflected through its use as a
structure to appraise the actions of the regime and failures to international actors to
properly address the crisis. Recurrent UN institutional reports, international media
productions, and assertions of international actors for greater accountability caste Sri
Lanka as a negative case study for international protection – with institutional changes
including greater emphasis on ‘human rights up front’ for UN organs and R2P convening
mechanisms for Under-Secretary Generals emphasizing a necessity to address future
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crises through a protection lens. Sri Lanka as a case study then served as a data point in
the wider normative context leading into international debate following the Secretary
General’s Report on ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ in the summer
following Sri Lanka’s humanitarian crisis with subsequent UNGA debate more firmly
articulating the SOD’s three-pillar framework leading into further cases addressed in this
thesis.
When Libya emerged several years later, very different factors were at play. Catching the
international community largely off-guard, the wave of revolutions in the Arab Spring
from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya dominated international media attention from the
beginning stages of uprising. Qaddafi’s track record of foreign adventurism and support
of terrorism meant that the authoritarian regime was uniquely reviled despite its decade
of weapon disarmament and cooperation with western actors through the GWOT. When
the uprising sparked, reports of airstrikes and mass atrocities in the thousands ignited
international calls for protection measures. If R2P could fit an implementation
framework, Libya would uniquely match it with a linear sequence of international
condemnation through UNSC press statements, met with formal consideration and two
UNSC Resolutions – first with economic sanctions and ICC referral, and subsequent
Resolution 1973 authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect the population12.
Building a progressive international response including military force under an explicit
threat of mass atrocities, the international community invoked R2P and moved towards
decisive protection. While a level of confirmed atrocities and explicit intent to cleanse
Benghazi provided considerable political leverage, the speed and decisiveness of the
response to a case of imminent (rather than confirmed ongoing) mass atrocities provides
a particular precedent for R2P. Furthermore, in 1990s cases in which authorized
12 Robert W. Murray, ‘Humanitarianism, Responsibility or Rationality? Evaluating Intervention as State
Strategy’ in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds.), Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of
Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 30.
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interventions under humanitarian auspices did take place, there were implicit citations in
resolutions of the ‘exceptional’ or ‘unique’ circumstances arguably to avoid opinio juris
precedence – devoid in the Libyan resolution13. This was centered by the fact that
delegations clearly articulated the imminent threat of mass atrocities in Benghazi, with
inaction in the council widely recognized to result in a bloodbath of thousands.
Aligned with critical constructivism and theoretical assumptions undergirding my
research, R2P through this case in relation to nonintervention was interpreted with a
variance of subjective meanings across actors. Canadian government officials voiced
support for R2P as a means of promoting democracy in Libya14. While the United
Kingdom is perhaps one of the very few to articulate that intervention for humanitarian
purposes may be ‘legal’ without UNSC approval15. The African Union articulated the
crisis as firmly within its regional sphere of influence, with intervention an illegitimate
response. In comparison, the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council pushed for a
more decisive response and echoed a call for Security Council authorization for
intervention. Despite a level of economic and military ties, the Chinese delegation in the
UNSC affirming the importance of the Arab League’s regional support, and Russia
skeptically articulating the necessity for action under considerable reservations with
neither was willing to block Resolution 1973. The Libyan case then served to clarify the
boundaries of R2P in terms of the SOD applying only to those four mass atrocity crimes
of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes through UNSC
authorization. However, while there was widespread articulation of the illegitimacy of
13 Sir Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention’ in Jennifer M. Welsh (ed.),
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 79.
14 Kim Richard Nossal, ‘The Use – and Misuse – of R2P: The Case of Canada’ in Aidan Hehir and Robert
Murray (eds.), Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 116.
15 See: UK Government, ‘Chemical Weapon Use By Syrian Regime- UK Government Legal Position’, 29




Libyan actions against unarmed protesters fueling measures and accountability in Libya,
the legitimacy of any intervention was comparably thin, and critically assumed to limit
the immediate threat of civilian atrocities in Benghazi and play an air-policing rather than
active role towards regime change.
Even with a clearly articulated threat to cleanse Benghazi, consistent reports of civilian
atrocities, a number of BRICS powers – all of whom where on the UNSC in 2011 –
echoed the failure to exhaust political measures and that such military force projections
would not limit civilian suffering or address root causes of the crisis or contribute to a
peaceful end of domestic disputes. Germany on the UNSC, with NATO alliance interests
at stake, opposed military action, asserted that intervention could cause further suffering
for the population while other regional and coalition actors with unique resources for the
Libyan conflict refrained from action or providing weak support following initial
contributions. Furthermore, illustrating the fragility of consensus underwriting
intervention, as soon as strikes took place, the Arab League president called for an
immediate end to the military action, with Russia, China, India, Brazil, and number of
other international actors quick to outline that such expansive target sets were not
authorized or helpful with the norm of nonintervention serving as a salient lens to frame
international discourse and behavior.
Where Libya perhaps played the most notable role surrounding the contestation of
nonintervention relates to the impact of protection measures and international assertions
of illegitimacy surrounding how the humanitarian protection operations were conducted,
as well as long-term repercussions of the functional regime change. Illustrating the
cyclical nature of norms in particular foreign policy issue areas, the resulting regime
change and failed rump state of Libya driving wider regional instability has been framed
as a negative case study for R2P by a wide number of major international actors
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including China, India, Brazil, as well as Western powers with officials in the US
highlighting the unfortunate inability of Libyan actors to consolidate a legitimate national
authority following the 2011 revolution. Outside of any contention surrounding R2P’s
influence, as Justin Morris outlines, “Libya served as a highly significant backdrop for
the UNSC debates over how to respond to the situation in Syria. In this context it soon
became clear that the shadow it cast was a dark one, both for the people of Syria and for
the concept of R2P”16. Libya’s dissolution into chaos was perhaps an unavoidable
consequence of a power vacuum within a political poorly developed state construct.
However, the power vacuum left from Qaddafi’s ouster was artificially decisive with
NATO-led air support. Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that in future
humanitarian crises, Russia “would never allow the Security Council to authorize
anything similar to what happened in Libya”17. India’s Permanent Representative to the
UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, commented, ‘Libya has given R2P a bad name’18. As the
unwillingness to address the case of Sri Lanka within international bodies can be seen to
have highlighted the illegitimacy of the international response, the Libyan case reflected
a different conclusion in which the norm of nonintervention can be seen to have
strengthened in relation to R2P through the argued way it was carried out, but also the
failure of intervention under R2P to address the root causes of instability which lead to
mass atrocities – cyclically influencing normative assertions in following cases. What the
Libya case also highlights are distinct arguments for nonintervention as a salient and
legitimate norm across wider cases, particularly of civil war or interventions that would
functionally impose regime-change. International consensus for intervention to save
unarmed protesters was shaped towards overt partiality, which was ultimately argued as
16 Justin Morris, ‘Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum’, International Affairs
89(5) (2013), 1274.
17 Alan J. Kuperman, ‘Obama’s Libya debacle’, Foreign Affairs 94(2) (2015), 66-77.
18 Philippe Bolopion, ‘After Libya, the question: To protect or depose?’, The LA Times, 25 August 2011,
accessed 14 June 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/ 25/opinion/la-oe-bolopion-libya-
responsibility-t20110825.
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an illegitimate action and representative of a practice that fails to address the root causes
of instability. This example has served as a salient-counter point to R2P’s invocation in
Syria.
While slower to devolve, Syria as a unique uprising of the Arab Spring also faced a
revolution met with government violence and ultimately mass atrocities. The Assad
regime’s pursued strategy of nominal political reform and violent repression spun what
was a call for political reforms into a full-scale civil war. While alleging to wage war
against domestic extremists, these claims ultimately evolved into a self-fulfilling
prophecy, with Islamic extremists from across the globe flooding into Syria. Unable to
build an effective opposition authority outside or within the country, anti-government
forces now exist on a spectrum from the nominally secular Free Syrian Army, Kurdish
populations in the north, the Al-Qaeda aligned Al-Nusra Front, and extremist Islamic
State amongst a wider kaleidoscope of opposition groups fighting with pro-government
forces as well as amongst themselves. However, while opposition groups have carried out
mass executions and other widespread atrocities, the Syrian government’s pursued
counter-insurgency strategy has played a disproportionate role in human suffering.
Designed to reduce insurgent territorial control through displacement of the civilian
population from areas of its control, pro-government forces have sieged rebelling or
insurgent-held population centers, targeted doctors and medical facilities while stemming
international access, medical aid, food, and water. Using indiscriminant and widespread
weaponry against these areas, tens of thousands of non-combatants have perished in cases
of mass atrocity crimes with recognized government culpability. In 2013, the alleged use
of chemical weapons by government forces killed over 1,000 in a single set of strikes.
Tracing the contestation of nonintervention through the Syrian case from the beginning of
violence in 2011 until mid-2015, illustrates how the norm has informed the decisions of
actors.
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While UN organs and bodies have recurrently addressed the Syrian case with a number of
resolutions invoking R2P, lack of consensus in the Security Council has halted any
precedence towards humanitarian intervention. While faced with explicit vetoes in the
UNSC from Russia and China, even Western actors have been unwilling to project force
through articulations that the projection of force in Syria may not bring humanitarian
consequences with intervention devoid of UNSC authorization for humanitarian purposes
lacking necessary legitimacy. What this reflects may be tied to a number of complex
considerations within a web of proxy and alliance interests with tens of state and
hundreds of domestic factions involved in the ongoing crisis. Contextually, with a
substantial air defense network and advanced standing military, any action against the
regime would be violently challenged from within, and by strong international political
partnerships from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah abroad. And although humanitarian
atrocities are carried out on mass scales, the root causes of instability within Syria are
complex domestic political matters tied to a plurality of actors and considerations in
which the projection of military force for humanitarian purposes may not play a clearly
beneficial role, and could negatively impact the humanitarian crisis. Syria has thus
highlighted the complexities of international and regional political and operational
fissures surrounding R2P, with Syria illustrating a case of manifest failure with the deaths
of tens of thousands of civilians and the regime’s unwillingness to countenance foreign
interference. Syria differs from many cases applicable to R2P in that the recognized
authorities of Cote d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of
the Congo all provided a level of regime-consent to foreign interference. In contrast, the
Assad regime has decried any foreign involvement with ‘insistence on absolute
sovereignty and readiness to prolong the conflict without negotiating with the
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opposition’19. Like Libya and Sri Lanka, the implementation of R2P in Syria places in
conflict diverging normative conceptions or international order, with Syria as an
important case study for norm contestation in relation to R2P and nonintervention.
No Syrian actor within or outside has been able to build a unified opposition to stitch the
country back together. While continued conflict has resulted in a factitious state of
various pockets of authority, the projection of force for humanitarian purposes has been
contested internationally as an policy choice that may not have an impact on the regime’s
counter-insurgency strategy and could likely bring about further suffering for the
minority Alawite and Christian populations. Although the regime is culpable for mass
atrocity crimes, its collapse would herald what many have framed as a Libya repeat.
Since 2013, the conflict has increasingly regionalized, with Iranian, Lebanese-Hezbollah,
and now Russian units directly fighting alongside pro-government forces. On the
opposing spectrum, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have funded and armed
progressively more extremists opposition groups. Furthermore, the rise of ISIS has been
recognized as international threat to international peace and security, gaining wide swaths
of territory from government control in both Syria and Iraq. Thus, under a web of various
competing interests and actors globally, nonintervention and R2P have served as
normative resources, but of various considerations contributing to limited consensus
supportive of humanitarian intervention. The high level of international activism, non-
military protection measures and invocation of R2P suggests that R2P may in fact not be
a weak or meaningless international norm in relation to nonintervention, but has been
trumped by contextual rationale and complexities underwriting the crisis in Syria.
19 Derek Averre and Lance Davies, ‘Russia, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect:
The case of Syria’, International Affairs 91(4) (2015), 833.
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Within the modern international normative order, these cases highlight a seeming erosion
of nonintervention relative to R2P in that international actors most firmly in the UNSC no
longer consider nonintervention as absolute norm relative to egregious human rights
abuses. Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, the action of nonintervention does not
necessarily reflect its salience as a norm. Wider international context such as the GWOT,
availability of international forces from major powers, geographic factors, and the wider
pragmatic material or alliance of interests of states interact within the lattice of
international norms - greatly impact their invocation and implementation.
Implications for Intervention
Intervention and its impact on domestic political orders is more complex than many
policymakers are willing to recognize. External actors may not fully understand the
character or scope of intra-state atrocities or the grievances that underwrite domestic
crises. Intervention may fail to bring internal stability, with the complexities of domestic
political orders illuminating the boundaries of what foreign intervention can accomplish.
In response to mass atrocities, the projection of force has been seen as a tool to either
coercively impact the calculations of domestic actors carrying out specific behaviors or as
a means of denial of area or resources to commit such atrocities. More research must be
accomplished surrounding those types of interventionary practices that might be able to
change the calculus of intra-state actors and protect populations. In Syria, denial was
articulated through a potential no-fly zone or removal of chemical through strategic
strikes. However, coercion provides a separate conception of the projection of force to
induce a shift in behavior – targeting specific actors as a means to halt particular
atrocities. The history of intervention’s ability to accomplish these goals is decidedly
mixed, with wider interventionary practice in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya exposing the
economic costs and complexities in securing domestic order through foreign intervention.
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Rather than reinforcing the practice of humanitarian intervention under R2P’s Third
pillar, recent cases of large-scale human rights abuses committed by state actors have in
many ways reaffirmed the norm of nonintervention. While blatant cases of genocide,
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity were well documented through
these cases, the sad reality is that the human dignity that humanitarian intervention is
meant to protect may not actually be secured through the external projection of force. If
intervention fails to halt atrocities, drives wider international conflict, or lead to further
civilian suffering, humanitarian interventions may be deemed illegitimate – constraining
further practice. Of those cases addressed in this thesis, the only currently stable country
of the three remains Sri Lanka, which has since 2009 carried out democratic elections and
some progression towards reconciliation. This stands in stark contrast with Libya, which
while highlighted as a ‘textbook case’ of decisive intervention, has yielded continued
atrocities with regional and even international instability through the flow of weapons
and fighters. This has seemingly mirrored wider cases of intervention and statebuilding in
Iraq and Afghanistan, highlighting that no matter the size of the military or peacekeeping
forces projected internally, if the intra-state political community cannot build legitimate
institutions to secure order, the stability will likely be unsustainable and violently
challenged.
The three cases addressed in this thesis were selected based on the recognition of
imminent or ongoing mass atrocities crimes pegged with invocation of R2P through the
recent post-2005 international political context. Carrying out atrocities as a means to
regain order, territorial integrity, or monopoly on the use of force served as the basis for
conflict that resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. While not specifically
selecting for cases of civil war, each reflected domestic actors challenging the authority
of existing regimes. Within wider context, military force projection with recognized host-
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state authority consent has been politically less contentious as the cases of Mali, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others have recently attested. However,
international actors have recurrently challenged the potential for humanitarian purposes
in these cases, with projection of external force arguably weighing heavily on domestic
disputes and potential outcomes, while also creating warped incentives for belligerents to
draw international attention and support. Non-intervention as a political action in these
cases of mass atrocities then benefits the government’s military pursuits as the Sri
Lankan victory, or conversely Qaddafi’s regime collapse, highlights. Research on the
relationship between R2P, intervention, and civil war may provide insights into limits of
intervention’s utility.
This illustrates nonintervention’s persistence through articulations that intervention even
in cases of mass atrocities is illegitimate due to its inability to address root causes.
Embracing more pluralist conceptions of international society, state governments
constantly struggle to maintain legitimacy and order which may at times lead to internal
political disputes and conflict. In order to maintain order, which any conception of justice
is based, government’s must be free to address internal crises without the threat of
external intervention in support of terrorist or revolutionaries in the name of human rights
protection.
How nonintervention impacts the behavior of states is through its influence as a resource
that guides or conditions the interests and appraisals of behavior at the international level.
Forming a type of path-dependence, the projection of force devoid of regime consent,
UNSC mandate, or act of self-defense is recognized as a subversion of an existing norm
of legitimate conduct. State actors then appraise contextual cases in relation to normative
and non-normative considerations such as the availability of military resource, and
appraised political or material costs of specific behaviors. This does not mean that states
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are forced to not intervene when their perceived interests align with particular behaviors
which challenge exiting norms, but rather that they serve as one reference point of many
which vary in contextual and historical influence as social constructions.
The contestation of nonintervention as a lens has profound implications for military
planners and foreign policymakers at the international level in that any projection of force
for humanitarian purposes may not have the necessary legitimacy to accomplish its
political aims, with interventions even negatively impacting the very humanitarian crises
they are meant to halt. In this respect, the undergirding normative architecture of
international society fulfills an important role in delineating those behaviors, which are
seen to promote or negatively influence conceptions of international order and justice.
Nonintervention’s enduring salience then reflects its moral and practical utility and serves
as an important constraint on state behavior. While Rwanda and Kosovo exposed this
‘legitimacy gap’ between UNSC decisions and international values and beliefs
surrounding the projection of force for humanitarian purposes, it is still unclear if a
normative architecture which provides a permissive environment for such interventionary
practice would better secure international order.
Conclusion
The continued salience of nonintervention within the normative architecture of the
international order provides a substantive guard to the foreign aggression of states, but
also reflects values and beliefs tide to the conception that international political
communities require the authority to resolve domestic political disputes that may at times
lead to a high level of casualties. Tied to conceptions of popular sovereignty and self-
determination, the legitimacy of domestic government requires a critical mass of support,
which may yield domestic conflict or greater civil war in the most sever cases of dispute
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or perceived illegitimacy by a segment of the population. Because of the nature of
insurgencies, terrorist movements, or other political uprisings, civilian costs may be high.
As domestic crises or conflict yield civilian deaths, or the distinction between combatant
and noncombatants becomes greyed, the political community retains the authority to
ensure security without foreign interference. While these domestic atrocities to secure
domestic order and legitimacy may violate international values and beliefs undergirding
the normative architecture of international order, how nonintervention has maintained
salience highlights its persistence and utility through the seeming inability of foreign
intervention to resolve intra-state political disputes.
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